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ABSTRACT
The American system of governance includes a network of state and local units identified
as either general purpose or special purpose governments. The latter are often aligned
with, but operate independently of, general purpose governments. Even as these special
purpose or special district governments have shown extraordinary growth relative to their
general purpose counterparts, there has been little interest in them or the structural
characteristics that distinguish their systems for maintaining order and assuring
accountable behaviors. In the meanwhile, the literature regarding accountability has been
expanded materially in the last several years leading to debates about its form, component
parts, objectives, and the preferred means for achieving accountability as an end state.
While these concepts may have application to special districts, inquiry has yet to extend
to the particular devices required to monitor or control these governments.

This research effort closes the knowledge gap by linking this little studied form of
government with recent ideas about accountability and the role that citizen participation
plays in developing or advancing accountable behaviors. The analysis applies an
adaptation of the well known model developed by Romzek and Dubnick (1987) to create
an accountability framework and documents the role that public participation plays in
influencing accountable behaviors. The analysis culminates in a multivariate model that
examines the role of pubic participation in the context of competing influences that might
also force accountable behaviors.
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The research concludes that participation can be an important influence in shaping
specific forms of accountable behavior but that other factors are also essential to
sustaining accountability. Most notable among these other factors is the role of the
workplace environment, defined here in terns of employee interaction, ethics training,
purpose, overall sense of commitment and other attributes.

iv

This paper and its contents are dedicated to my wife Terry Travis. None of this would
have been possible without her patience, encouragement, and support. Absolutely, more
than any single person, she shared the burdens of this time consuming, sometimes
frustrating, and always demanding effort.

Terry, I cannot thank you enough for your love and selflessness during this very stressful
period of our marriage. You always seem to be there for me. Now it’s my turn.

v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many people guided me through the preparation of this paper. Although this paper has
been my project and responsibility, these people showed extraordinary support and
commitment to its completion.

I have to thank in particular my committee chair, Dr. Xiaohu Wang who, at the personal
request of my former chair Dr. Evan Berman, agreed to advise me knowing very little
about the course of the research I was pursuing. Dr Berman, now at Louisiana State
University, has continued to remain involved even as Dr. Naim Kapucu, new to UCF,
agreed to become a committee member. Not last among the faculty, Dr Wendell Lawther
requires acknowledgment because, in addition to sitting on the committee, he is largely
responsible for my decision to enroll in this program.

Returning to graduate school at my age was difficult in itself and required extreme
adjustments in my personal and well established professional life. Learning to cope with
interlibrary

loans,

electronic

journals,

and

systems

seemingly

designed

for

undergraduates were continuing challenges to me, my family, friends, professional
colleagues and other students in the program. These challenges, however, created bonds,
and together these people helped me navigate a maze of study, classes, talk and paper
work to achieve this goal.

vi

As a member of the first public affairs cohort, I am especially aware of the support and
friendship that comes from my other classmates with varied interests and backgrounds.
The students from this group who have already graduated have set a standard that has to
be maintained or exceeded. Several of them will be good friends through life. I have to
thank Mike Neidhart and Jorge Figueredo in particular because we pushed or prodded
each other through seven years. I have a special thank you for Margaret Mlachak, the
department’s assistant, who has always managed to make things work as presumably they
were intended.

I would be badly remiss not to thank my partners and staff at work who have tolerated
my frequent office absences and my incessant use of office resources. They have made
extraordinary professional sacrifices to support my program of study. My office team is
almost like family -- I’ve been friends and colleagues with most of the people I work with
for almost half my life -- and I know they share my sense of accomplishment.

I have other friends to thank as well, and I’m confident they know who they are. They
read and (re)read drafts and helped me plan mailing strategies to unknown people in
distant places. And certainly without the responses of almost 300 individuals who took
their time to answer my survey and, in some cases respond to personal questions, none of
this would have been possible.

vii

Finally, of course, there is my real family, my wife, my parents, my brother and his
family and my sister and her family. All of these loved ones have watched me and
encouraged me and now applaud. They have made extraordinary personal sacrifices to
accommodate me for many, many years. I can’t thank any of them enough.

I hesitate to call this dissertation a labor of love but I’m proud of the result.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

xii

LIST OF TABLES

xiii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1

1.1

Overview and General Perspective

2

1.2

Research Questions

4

1.3

Contributions to the Literature

6

1.4

The Research Effort

9

1.5

Organization of the Study

11

CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1

Special Districts and Their Role
in the System of Governance

14

15

2.1.1

History and Growth of Special Districts

15

2.1.2

The New Public Management and its Relationship to
Special Districts

18

Features of Special Districts that Influence Their
Responses to Public Participation and Accountability

22

Summary: Special Districts and Their Problems

44

2.1.3
2.1.4

2.2 Foundations and Principles of Accountability

45

2.2.1

Normative Interpretations of Accountability

47

2.2.2

The Social Justification for Public Participation
as a Tool for Achieving Accountability

49

How Accountability Occurs:
The Romzek and Dubnick Model

59

2.2.3

2.3 Alternative Perspectives on Accountability:
A Revised Foundation for Examining Accountability in Special
Districts
2.3.1

Five Dimensions of Accountability

ix

61
65

2.3.2

Role of Public Participation in Context of
Revised Model

2.4 Public Participation and Its Role
in Accountability
2.4.1

Concerns about Public Participation

71
74
78

2.5 Implications of the Framework
for Research Hypotheses

81

2.6 Summary

83

CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

87

3.1 Model Overview and Description
of Key Variable Relationships

87

3.2 Research Strategy

91

3.3 Survey Development

94

3.4 Population and Sampling Frame

95

3.5 Distribution of Survey and Data Collection

102

3.6 Instrumentation and Measurement

103

3.6.1

Public Participation

103

3.6.2

Accountability

105

3.6.3

Control Variables

115

3.7 Construction of Accountability Criteria

118

3.8 Follow-Up and Interpretation

119

3.9 Anticipated Outcomes Based on Model

119

3.9.1
3.9.2

3.9.3

Research Question 1: What Is the Importance of
Accountability in the Administration of Special Districts

119

Research Question 2: In What Ways, if at all, Does
Public Participation Affect Organizational
Accountability And Does Its Influence Vary by
Operational or Program Focus

120

Research Question 3: Are There Observable Differences
in the Way That Public Participation Affects Each
System or Dimension of Accountability?

120

3.10 Summary

121

x

CHAPTER 4. DATA AND ANALYSIS

122

4.1 Organizational Profile of Respondents: Perceptions and Realities
of Accountability

122

4.1.1

Perceptions of Accountability

124

4.1.2

Realities of Accountability

126

4.2 The Initial Stages of Model Building: Description of Key Variables
Considered
4.2.1
4.2.2

131

Reliability Analysis: Construction of Index
Values used in Multivariate Analysis

134

Non Index Measures or Variables

138

4.3 Model Building: Univariate
and Bivariate Procedures

140

4.3.1

Univariate Analysis

141

4.3.2

Univariate Findings

142

4.3.3

Bivariate Analysis

146

4.3.4

Bivariate Findings

155

4.4 Model Building:
Multivariate Procedures

158

4.4.1

Overview of the Preferred Multivariate Model (Model 1)

159

4.4.2

Multivariate Analysis, Preferred Model (Model 1), All
Cases Retained

160

Multivariate Assumptions, Preferred Model (Model 1),
All Cases Retained

163

Outlier Analysis, Initial Model (Model 1), All Cases
Retained

170

Multivariate Analysis, Revised Model (Model 2),
Thirteen Cases Removed

172

Multivariate Analysis, Revised Model (Model 3), Four
Cases Removed

174

4.4.3
4.4.4
4.4.5
4.4.6

4.5 Model Building: Confirmation
and Reconciliation of Three Models
4.5.1

Interpretations and Comparisons with
Bivariate Analysis and Findings

xi

176
177

4.6 Application of Data and Analysis to
Research Questions and Hypotheses
4.7 Summary
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

179
183
185

5.1 Summary of Findings

186

5.2 Voices and Participation

189

5.3 Accountability of Special Districts

194

5.4 Implications for Public Administrators

196

5.5 Suggestions for Future Research

199

5.6 Limitations of the Current Study

201

APPENDIX A: COMPARISONS BETWEEN SPECIAL PURPOSE AND
GENERAL PURPOSE GOVERNMENTS

204

APPENDIX B: HISTOGRAMS ASSOCIATED WITH KEY
VARIABLES ANALYZED

209

APPENDIX C: SURVEY

212

APPENDIX D: IRB APPROVAL LETTER

224

REFERENCES

227

xii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1

Basic Accountability Framework

60

Figure 2.2

Form and Content of Accountability in Response to Situation

63

Figure 3.1

Relationship and Interaction Among Key Variables

89

Figure 4.1

Histograms Associated with Key Variables Analyzed

164

Figure 4.2

Partial Regression Plots Associated with Key Variables, Model 1

166

Figure 4.3

Scatterplot, ZRESID/ZPRED, Model 1

170

Figure 4.4

Outliers and Influentials, Model 1

171

Figure 4.5

Scatterplot, ZRESID/ZPRED, Model 2

174

Figure 4.6

Scatterplot, ZRESID/ZPRED, Model 3

176

xiii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1

Historical Growth in Special Districts and Local
General Purpose Governments

16

Features Distinguishing Special Districts from General
Purpose Governments, Operations and Structure

27

Features Distinguishing Special Districts from General
Purpose Governments, Accountability Structures

29

Table 2.4

Form and Content of Accountability

66

Table 3.1

Inventory of Large Special Districts, Their
Function(s), and Relationship to Sampling Frame

96

Table 3.2A

Construction of the Sampling Frame Used in the Analysis

97

Table 3.2B

Sampling Frame, By Type of Special District

97

Table 3.2C

Sampling Frame, By Total Employment

98

Table 3.3A

Public Participation, Accessibility,
Paths to Information, Staff and System Resources

105

Public Participation, Permeability: Opportunities to
Engage the Organization at Specific Task Levels

106

Public Participation, Transparency: Embedded
Attitudes Toward Open Governance

106

Accountability, the Administrative Dimension:
Presence of Management Controls Intended to Assure
Routine Command and Control

107

Accountability, the Professional Dimension: Presence of
Industry Guidelines, and Procedures Intended to Create
Standards of Practice

108

Accountability, the Political Dimension: Behavioral
Conduct That Suggests Stewardship and Presence of
Leadership Integrity

108

Accountability, the Market Dimension: Responsive
Service Practices Institutionalized by Consumer
Oriented Demands

109

Table 2.2
Table 2.3

Table 3.3B
Table 3.3C
Table 3.4A

Table 3.4B

Table 3.4C

Table 3.4D

xiv

Table 3.4E

Table 3.5A

Accountability, the Legal Dimension: The Presence of
Rules and Regulations That Assure a Minimum
Standard of Conduct
Internal Controls: Organizational Attributes That
Influence the Manner in Which Deliberations and
Policies Are Shaped

109
115

Table 3.5B

External Controls: Environmental Attributes That
Influence the Manner in Which Deliberations and
Policies Are Shaped

116

Table 4.1

Frequencies Associated with Survey Questions Probing
Accountability and its Role in Governance

125

Table 4.2A

Criteria for Assessing a RIGOROUS Standard of Accountability

128

Table 4.2B

Criteria for Assessing a MEDIUM Standard of Accountability

128

Table 4.2C

Criteria for Assessing a LOW Standard of Accountability

128

Table 4.3

Comparisons in Standards of Accountability

129

Table 4.4A

Descriptive Statistics, Variables Associated with Dimensions of
Accountability

132

Descriptive Statistics, Variables Associated with Public
Participation and its Role in Accountability

133

Attributes and Questions Associated with Key Index Variables,
Models 1,2, and 3

135

Attributes and Questions Associated with Key non-Index
Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3

139

Frequencies for Likert Scale, non-Index Variables,
Models 1, 2, and 3

140

Table 4.8

Tests of Normality, Kolmogorov-Smirnov

142

Table 4.9A

Spearman Bivariate Correlation Matrix,
Key Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3

148

Spearman Bivariate Correlation Matrix
Key Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3

149

Spearman Bivariate Correlation Matrix
Key Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3

149

Table 4.10A Pearson’s Bivariate Correlation Matrix
Key Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3

152

Table 4.10B Pearson’s Bivariate Correlation Matrix
Key Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3

153

Table 4.4B
Table 4.5
Table 4.6
Table 4.7

Table 4.9B
Table 4.9C

xv

Table 4.10C Pearson’s Bivariate Correlation Matrix
Key Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3

153

Table 4.11

Coefficients, Model 1, ORGACT Dependent

162

Table 4.12

Variance Inflation Factors, Model 1, ORGACT Dependent

165

Table 4.13

Coefficients, Model 2, ORGACT Dependent

172

Table 4.14

Coefficients, Model 3, ORGACT Dependent

175

xvi

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The American system of governance includes a network of state and local units
identified as either general purpose or special purpose governments. The latter are
often aligned with, but operate independently of, general purpose governments.
Even as these special purpose or special district governments have shown
extraordinary growth relative to their general purpose counterparts, there has been
little interest in them or the structural characteristics that distinguish their systems
for maintaining order and assuring accountable behaviors. In the meanwhile, the
literature regarding accountability has been expanded materially in the last several
years leading to debates about its form, component parts, objectives, and the
preferred means for achieving accountability as an end state. While these concepts
may have application to the special districts, inquiry has yet to extend to the
particular devices required to monitor or control these governments.

This dissertation seeks to close this knowledge gap by linking this little studied
form of government with recent ideas about accountability and the role that citizen
participation plays in developing or advancing accountable behaviors. By providing
a defined analytical structure, the research offers a model that may have application
to forms of government other than the special district or special purpose unit.

The research indicates that participation is a key variable in shaping an
organization’s commitment to accountability but it also indicates that the work
environment can be nurtured to enhance accountability. Taken together, these
findings

suggest

strategies

or

approaches

that

administrators

can

take

simultaneously to engage their constituents and to cultivate an ethos that is itself
based on a standard of accountable behavior.

1.1 Overview and General Perspective
In 1967, there were fewer than 22,000 independent special district and special
purpose governments in the United States. By 2002, exclusive of elected school
boards, there were an estimated 35,000 of these units engaged in the direct
production or provision of varied public services including those associated with
public safety, libraries, environmental concerns, conservation practices, water and
waste water collection and distribution, healthcare, housing, power generation,
recreation and other activities (U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau
[USDC], 1997). These numbers compare with approximately 35,000 local
governments in 1967 (USDC, 1997), up to about 36,000 of these units in 2002
(Turk, 2002), which in many cases are providing similar services.

In contrast to the number of local municipalities which actually declined from 1997
to 2002, the steady growth of special district governments hints at their
attractiveness for certain kinds of activities. Their utility as a vehicle for delivering
2

or implementing services, however, is not without controversy (Bollens, 1961;
Bottomley, 2000; Foster, 1997; Henriques, 1986; Mitchell, 1992, 1999; Moe, 2001;
Walsh, 1978).

Easily perceived as extensions of the general purpose governments that may have
played a role in creating them, it is reasonable to assume that special district
governments will act in the broader public interest (Bottomley, 2000). Implicitly,
however, the relationship between citizen and government carries an obligation to
give affected constituencies a voice in policy and implementation (Box, 1992, 1999;
Hirschman, 1970; Innes, 1992; Paul, 1991; Walters, Aydelotte, & Miller, 2000). It is
not clear that these special district governments provide an opportunity for that
voice to be heard. Further, it remains unclear how powerful that voice may be when
intended to encourage accountable behavior or influence program priorities.

The existing literature argues that the independence of special districts removes the
structural devices that might otherwise assure the most democratic schemes of
accountable behavior (Foster, 1997; Moe, 1994, 2001; Moe & Gilmour, 1995).
Operating in a zone that places them between conventional governments and private
organizations,

special

districts

appear

insulated

from

the

discipline

and

accountability imposed by overhead systems, citizen engagement or the marketplace
in which they frequently function.

3

Public participation now has a wide range of advocates who see civic engagement as
possibly the most powerful means of achieving public accountability (Ashford &
Rest, 1999; Balla, 2000; Gardner, 1998). Implicit then in claims about flagging
accountability is the belief that virtually any instrumentality that distances itself
from active public engagement is inherently flawed (Arnstein, 1969).

1.2 Research Questions
This

dissertation

discusses

key

theoretical

concepts

and

dimensions

of

accountability and their linkages to the public participation activities of independent
special districts, considering three research questions. These questions relate to the
perceptions about the procedural form of accountability as it might be influenced by
public participation and practiced by special purpose governments.


RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the importance of accountability in the
administration of special districts?



RESEARCH QUESTION 2: In what ways, if at all, does public participation
affect accountability and does its influence vary by operational or program
focus?



RESEARCH QUESTION 3: Are there observable differences in the way that
public participation affects the various forms of accountability?

These questions are explored using a modification of the Romzek and Dubnick
model first posited in 1987 and applied in varying forms by Deleon (1998), Kearns
(1994), and Dicke (2000) to a number of diverse situations that appear to validate its
utility for understanding the ways in which accountability functions.
4

Although

preserving the basic integrity of the Romzek and Dubnick (1987) model, several
modifications proposed in this paper also capture the market and operational
situations that characterize many special district governments.

Intuitively, whatever role public participation may play in accountability, there are
moral and democratic reasons to assure open and continued communication (DeSario
& Langton, 1987a, 1987b; Koontz, 1999a, 1999b; Lando, 1999; Langton, 1987a,
1987b; Warren, 1996).

Public participation is likely to be useful in defining

organizational priorities for resource allocation and for ranking the preferred
strategies for achieving policy implementation (Boaden, Goldsmith, Hampton, &
Stringer, 1982; Simon, 1999).

The literature offers hopeful promise that public

participation is a trust building mechanism that elevates the value of content through
continuing interaction (Bockmeyer, 2000; Cole, 1972, 1974, 1975; Langbein &
Kerwin, 2001; Lindstrom & Nie, 2000; Lowndes, Pratchett,& Stoker, 2001).

If electoral based controls are the most strident measure of accountability, then
special district governments may not be accountable since decisions made by these
bodies are often made on the basis of market actions or technical demands occurring
outside of the political process as that process is experienced in the special district
setting. If, in fact, controls in special districts are not politically centered, public
participation, even if legislatively imposed, may have little meaningful role in
achieving accountability.
5

1.3 Contributions to the Literature
The many perspectives associated with public participation and its potential impact
on dimensions of trust, legitimacy, program effectiveness and accountability point
to its instrumental role in shaping policy if only to confirm an agenda advocated by
bureaucrats or other interests (Cole, 1972, 1974, 1975; Haque, 2001; King, Feltey
and Susel, 1998 ; King and Stivers, 1998; Koontz, 1999a, 1999b).

Given the wide support for public participation, however defined or operationalized,
its function as something more than a vehicle for exchanging information is just
being explored beyond an instinctive level.

Traditional views hold that the

electorate is involved legally and practically through representative forums (Adsera
& Boix, 2001). That which has been written about public participation, however, is
mostly concerned with the administrative processes that are available for managing
and controlling citizen input (Bens, 1994; Box, 1992; Koontz, 1999a, 1999b).

Although discussed in varied contexts, accountability remains something of a
loosely defined term. Frequently invoked rhetorically, the content of accountability
varies widely with the context and the problem (Behn, 2001; Johnston and Romzek,
1999; March & Olsen, 1995; Romzek, 2000; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Romzek &
Ingraham, 1996), pointing to the difficulties in establishing a system or metric on
which to judge its relevance or its application. Romzek and Dubnick (1987) have
broadened our understanding of the conflicts that elected leaders and bureaucrats
6

must manage as they deal with a range of expectations perceived to be associated
with behavioral control.

In explorations of accountability, their model and its

derivatives have been applied to an executive agency (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987), a
network of affiliated intergovernmental agencies, (Radin & Romzek, 1996)
congressional staff functions (Romzek, 2000), military operations (Romzek &
Ingraham, 1996), government managed personnel systems (Romzek & Dubnick,
1994) and a number of third sector organizations (Dicke, 2000, 2002; Dicke & Ott,
1999).

While the efforts of Romzek and Dubnick (1987) remain relevant, particularly as a
classification scheme, the basic framework of their model can be bolstered by
amplifying certain dimensions that are the underpinnings of accountable behavior as
they seem to define it, specifically public participation.

In effect, the proposed

construct is a modest revision of their model that addresses the role of public
participation and its impacts on the accountability behaviors within their typology.

As for the matter of special district governments themselves, the growth in both the
demand for public participation and the number of special district governments
suggests a divergence between normative democratic values and the consolidation
of political power in these multiple units that must be better understood (Campbell
& Marshall, 2000; Musolf & Seidman, 1980).

Bollens recognized these

governments in 1961 as worthy of study because of their unusual structure and
7

behavior.

Almost inexplicably, scholarly interest in these units has remained

dormant for a period of about 30 years, even as the special district has become a
preferred device for achieving certain goals of local governance (Bottomley, 2000;
Foster, 1997).

Within the academic community, contracting and privatization have increased the
awareness of third sector organizations, primarily non-profit organizations engaged
in a certain kind of activity (Dicke, 2000, 2002; Dicke & Ott, 1999; Kearns, 1995;
Mulgan, 2001).

While special district governments may assume some of the

attributes of these non-profit or non-governmental organizations, the former are
distinguished by their creation exclusively in the public realm. Unlike non-profits
that may have similar objectives, special districts take their form, budgeting
procedures, and mission specifically in the public’s name. Their entitlement and
their subsequent empowerment signal a pact between the governed and those acting
on behalf of the governed (Wettenhall, 1999; Wilson, 1995). The literature on the
third sector, primarily developed to address emerging issues in organizations outside
the United States (Bottomley, 2000; Hirst, 1995; Mulgan, 1997, 2000a, 2000b,
2001; Uhr, 1999; Wettenhall, 1999; Wilson, 1995), may offer lessons regarding
moral or mutual obligations but it would be a mistake to impute the same means of
assuring accountability.

8

The ways in which our governmental institutions practice have become increasingly
complex and we can no longer anticipate that traditional systems of control or
systems designed to control certain bodies are forms that have universal application
(Deleon, 1998). The traditional views seem insufficiently developed to manage the
diverse problems and constituencies that are a part of the democratic process as it
now exists and will continue to evolve (Koontz, 1999a, 1999b). The challenge for
public administration will be to preserve the independence that remains the
foundation of special district work while simultaneously assuring that the initiatives
they pursue are consistent with broader public objectives (Bonut, 1996; Bottomley,
2000; Deleon, 1998; Mitchell, 1992).

Answers to the proposed research questions could identify the major influences
connected with the relative effectiveness of public participation at a broad level.
This effectiveness has a practical as well theoretical significance to administrators
involved with both general and special purpose governments seeking to enhance
their own performance or that of their respective governmental units, regardless of
the underlying motivation.

1.4 The Research Effort
This research effort represents an assessment of the operating characteristics and
practices in special district governments as they relate to public participation and
accountability.
9

Of the estimated 35,000 special districts, less than five percent generate
approximately eighty percent of the revenues attributable to all special districts and
about ninety percent of long term debt (USDC, 1997). Within this group of about
1,400 governments, approximately 500 special districts were identified for the
sampling frame. Each of these specifically targeted bodies employed at least
seventy-five people at the time of the 1997 U.S. Census of Governments (USDC).
Collectively, these units represent the full complement of social, physical and
technical services available through these units.

Each special district in the sampling frame received a self-administered survey
questionnaire addressing issues related to structure, legal standing, electoral
procedures, board construction, routine operations, and procedures involving public
participation activities. The survey was directed toward the senior management of
these bodies because they are the principal coordinators of institutional policy
within each respective organization. Approximately forty percent of the surveys
were returned for inclusion in the analysis.

Issues of accountability are dependent primarily upon the framework offered by
Romzek and Dubnick (1987) modified to accommodate market behaviors, public
participation, and other complexities not addressed in their model. The work of
Arnstein (1969), Cole (1972, 1974, 1975), Rowe and Frewer (2000), International
Association for Public Participation [IAPP] (nd), Koontz (1999a, 1999b), Wang
10

(2001) and many others is instructive regarding the choice of variables, form of
measurement, and emphasis on the environmental or organizational conditions that
might influence participation and its relationship to accountability and legitimacy.

The research explores the relative effectiveness of the public's participation in the
decision making process as it is managed or perceived to be managed by these
special purpose governments. Data from the survey instrument were assembled into
a multivariate model that tests the influence of public participation on practices of
organizational

accountability.

The

relationships

among

special

purpose

governments, public participation, and accountability are further probed in
unstructured interviews conducted with executives at selected districts.

1.5 Organization of the Study
The following chapter establishes the theoretical framework for this analysis,
describing the operating characteristics of special district governments in this
country and the claims regarding their avoidance of organizational accountability.
Public participation’s role in shaping a democratic ethos is also documented in this
chapter as are its perceived value for advancing decision making and influencing
policy outcomes. Finally, Chapter 2 offers a structure for examining the various
dimensions of organizational accountability and explains the ways in which pubic
participation and accountability are linked. In effect, Chapter 2 is an introduction
both to the special district form of government and to recent thinking on broad
11

issues associated with democratic accountability and institutional devices available
to maintain control.

Chapter 3 describes the procedures deployed in the research including the choice of
sampling frame, the process of constructing and distributing a survey instrument,
the choice of variables considered for analysis, and operationalization of measures
and their relationship to the specific research questions posed at the organizational
level.

The suggested control variables are revisited and justified as

possible

sources of rival explanation.

Chapter 4 is a discussion of the univariate, bivariate, and multivariate procedures
introduced into the analysis.

The relationship between public participation and

accountability is probed statistically and anecdotally in the context of the
framework outlined in Chapter 2. The analysis confirms the importance of
participation as a substantial factor in the variation of an organization’s commitment
to accountability.

Finally, Chapter 5 provides further insights into the value of this research from the
perspective of agency or administrative management. This chapter explains how the
current findings compare with other, potentially related concepts and demonstrates
the utility and generalizability of the modified Romzek and Dubnick model.
Chapter 5 includes suggestions for further research that focus on the need to
12

compare and contrast attitudes between special purpose and general purpose
governments so that their respective impacts on organizational accountability may
be better understood.
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This dissertation probes the characteristics of special purpose governments that
distinguish this form from general purpose governments, identifying aspects of its
structure that may be most troubling for those concerned with issues of
accountability as the concept has come to be defined in the literature. While the
broader dimensions of accountability are important to analyzing the behavior of
these governments in varying situations, this analysis is most concerned with
accountability and its linkages to the public participation activities of these special
districts.

Chapter 2 chronicles the evolution of special district governments, their particular
institutional form, their function as fiscal and service vehicles in the broader system
of governance, and claims about their disregard for accountable behavior. Public
participation is described in terms of its theoretical value for directing policy
discussions to a diverse range of issues including accountability generally.
Accountability is also discussed in terms of its relative complexities and the
frequent conflicts between objectives and the means to exercise control. Finally, the
Romzek and Dubnick (1987) model is offered with modifications as a possible
structure for evaluating the accountability of special purpose governments. These
modest changes to the Romzek and Dubnick model are proposed to recognize the
explicit role of participation in their typology and to capture certain market oriented
functions of special district or special purpose governments.
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2.1 Special Districts and Their
Role in the System of Governance
Reflecting the classification scheme articulated in the U.S. Census of Governments,
this analysis focuses exclusively on those units of government that exist as entities
separate from general purpose governments with substantial administrative and
fiscal independence. To be recognized by the U.S. Census Bureau as a special
district with independent powers, rather than a subordinate or dependent unit, these
governments must exist as an organized entity, possess governmental character, and
operate with substantial autonomy beyond the control of a designated general
purpose body (USDC, 1997)1. Regarding these criteria, the U.S. Census Bureau
standard for a determination converges on the protocols for oversight and
regulation, noting that budgetary processes, financial resources, staffing and
administrative controls are exclusively the legal purview of the special district
government itself (USDC, 1997).

Subordinate entities, by contrast, may be

designated as a district or an authority for identification purposes but these units are
subject by law to some level of administrative or fiscal control of the state or of
other independent local governments (USDC, 1997)2.

2.1.1 The History and Growth of Special Districts
From 1967 to 1997, the number of municipalities and towns remained relatively flat.
Preliminary data from the current U.S. Census of Governments indicates a potential
decline in these local general purpose bodies during 2002 (USDC, 2002). Over the
same

35

year

period,

their

special
15

district

counterparts

increased

from

approximately 21,000 units to more than 35,000 units as shown in Table 1,
excerpted from Volume 4, Government Finances, Part 2, Finances of Special
District Governments (USDC, 1997) and Preliminary Report No. 1 The 2002 Census
of Governments (USDC, 2002). Today, there are almost an equal number of special
district and local general purpose governments.

Table 2.1: Historical Growth in Special Districts and Local
General Purpose Governments
Census Year

Number of Special Districts

Number of Municipalities and
Townships

2002

35,356

35,937

1997
1992
1987

34,683
31,555
29,427

36,001
35,935
35,891

1982
1977
1972

28,078
25,962
23,885

35,810
35,684
35,508

1967

21,264

35,153

The number of special purpose governments varies widely by state and the
relationship to population is weak (USDC, 1997). . Eleven states have more than
1,000 of these governments, including Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska, all states
with modest concentrations of population (USDC). Three states have fewer than
fifty of these governments, while Florida, among the four largest states in terms of
population, had 528 special district governments in 1997 (USDC).
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The U.S. Census Bureau reports that more than 92 per cent of the special districts
perform a single function (USDC, 1997).

The largest share of governments is

engaged in activities tied to the management or control of a natural resource,
including drainage and flood control, irrigation, or soil and water conservation
(USDC). Those districts engaged in fire protection services comprise the second
largest activity (USDC). The third and fourth most reported functions involve
respectively community development activities and the maintenance of water
supplies (USDC).

The limited literature offers some explanations for growth in the number of special
district governments.

The reason cited most frequently is the need for added

financial resources. With their legal independence, special districts provide access
to capital and debt not reflected as liabilities on the balance sheets of existing
general purpose governments with which they may be aligned. Since this debt is
unlikely to be a general obligation, it will rarely require a referendum for approval.
With the boundaries of about one-third of the special districts matching those of
another local government, it is compelling to view these districts as partners
combining their financial resources to pursue a common service objective. While
this analysis does not deal with the particular motivations for creating these
governments, financial independence emerges as a troubling attribute of these
governments that may not be subject to adequate oversight or controls.
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2.1.2 The New Public Management (NPM) and its
Relationship to Special Districts
Setting aside definitional problems, the principles prescribed by the New Public
Management (NPM) may have strained whatever systems exist for assuring
accountability (Lynn, 2001). In effect, there is a developing opinion that values of
governance more appropriately centered on process and equity have instead yielded
to market and technical forces exclusively concerned with outcomes and efficiency
(Barberries, 1998; Hirst, 1995, Kettl, 1988; Moe, 1994; Mulgan, 1997, 2000), areas
in which special districts ostensibly excel. In the NPM perspective, citizens cede
their power to determine priorities and allocations, opting to leave those decisions to
others with certain education or expertise (Barber, 1983; Haque, 2001; Hirst, 1995).
Programs driven by efficiency and outcome create principal and agent relationships
with extraordinary asymmetries of information (Riccucci, 2001).

The relationship between government and the electorate takes a new urgency
because the NPM values of efficiency and effectiveness implicitly encourage more
diverse approaches to the delivery of traditional government services (Bonut, 1996;
Kettl, 1988). Such approaches include, among others, an increased reliance on third
parties to produce or provide services, raising questions about their publicness
(Antonsen and Jorgensen, 1997), lines of authority (Gilmour & Jensen, 1998;
Haque, 2001), and the means of oversight (Moe, 1994; Moe & Gilmour, 1995).
These third parties take many forms, including conventional private concerns as
well as a variety of non-profit and quasi- governmental entities. As the variety of
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partnerships and vehicles has increased, so has awareness that systems must be
implemented to control the providers or their output, sometimes both (Kettl, 1988).

Except for a few notable exceptions, the special district has been virtually ignored
even as the numbers sustain it as the preferred device for achieving certain goals of
local governance. Foster’s The Political Economy of Special Purpose Governments
(1997) remains the most comprehensive study of these independent governments,
explaining their dominance in the federal system as the result of many competing
forces, including political and financial insularity.

Her analysis points to the

potential for abuses inherent in this system of autonomous governments but it does
not investigate the more specific issues of accountability. Moe and Gilmour (1995)
have written about the power of federal enterprises, and their work documents the
potential for abuse in these bodies which have a structural kinship to the thousands
of state and locally created special district governments. Bozeman and Bretschneider
(1994), Perry and Rainey (1988), Rainey, and Bozeman (2000), as well as Rainey,
Backoff, and Levine. (1976), have labored to distinguish public organizations from
private organizations.

Their various typologies hint at the existence of

instrumentalities that are neither public nor private but the subject of special
districts is never addressed. Mitchell (1992, 1999), Mitchell and Miller (1992),
Walsh (1978), and Henriques (1986) provide perspective on the operations of
government agencies identified specifically as public authorities. Mitchell (1992),
for example, references about 6,400 state, local and national authorities compared
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with a reported count of 31,000 special districts in approximately the same time
period. The governments Mitchell critiques might be classified as special districts
according to the criteria or definitions applied here but these bodies are far fewer
than the total number of special districts cited in the Census of Governments
(USDC, 1997, 2002). Their informative evaluations are the product of deliberate,
but narrowly construed, definitions that may diminish the scale of financial and
political power that stems from these many governments operating collectively.

While third party agents have attracted attention and stimulated disagreement
regarding their legitimacy, appropriate role in governance, and relationship to other
forms of government, special districts have been ignored by all but a handful of
academics. Given their numbers and the rancor regarding the social and political
changes induced by NPM reforms and the agents assigned to conduct its mission,
the neglect is all the more remarkable.

Governments at every level now commonly promote engagement as a means of
achieving public accountability through information exchange (Bonut, 1996;
Buckwalter, Parsons & Wright, 1993; Committee on Public Involvement in
Transportation

[CPIT],

1998;

Department

of

Environmental

Protection,

Pennsylvania [DEP], 1996; Helsey & Strange, 2000; U.S. Department of Energy,
Office of Environmental Management [USDE], 1994; U.S. Department of Interior
[USDI], 1998). Regardless of its form, proponents argue that pubic participation
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promotes accountability through heightened awareness of public needs and
priorities. Participation processes that give much of the role of policy development
and implementation to the public are advocated as those most likely to assure
accountable behaviors (Berman, 1997; Boaden, Goldsmith, Hampton & Stringer;
1982; Chopyak, 2001; Cole, 1972, 1974, 1975; Cvetkovich & Earle, 1994; Elfin
1993; Evans, 1999; Irwin & Repko, nd; King, Feltey & Susel, 1998; Kramer,
Pommerenke & Newton, 1993; Lowndes, Pratchett & Stoker, 2001; Mazmanian &
Sabatier, 1980; Payne & Skelcher, 2001; Spady, 1995). In some state and federal
processes, public participation is codified in legislation to assure equity and
procedural fairness (CPIT, 1998; DEP, 1996; USDE, 1994; USDI). Critics charge
that special districts are immune from these standards of behavior, negating the
power of civic engagement (Bottomley, 2000; Henriques, 1986; Kettl, 1988, 1996;
Leazes, 1997; Paul, 1991; Spence, 1999 Wettenhall, 1999).

Implicit links among public policy, administration, and law (Moe, 1994; Moe and
Gilmour, 1995) advance the concept of overhead democracy (Redford, 1969) that
extends control and accountability through the chief executive officer to the
electorate that has empowered that chief executive. Overhead democracy is largely
a hierarchal construction with the chain of both accountability and control well
defined backward and upward to the highest ranking elected office holder (Moe and
Gilmour; Durant, White, Wolf, Hajj, Kets de Vries & Miller, 1995). Its idea as a
means of control perfectly comports with the Romzek and Dubnick (1987) model
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that relies on a hierarchal structure. Overhead democracy is a blatantly political
construction, highly dependent upon the role of the electorate engaged in democratic
institutions. Special districts, it is argued, are free of the conventional hierarchal
chains or overhead devices linking this form of government to other responsible
parties (Durant et al; Moe, 2001), that is, those elected and their electors.

Rational economic behavior, specifically public choice theory, offers another
vehicle for maintaining the accountability of certain government activities.

For

those services or products that might be otherwise secured in the private
marketplace, there may be an opportunity to secure alternative providers, possibly at
a more satisfactory price (Haque, 2001) One argument that sustains special districts,
however, is that they are a means to correct perceived market failures (Barberries,
1998; Henriques, 1986; Walsh, 1978). By design or by chance, special districts may
be monopolistic suppliers, presumably of a largely public good (Barberries). If so,
accountability is difficult to achieve through an exit strategy (Barberries; Box, 1999;
Kettl, 1993).

2.1.3 Features of Special Districts that
Influence Their Responses to Public
Participation and Accountability
Special districts draw their mandates from legislative action, usually at the state
level (Foster, 1997; Henriques, 1986; Mitchell, 1992, 1999). In practice, special
districts retain the attributes of a government body but they exercise wide
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discretionary powers that have premised concerns about their commitments to
public action and public responsibility (Henriques, 1986; Wettenhall, 1999).

Not

altogether public or private, special districts are intermediaries between traditional
government and the private sector with the specific model adapted to a particular set
of program goals or operating needs (Mitchell, 1999; Walsh, 1978).

Given the proliferation of third sector organizations in the United Kingdom,
Australia and New Zealand as vehicles for delivering largely social services, it is
inviting to borrow from the literature (Auditor General of Canada, 1998; Bottomley,
2000; Brennan, 1999; Choudhury, 2002; Cragg & Dyck, 1998; Evans, 1999; Hirst,
1995; Kearns, 1994; Mulgan, 1997, 2001; Payne & Skelcher, 2001; Ryan, 2002;
Wilson,

1995; Winston, Burwick, McDonnell & Roper, 2002 to cite several

examples) that explores the independent relationship of third sector organizations
with respective levels of general purpose government. Indeed, there appear to be
some similarities that tie these groups to special districts but it is not altogether
clear how the altruistic character of socially focused organizations influences
accountable behavior. While special district governments may assume some of the
structural attributes of these non profit or non-governmental organizations, the
former are distinguished principally by their creation in the public realm
(Bottomley, 2000; Mitchell, 1992, 1999; Henriques, 1986).
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For the most part, legislation in the fifty states allowing these governments has been
cobbled together, in response to the circumstances of a particular time and place
(Leigland, 1992). Walsh (1978) made similar observations several years ago, adding
that their varied form of origin and operation generate moral or administrative
behaviors that would otherwise be unacceptable in the public domain. If so, then the
differences in style and programmatic content of special districts also make it
difficult to implement a uniform series of controls should it be determined that more
rigid oversight is desirable .

Some states have recognized the need to impose order and consistency to chancel
the energy of these governments. In Florida for example, special districts appear in
the 1979 statutes initially but a series of amendments passed through 1990 attempt
to impose uniform criteria for organizing, approving and implementing these
governments (Mitchell, 1992).

Over the next several pages, these and other issues are discussed in more detail.
What emerges is a structure, pattern of behavior, and focus which seem, certainly at
an intuitive level, to be at odds with most concepts of democratization and
accountable behavior.
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Overview: The Structure and Activities of Special Purpose Governments To understand
the growing and unusual roles filled by these governments, it is useful to explore the
character and structure of these bodies and compare them with their general purpose
counterparts that may have actually created them.

General purpose governments are normally associated with broad ruling and regulatory
powers specified in law and the typical state constitution. These governments provide
broadly distributed services commensurate with their broad policy and social objectives.
The costs for these services are also broadly distributed. There is an obvious separation of
powers between the legislative and executive branches. Most activities function together
to create an overhead system where authority, and ostensibly responsibility for decisions
and actions, vests in officials at increasingly higher levels of position. Decisions are
largely made through visible electoral processes and are frequently debated in a highly
public forum. Even in the control of a powerful chief executive, power can be dispersed
because of the electoral system.

In the main, special districts are narrowly engaged. They are usually service specific even
if the service is itself concentrated in a particular geographic area. Of the approximately
35,000 districts identified in 1997, almost 32,000 were engaged in a single activity
(USDC, 1997), for example, transportation, drainage, flood control, parks and recreation,
power, housing, sewer and waste collection among others. They normally exercise
specific powers defined in discretely written legislation (Leigland, 1992; Walsh, 1978)
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and are usually overseen by a board that is often appointed rather than elected (Bollens,
1961). Costs are applied across a narrow constituency and rarely involve general
obligation debt. In some instances, board seats are prescriptively filled by designated
interest groups or constituencies. Where elections or plebiscites do occur, they may be
linked directly to property ownership (Bollens, 1961) or some special qualification as
they are in Florida (F.S. § 190.006).

In effect, special districts may have highly centralized decision making power, exercised
over a very limited area of expertise or influence. The degree of power or its
concentration varies by setting and activity because enabling legislation from state to
state is also varied. So, while is not clear which vehicles and structures may be more
permissive or restrictive, there is an impression that the framework and foundation that
govern these units are intuitively misaligned with democratic ethos and decision making.

Policy, formulated in such a context, logically appears disconnected from what might
otherwise be the transparency anticipated in a public setting dependent upon civic
involvement. Fiscal practices, absent a well identified overhead system, seem to invite
discretion, abuse or an abdication of responsibility. At the very least, the accountability
practices expected from general purpose governments seem less developed or more
compromised in these special purpose units.
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Tables 2.2 and 2.3 profile the many similarities and differences noted in special district
and general purpose governments, providing further perspective on the above as well as
other issues discussed in this paper, particularly their independent structure, legal powers,
relationship(s) with affected constituencies that form the basis for claims that special
districts are not accountable. Table 2.2 considers the general powers, processes for
decision making, the distributional nature of their respective services, definitions of the
public they serve, and fiscal powers. Table 2.3 summarizes issues and structures for
achieving accountability respective to both types of government. Further detail on the
information provided in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 is also available in the Appendix within
Tables A.1 through A.5.

Table 2.2: Features Distinguishing Special Districts from General
Purpose Governments, Operations and Structure
General Purpose
Governments

Special District
Governments

Presumed Issue or Concern
for Special Districts

General Powers
Geographically specific

May be geographically
specific but more likely to be
service specific

Constituencies are narrowly
defined

Powers most likely to
originate with State

Powers defined by enabling
legislation but may not be
discrete

Wide variability in structure
and powers

Obvious separation of powers
between executive and
legislative functions

Board involvement
(legislative) but management
vested in administrative
authority (executive)

Structure contrary to
convention and expectations

Broad taxing and revenue
powers

Specific taxing and revenue
powers

Financial powers deeply
vested

Broad objectives but no
specific mission

Stipulated objectives and
presumably specified mission

Insularity
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General Purpose
Governments

Special District
Governments

Presumed Issue
or Concern

Decision Making
Representative based on broad
constituency demands

Board members may come
from specified interest groups
or specified constituencies

Community interest not
addressed

Wide range of issues debated
in public forums

Agenda tends to be narrowly
construed

Issues considered out of
context

A specific type of public
participation not typically
mandated

In some cases, public
participation of a certain type
is legislated

Requirements should not be
confused with effectiveness

Broadly distributed, based on
widest possible concept of
public interest

Distributed or provided to a
specific constituency

Can be construed as a private
good

Keyed to vague quality of life
considerations

Keyed to specific
considerations about
efficiency and effectiveness

Process and quality of life are
secondary but likely to be
invoked

Issues may be multi
dimensional but
constituencies are small and
the mission is defined
Responsibilities focus on a
specific constituency

Narrow constituencies define
agenda, using public resources

Relatively broad financial
power and spending authority

Focus primarily on enterprise
activities

Self sustaining actions
become priority

Varied financial resources
available

Broad financial tools available
but resources are relatively
limited

Self sustaining actions
become priority

Subject to legislative and
executive discussions and
debate

Insular budgetary authority

Financial independence

Subject to extensive public
disclosure

Public disclosure not
systematically employed

Non-transparency

Public Services

Public Interest
Multi-dimensional
constituencies but
geographically defined
Governmental responsibilities
extend to all citizens

Activities appear largely
private

Fiscal Powers
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Table 2.3: Features Distinguishing Special Districts from General
Purpose Governments, Accountability Structures
General Purpose
Governments
Obvious legislative/executive
avenues available

Special District
Governments

Presumed Issue
or Concern

Weak hierarchal in terms of
external interface

Violates principles of public
law.

Board participation in controls
widely mixed and influenced
by represented interests

Responds to privatized or
narrow interests

Electoral based

Strongly professional

Focused on outputs not process

Tools available for recall or
impeachment

Appointments or board
positions typically long term

Weakened span of electoral
control

Controls focus on procedures
for financial reporting

Controls are ex ante, not
anticipatory. Controls
construed as accountability
systems.

Use of informal channels
becoming more common

Channels largely formalized

Processes not culturally
instituted

Activities largely open to
public scrutiny

Generally resistant to public
participation

Participation not deemed
necessary for management's
goals

Public participation
recognized vehicle for
purposes of information,
education and trust building

Certain forms of public
participation accepted as
necessary to model
accountable behavior

Participation legislated for
certain forms of activities. Not
consistent with community
centered initiatives

Goals and expectations broad
and varied may be broad

Goals specific

Internally and goal focused

Strongly hierarchal and
linked to external interface

Inherently complex issues

Thematically, the issues identified in the literature and summarized in these tables relate
to the center of controls (Kettl, 1988, 1996; Moe, 1994, 2001), accountability structures
(Moe & Gilmour, 1995), the means of financial management (Doig & Mitchell, 1992;
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Eger, 2000; Leigland, 1992; Nunn & Schoedel, 1997; Henriques, 1986; Mitchell, 1992,),
emphasis on outcomes rather than process (Moe, 1994, 2001), and possible constraints on
public participation (Henriques, 1986; Walsh, 1978).

The impressions about behaviors of special districts and their implications stem
primarily from case study observations, many on the most powerful special district
governments (Bollens, 1961; Bottomley, 2000; Finn, 1992; Henriques, 1986;
Koppell, 2000, 2001; Mitchell, 1992, 1999; Mitchell & Miller, 1992; Walsh, 1978).
As a result, the claims remain untested in a form that allows generalization, and they
reflect a biased or rhetorical quality.

Like general purpose governments, special purpose governments may be involved in
either the provision or actual production of services. The leadership of these bodies,
as well as the boards that provide oversight and set policy direction, may be elected
although the majority of boards are appointed (Bollens, 1961; Bottomley, 2000;
Foster, 1997; Henriques, 1986; Koppell, 2000, 2001; Mitchell, 1992, 1997, 1999;
Mitchell & Miller, 1992; Walsh, 1978). Many have the power to tax while others
depend on user fees or assessments (Bollens; Bottomley; Foster; Henriques,;
Koppell; Mitchell; Perry, 1992b; Walsh).

Enabling legislation typically allows special districts the right to develop,
implement and finance programs through tax levies or assessments (Bollens, 1961;
Douglas, 2000; Foster, 1997; Henriques, 1986; Koppell, 2000, 2001; Leigland,
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1994, 1995; Mitchell, 1992, 1999; Doig & Mitchell, 1992; Perry, 1992b; Walsh,
1978).

In theory, the assessments provide benefits defined in case and

administrative law, but there is discretion in the means by which the benefits are
captured or assigned (Uniform Community Development Act of 1980; Uniform Special
District Accountability Act of 1989). Under such circumstances, the financial powers
of these special purpose governments appear unilateral.

Some special purpose governments have all their powers delegated to them
specifically. In other cases, unless expressly prohibited, the external controls may
be insufficient to preclude like powers from being implemented through
administrative procedures (Walsh, 1978). Critics claim that the oversight functions
of these governments are simply inadequate in the context of such powers
(Henriques, 1986; Leigland, 1992; Mitchell, 1999; Moe, 1994, 2001; Moe &
Gilmour, 1995; Perry, 1992b). Moe (2001) wryly notes that laws which may exist
are nothing more than the quasi-management of qusai-governemnt.

Concerns Focused on Independence The many possible responsibilities, financial
resources, and legal configurations assumed by these special purpose governments
prompts some disagreement regarding the form of entity that is often identified as a
special purpose government3.

Leigland (1992, 1994, 1995) and Mitchell (1992,

1999) focus on the size and scope of special district mandates while Foster (1997)
observes that census definitions are precise in meaning although potentially more
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exclusionary. Antonsen and Jorgensen (1997) suggest that the degree of publicness,
more than particular structure, influences the content of processes.

It is the legally independent status of special purpose governments, however, that
ultimately distinguishes these bodies from general purpose governments and
remains their primary source of power (Henriques, 1986; Koppell, 2000, 2001; Moe,
2001). Independence elevates their utility to related governments, allowing greater
freedom, flexibility, and elasticity in the provision and financing of many public
services (Doig & Mitchell, 1992).

At the same time, the literature's reference to independence extends to many
observed criticisms. Among these are problems or criticisms are board construction
(Berkley & Fox, 1978; Bollens, 1961; Mitchell, 1997; Payne, & Skelcher, 2001;
Wilson, 1995; Stewart, 1995), coordination and fragmentation of functions (Berkley
& Fox), staffing, management, and procurement procedures (Henriques, 1986; Moe,
2001), the responsiveness of the organization itself (Haque, 2001; Moe and
Gilmour, 1995), and the form of oversight systems in place (Berkley & Fox;
Boschken, 2000). Independence through this lens hints at gross abuse of authority
and a pattern of repeated misconduct that otherwise has no control (Henriques,
1986).
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Nowhere is the independence of special districts more evident than in the practice of
their financial affairs (Berkley & Fox, 1978). In his seminal work Special District
Governments, Bollens (1961) observed that the 1955 operating receipts and debt of
some 12,000 special districts were greater than the collective expenses of all
counties, townships and towns. The debt of special districts has increased. It is
now approximately that of the nation's incorporated cities and counties (USDC,
1997) and evidences the importance of special districts as vehicles for achieving
certain programmatic objectives (Nunn and Schoedel, 1997; Foster 1997).

In a

recent year, forty-one percent of the total public debt in California was attributable
to the actions of special districts (Douglas, 2000). Such enormous financial power
magnifies concerns of possible permissiveness and public control.

The typical district can contract and incur debt outside of the appropriations and
hearing processes normally required of the general purpose government (Berkley &
Fox, 1978).

Even where meetings are noticed, the actions that commit the

organization to long term financial obligations may involve only a few board
members and key staff (Henriques, 1986). Unless the government faces a sunset
provision, it is assured a minimal life that remains concurrent with any outstanding
debt (Bollens, 1961).

If both the appropriations and administrative processes indicate an absence of
traditional public controls, then the typical special purpose government may operate
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under a structure more characteristically enjoyed by private organizations (Bollens,
1961; Mitchell, 1992, 1999; Leigland, 1992). In the corporate model, for example,
oversight occurs through a well defined class of regulators or interest groups
concerned only with the performance of that single entity. Official actions are left
primarily to a group of carefully feted board members (Koppell, 2000, 2001).
Stockholders may be entitled to elect these board members but voting tends to be a
function of large ownership interests. In any case, management operates with some
level of discretion and the mission of the organization takes precedence over the
process for achieving the mission.

Simply through their independent status and largely internal program focus, special
districts may have little practical or legal motivation to engage in highly interactive
and encompassing participation activities that are the more visible and accepted
approach to policy development and program implementation used by general
purpose governments (Walsh, 1978).

Independence, in this context, alludes to

social and political disconnection.

Legal Isolation Independence breeds behaviors that might otherwise be contained
through a formalized system of checks and balances (Berkley & Fox, 1978; Koppell,
2000, 2001). Decisions may not require either the resources or cooperation of
multiple governmental units. At the same time, the interest groups associated with
or working on the behalf of special districts tend to be narrowly defined (Campbell
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and Marshall, 2000; Walsh, 1978). Acting beyond the legal and political reach of
related jurisdictions, special districts are relieved of the challenging electoral
responsibilities and demands imposed by broadly based public constituencies
(Bollens, 1961; Henriques, 1986; Hitchcock, 1992; Hudson, 1996; Mitchell, 1999).

General purpose governments may retain, in some instances, the right to appoint
board members of special district governments, but the evidence indicates that both
distance and time are likely to diminish the oversight value of appointments
(Berkley & Fox, 1978; Davies, 2000; Leigland, 1992; Mitchell, 1992; Stewart,
1995; Wilson, 1995). Changing political ideology, shifts in technology, and
competing demands on the time of constitutional officers often inserted into board
roles, compromise the value of an appointment. The overhead system, that is the
electoral mechanism envisioned as linking board appointees to office holders and
citizens, simply does not provide an adequate span of control over special purpose
governments (Berkley & Fox; Wilson, 1995).

Almost by default, the political

power and financial resources that come with independent status relieve special
districts of the need to curry political favor from competing interests and competing
priorities (Walsh, 1978).

Absent a political or legal need for public debate to actuate key decisions, special
districts are in a position to check or eliminate constituent power (Henriques, 1986).
Even if actions to control civic involvement are not overt, channels that might
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otherwise aid participation may be sufficiently narrow that special districts are
effectively encouraged to pursue their priorities with little subsequent public
accountability (Box, 1992, 1999; Burns, 1994; Cummins, 2000; Foster, 1997;
Gilmour & Jensen, 1998; Kettl, 1988; 1996; Koppell, 2000, 2001). Access to these
special purpose entities, Walsh (1978) says, is closed to all but the most
knowledgeable insiders.

The Public's Role in Special District Governance The forms of accountability
practiced by special district governments as well as the need or desirability of
implementing controls that purposefully insert civic involvement into their regime
raise obvious questions about their role in a broader system of public governance
(Henriques, 1986; Mitchell, 1992, 1999; Mitchell & Miller, 1992, Moe, 2001).
While similar criticisms, of course, also apply to general purpose governments
which have experienced their own documented decline in trust (Inglehart, 1997;
King, 1997; Mansbridge, 1997 Neustadt, 1997; Nye, 1997), general purpose
governments and their policies are implemented through direct electoral
participation. Such participation, even if rarely exercised, is a product of direct
public action (Aberbach & Rockman, 1988; Adsera & Boix, 2001).

Setting aside questions about both the role and the adequacy of appointed office
holders in the constitutional system, the chain of accountability ties the chief elected
official in a general purpose government to a certain constituency (Downs, 1999;
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Moe, 1994, 2001; Moe & Gilmour, 1995). Intermediaries -- staff or professional
manages for example -- may act on the behalf of that official but the electorate
provides consent within a given operating structure. The principle of public law
does not suggest the perfection of the balloting system but it does underscore the
fundamental relationship that exists between the elected and the electorate (Moe &
Gilmour). While technical and professional skills may be important in choosing
among resources or policy options, democratic methods activate decisions (Kweit &
Kweit, 1987).

Presumably, balloting and direct empanelment of controlling boards then would
mitigate many of the concerns stemming from an inadequate linkage between the
special district and its constituents. Since balloting for board elections and policy
matters is often confined exclusively to property owners within the jurisdictional
area of the special district, it is not clear that electoral institutions operate as
accountability systems in the sense implied by general purpose governments
(Bollens, 1961).

At best, there is a de facto disenfranchisement of certain

individuals (Bollens; Burns, 1994).

While apparently case law validates voting

procedures based on property or position, they would seem to obviate legitimacy
and undermine systems of trust that are associated with better understood
democratic institutions (Bollens) 4.
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By instilling behavioral or economic efficiencies, the marketplace is assumed to
provide much of the accountability that conventional participation, balloting,
oversight, and regulation may be unable to achieve (Boschken, 2000; Bottomley,
2000; Bozec , Breton & Cote, 2002; Burns, 1994; Casile, 2001; Cragg & Dyck,
1998; Cummins, 2000; Gillette, 1994; Hawley, 2000; Kettl, 1988; Nutt, 1999;
Robert, 1993; Walsh, 1978). The metaphor of citizen as consumer focuses attention
on public goods and services as commodities that are interchangeable on the basis
of price and content.

That construct may not always be appropriate.

Gillette,

Bottomley, and Koppell (2000, 2001) argue that market discipline has largely failed
to control special districts except at the most basic level. Special districts claim to
be efficient but the regulations that create these bodies serve at the same time to
create artificial price supports or other anomalies that make it difficult for
competitors to enter the market freely (Gillette, 1994).

Such barriers to entry

forestall consumers from supporting alternative service providers even where
demand may warrant. If market discipline is inadequate to exercise control over
those services that might otherwise be available through private initiatives, then it
should be assumed that exit strategies are even more limiting in those settings where
public goods constitute the entire inventory of product (Box, 1999; Simon, 1999). It
would, for example be difficult if not impossible for the customer of an
independently functioning electric utility to seek an alterative service provider.
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Amidst concerns that the nation's citizens have become more cynical (Berman,
1997) in large measure because government institutions are neither trustworthy nor
responsive to the demands of their citizens (Behn, 2000; Berman, 1997; Bockmeyer,
2000; King, 1997; King & Stivers, 1998; McTigue, 2000; Nye, 1997, Orren, 1997;
Thomas,

1998),

instrumentality.

special

district

governments

are

an

especially

curious

These special purpose units appear to mimic the activities of

general purpose governments (Henriques, 1986; Mitchell, 1992,1999; Mitchell &
Miller, 1992; Moe, 2001, Walsh, 1978) which have themselves been

roundly

criticized for their lack of focus (Bok, 1997; Inglehart, 1997; King, 1997; May,
1997, Neustadt, 1997). At the same time, an emphasis on efficiency raises charges
that special purpose governments trample or ignore civic centered processes
(Gilmour & Jensen, 1998; Moe, 2001; Robert, 1993). That is, economic and fiscal
values are implicitly given greater weight in policy and service decisions than social
or civic values.

Underlying these seemingly irreconcilable positions is an ideological duality that
blurs rather than distinguishes their public and private roles as potential vehicles for
service delivery (Box, 1999; Burns, 1994; Cragg & Dyck, 1998; Haque, 2001;
Kettl, 1988; Musolf & Seidman, 1980; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000; Robert). As Moe
and Gilmour (1995) observe specifically, it is not clear whether these legal entities
have served to privatize government or to enhance the publicness of the private
sector. At the very least, special districts maintain the appearance of independence
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from the duly elected general purpose governments that may have sponsored them
(Foster, 1997).

Though the complete autonomy that defines the powers of the fully independent
district may be a legal fiction, the distinction between independent and dependent
government units, measured in terms useful to affected citizens, can be very hazy
(Burns, 1994; Foster, 1997; Mitchell, 1999; Walsh, 1978). Whatever the reality of
their status, even an implied break in the chain of command that extends from the
organization to a legislatively enabled authority leaves special districts and special
purpose governments vulnerable to charges that their agenda is beyond the
meaningful control of the public they are chartered to serve. Indeed, their focus and
separation from politics and the political process are cited as reasons that special
districts and special purpose governments are assigned their particular tasks and
financial responsibilities (Berkley & Fox, 1978; Burns, 1994; Foster, 1997;
Mitchell, 1992, 1999; Moe, 2001). Assuming that the electorate's disaffection with
government might be countered with enhanced public involvement, as suggested by
the participatory model of democratic behavior, special districts loom as an obvious
exception to recent thinking.

Alternative Interpretations of the Issues A more limited body of literature offers
some evidence that the criticisms of special districts are ideological not structural.
These competing viewpoints acknowledge some of the obvious deficiencies while
40

arguing the importance of the structure to achieve certain types of objectives. The
issue may not be the structure but instead its misapplication.

Sam Nunn and Carl Schoedel (1997), for example, examine the patterns of total
spending in the largest metropolitan areas that are dependent on special districts for
service delivery using data from the 1987 Census of Governments, Foster's (1997)
same source of financial information. Applying their methodology for weighing the
role of these governments in the political economy, they concede that special
districts and area governments overall may spend higher per capita sums for
operations but conclude that total debt per capita is no higher in these areas than in
metropolitan areas with materially less dependence on special purpose units. Unlike
Foster, they find no evidence that social programs are underrepresented in the mix
of total spending.

Their analysis, if correct, may weaken claims that civic

engagement is needed to counter financial irresponsibility and to raise social
awareness. As for public involvement itself, they are silent on the matter.

While desirable as a normative state, the demands for enhanced participation may be
of greater or lesser importance if the nature of the services or goods provided by a
particular special purpose government adopts a social (human services and
healthcare for example) or physical form (water, sewer or transportation services for
example). Social tasks are reasonably expected to respond to their moral or ethical
foundations with responsibility and accountability emerging through stewardship
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(Bundt, 1992; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 2002. Dicke, 2000, 2002). Even
when technically based, these social disciplines are inherently more responsive to
their constituencies because of an implied ethos in which profitable behavior is also
moral behavior. For example, a community profits -- that is, it benefits – when all
its citizens are provided access to healthcare. As for special district governments
engaged in the delivery of physical services, demands for engagement may not
originate with citizens but rather activists. Despite being criticized by some elected
officials and planners that oversee the regulation of the state's land use practices,
Florida's development districts are popular with their residents because of their
concept of order, efficiency, and professional maintenance of an inviolate
community standard (Leusner & Holton, 2000).

Further, there may be distinctions to be drawn among the vehicles available to
achieve accountability and to impose accountable behavior. Romzek and Dubnick
(1987) as well as many others that either use or borrow from their typology (see, for
example, Dicke, 2000, 2001; Dicke & Ott, 1999; Kearns, 1994; Klinger, D.,
Albanian, J. & Romzek, 2002; Radin & Romzek, 1996), describe the evolving nature
and context of accountability and suggest that certain devices are relevant only to
specific circumstances (Deleon, 1998; Downs, 1999; Thomas, 1990, 1993).
Confounding the many possibilities, conditions favorable to the creation of trust
appear to be highly dependent upon interaction and participation (Bockmeyer, 2000;
Carnevale, 1995; Cole, 1972, 1974, 1975; Craig, 1998; Lindstrom & Nie, 2000;
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Thomas, 1998). In situations where trust is institutionalized in the cultural practices
of an organization's staff and leadership, it has been posited that formalized systems
of accountability may be less beneficial than approaches based upon less rigid
principles and rules (Franklin, 2001; Gardner, 1998). If that observation is true, the
value of a rigid overhead system may be overstated, and content of the workplace
must then be considered as a potential influence on accountable behaviors.

Even Walsh (1978), among the strongest critics of special purpose entities, observes
that more and more is being done to control this form of government as evidenced
by the few sates that have opted to activate comprehensive regulatory control over
these governments. Arizona, sufficiently concerned about the role in of special
districts, invoked a moratorium on their creation in 1984 (Leigland, 1992) that was
subsequently suspended. Walsh cites New York and Pennsylvania as among the
leaders in developing new systems of accountability. It is Florida, however, that has
made some of the most sweeping reforms with adoption of the Uniform Community
Development Act (1980) and the subsequent Uniform Special District Accountability
Act (1989). These combined acts prescribe a single procedure for implementing
such special districts in Florida, and they stipulate certain operating and reporting
requirements associated with accounting, creation, dissolution, elections and other
matters for both dependent and independent special purpose units.

Though the

emphasis is on financial accountability, rather than program content, the 1989 law
does bring actions of these governments into a centralized system where certain
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behaviors can be examined. Administrative practices associated with the 1989 law
are addressed in the Florida Special District Handbook (1999).

As well, this

volume highlights Florida's tradition of open meetings and open records which
together acknowledge the importance of an informed citizenry (Fla. Const. Art. I, §
24, 2003).

If there is a trend, it is toward increased, not less, control with a

considerable emphasis placed on activities that would inform citizens about the
functions of these units.

2.1.4 Summary: Special Districts and Their Problems
In the aggregate, there are enough criticisms to (re)evaluate the role that special
districts play in the larger system of governance. While some of the dissatisfaction
with special districts may be ideological, previous work available points to at least
isolated situations in which special districts may not have sufficiently advanced the
interest of the constituents they are mandated to serve, either by design or by
circumstance. Informal controls, rooted in workplace culture or dependent upon
personal or ethical standards of fairness, may be a mitigating or controlling
influence on accountability (Behn, 2001) but the strength of these devices is
speculative.

States such as Florida, Arizona, New York and Pennsylvania,

motivated to act affirmatively in the wake of abuses, have introduced legislation
that attempts to make these units more responsive through formalized means
comprised of financial, legal, and organizational accountability. However, on the
basis of existing empirical accounts, the attitudes inherent to the special district
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form of government provide no promise that the formalized methods alone are likely
to be adequate.

The growth in numbers and financial and financial power of special districts speaks
to their apparent desirability to accomplish certain service objectives even as many
constituents remain unaware of their structure and the avenues available to assert
opinions on policy.

If fiscal and performance effectiveness are themselves the

principal reasons to cerate these governments, then it might be inferred that the
democratic processes normally associated with America’s system of governance
have been casually ignored in favor of service outcomes.

Still, it is not altogether clear in what ways these governments may fail to be
accountable.

Without that understanding, it is difficult to posit what forms or

safeguards might achieve the desired or practical level of control.

2.2 Foundations and Principles
of Accountability
In the public administration literature, allusions to accountability often tender vague
sentiments about political integrity and administrative responsibility achieved
through the electoral process (Schacter, 2001). The term carries strongly expressive
messages usually precipitated by or associated with undesirable behaviors in
politically charged environments (Schacter). In its complexity, accountability is
simultaneously ambiguous and expansive (Downs, 1999 March and Olsen, 1995
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Mulgan, 2000b; Romzek and Dubnick, 1987; Klinger, Albanian, & Romzek, 2002;
Weber, 1999b) invoked by policy makers, claimants, activists, and politicians alike
to exercise control, fashion an ideology or simply seize power (Downs; March and
Olsen; Romzek and Dubnick; Schacter; Weber).

Given the wide variation in structure, mission, and form of control relevant to
special districts, it is only reasonable to speculate that the narrowest interpretation
of accountability will certainly find fault with this form of government.

Seen

exclusively in terms of control, for instance, the legal independence of special
districts is itself sufficient to determine these units may be ill-suited to implement
the public's business. Mulgan (2000a, 2000b, 2002) cautions that definitions extend
the prospect of accountability to virtually any organization. If idiomatic constructs
convey that power, then it has to be assumed that they also have the capacity to strip
virtually any organization of accountable behaviors.

The importance of accountability has always been a tenet of public administration
(Finer, 1941). Its dimensions and subsystems, however, form a different strain of
literature much of which has emerged only in the last 12-15 years, raising
uncertainties about its measurement and the means by which it might be achieved.
Although many third sector organizations domestically and overseas are exploring
notions of accountability that suit these and similar forms of government, nothing
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specifically exists in the literature that links accountability processes with special
districts.

2.2.1 Normative Interpretations of Accountability
Accountability is suggestive of an ideal conditional state that has links to
responsibility (Gilmour & Jensen, 1998), controls (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987),
oversight systems (Haque, 2001;
2001), lines of authority

March and Olsen, 1995), performance (Behn,

(Moe & Gilmour, 1995;

Payne & Skelcher, 2001),

workplace culture ( Burke, 1994, 1995) and methods of recourse (McTigue, 2000;
Schacter, 2001).

Without regard to its structure or form, the vehicle itself is

concerned with one or more matters associated with processes, programs, or fiscal
responsibilities and their management or implementation. Because so many special
districts are providers of very discrete and easily defined services, these various
aspects become intricately tied with satisfactory or successful program outcomes.
Although accountability may be its own reward because of its implied connections
to many democratic values, there is at least an implied thread to program
performance (Barberries, 1998; Berman & Wang, 2000; Downs, 1999; Schacter).
Behn (2001) argues that it is not implied but direct.

As it is often characterized, accountability carries a largely prerogative connotation
such that retribution and punishment emerge as constant threats to careers and goals
(Behn, 2001; Schacter, 2001; Uhr, 1999). Conceived this way, corrective actions
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logically occur only after dissatisfaction or disappointment (March and Olsen,
1995). To enhance the value of accountability as a device premised on affirmative
intervention, other approaches might be considered as part of the prescriptive
process for invoking desirable or worthwhile behaviors (Behn, 2002; O'Loughlin,
1990). If thought of as answerability, accountability may involve nothing more than
the confirmation, clarification, or justification of a specific position. The notion of
a dialogue that exchanges information about competing positions seems in concert
with broader concepts of democratic institutions as it furthers the theoretical
advantages of an accountability system based on public participation (IAPP, (nd);
Lindstrom & Nye, 2000)

The mix and emphasis of the devices or protocols associated with accountability
vary by situation, including the level or form of government (Klinger, Albanian, &
Romzek, 2002; March and Olsen, 1995; Romzek, 2000; Romzek and Dubnick,
1987; Romzek & Ingraham, 1996). Ultimately, however, the concept is about the
nature of performance and the channels available to guide, modify, or correct that
performance through suasion, rules, or recompense (March and Olsen, 1995;
McKinney, 1981; Day & Klein, 1987; O'Loughlin, 1990).

The ability to alter or reinforce behaviors speaks to a standard or benchmark by
which behaviors or actions might be measured. Like the behaviors which they
gauge, the criteria that comprise these benchmarks, as well as the systems in place
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for responding to performance, vary widely by the content and the context of the
activity being scrutinized.

In a democratically codified system of accountability, setting the standard by which
accountable behavior is measured may be a logical role for citizen participation
(Furlong, 1998; IAPP, nd; King, Feltey & Susel, 1998; Koontz, 19991, 1999b;
Lando, 1999; Payne & Skelcher, 2001; Thomas, 1990, 1993, 1995).

Such

engagement may occur through dialogue, ballot actions, or other individual or group
processes. A failure to perform in accordance with expectations or responsibilities,
however these have been determined, may result in the need for subsequent
discourse.

If trust or transgressions are deemed inviolate, they may result in

removal from office through action of law or action of the electorate or in the
imposition of other social or legal sanctions. The premise is that all governments
must be accountable for their actions within a given structure of responsibility and
expectations.

2.2.2 The Social Justification for Public Participation
as a Tool for Achieving Accountability
America's belief in fundamental freedoms, including the right to self expression, has
its origins in the liberal constructions provided by Locke, Rousseau, and Mills.
Contemporary interpretations embrace most of their principles.

Bellamy and

Castiglione (1997), for example, specifically reaffirm Locke's canons of equality,
liberty, individuality, and rationality as the foundation of a democratic philosophy.
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In effect, the collective teachings of classicists and current theorists pay homage to
the primacy of the individual in the context of a collective society where varying
points of view can be debated openly without prejudice or presupposition.

While the value of participatory exchange becomes an essential means of achieving
both self-expression and collective decision making in western society, an idealized
conceptualization of its content invites competing models for its implementation. In
turn, these models nurture competing ideas about democratization itself and the role
that democratic principles rightfully play in systems of accountability. Should the
conceptualization of democracy be somewhat untidy, it follows that accountability
within the public realm upon which it is highly dependent is untidier still.

If

engagement is fundamental to each of the competing views, variation in the form,
channels of communication, tools utilized, and points of access present
opportunities for greater or lesser civic expression (Ashford and Rest, 1999; Balla,
2000; Boaden, Goldsmith, Hampton, & Stringer, 1982; Gardner, 1998). By extension,
their relative availability and structure may be indicative of greater or lesser degrees
of accountability.

At least two of these competing views of democratization offer an ideological basis
for framing the current analysis.

These are the representative and participatory

models of democracy, each providing an ideological justification for differing
perspectives on accountability5.

These competing views are not altogether
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dichotomous in that their rationalization is the pursuit of societal empowerment
through citizen involvement (Braithwaite and Levi, 1998; Benveniste, 1989;
Boaden, Goldsmith, Hampton and Stringer, 1982; Checkoway, 1978; Wilson, 1997).
In their most basic forms, both allow for the systematic evaluation of ideas targeted
by democratic institutions (Warner, 2001). Nonetheless, they emphasize distinctly
different means for decision-making. Through their differing outlooks on the role
of participation in the system of democratic governance and their parallel rules for
implementing it, these models provide an enhanced understanding regarding varying
approaches to achieving and sustaining accountability in the political framework.

The Representative Model

In the representative model, citizens oversee the

behavior and actions of their elected officials through groups organized around
themes or interests. Such groups in this context include virtually any individual or
body working at the specific bequest of another.

The presumption in the

representative model is that each group negotiating its role in the distribution or
assignment of power is uniformly open to membership. Through free association,
these groups extend their influence or control over the electorate in some proportion
to the collective concerns of many individuals. Mobilized in their aggregate form,
interest groups function as a mechanism that controls or monitors the behavior of
elected agents.
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This model is dependent upon special interest politics for pursuing policy goals and
objectives. Faced with competing demands for time, and absent the skills or even
the willingness to become engaged in the affairs of state, individual citizens solicit
the help of interest groups to intercede with elected agents or bodies (Overdevest,
2000). In this frame, accountability will be largely a function of identifying those
groups with standing or resources.

One might posit that this is the form of

participation most consistent with the premise that special districts serve only
narrowly defined interests and fulfill largely private functions.

The Participatory Model Alternatively, the participatory model of democracy
emphasizes broad participation to protect individual rights and liberties. Citizens,
not groups, are the primary unit in the public policy decision-making process
(Overdevest, 2000. In this conceptualization, it is obligatory to involve all citizens
in the public decision-making process (Overdevest) rather than to engage those who
might speak on their behalf.

Although not inconsistent with a representative form of government, the political
system is centered on the demands of citizens not institutions. For this model to
work, citizens must take responsibility for engaging in dialogue, exercising public
judgment, and acting on those issues of public concern (Morse, 1993). So defined, a
system that fails to induce participation at virtually any policy level might be less
than fully accountable (Ashford & Rest, 1999). If that presumption is correct, the
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tests of accountability stand more rigorous scrutiny because there is a reduced
tolerance for the least exclusionary actions.

The participatory model is the foundation for Arnstein's classic ladder of public
participation (1969) that argues that citizens are co-producers of democratization, a
concept embraced by a number of theorists and recently resurrected by Thomas
(1990, 1993). Active engagement stands at the apex of Arnstein's ladder. She
insists that government fails if it cannot fully partner with its constituents. Based
exclusively on their electoral practices, special districts seem unlikely to pass
Arnstein's litmus test.

Conflicting Values in Accountability While accountability's role in governance
seems self evident, its conceptualization avoids uniform interpretation.

If the

literature has identified many if its principles, the application of the concept or its
dimensions is a product of those in a position to determine what may or may not be
accountable behavior at certain times and under particular circumstances (Ashford
& Rest, 1999; Koppell, 2005; O'Loughlin; 1990; Romzek and Dubnick, 1987;
Sinclair, 1995 Warren, 1996) Efficiency and effectiveness, for example, can impose
competing perspectives on accountable behaviors (Miller, 1998). These differing
viewpoints increase the likelihood of sparring between those responsible for
administrative activities and the citizens that are affected by these administrative
actions. The dynamic tension among budgets, efficiencies, and program objectives
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was the subject of some analysis following the Challenger explosion in 1986. The
prospect of continuing conflicts among these values has already been cited in the
opening weeks of the Columbia investigation.

Several conflicting themes appear in the discussion of accountability, attempting both to
define and explain the concept. These themes offer some insight into the dimensions of
accountability but are limited in advancing our understanding of the competing
perspectives and processes that often occur simultaneously (Weber, 1999a ). They offer
little knowledge about their relative power and influence.

Dwivedi and Jabbra (1989), Thynne and Goldring (1987), Virtanen (1997) and Uhr
(1999) focus on the role of moral reasonability at the organizational and individual
level. Accountability then becomes a personal and organizational commitment to a
specific value system tied to standards of conscionable conduct. The standard might
be based on codes of technical performance but they might also reflect social norms
for a community or a narrow interest group that maintains a certain behavioral
pattern. Cultural variations among classes and political orders, however, strongly
influence personal behavior (Miller, 1998; Weber, 1999a, 1999b). Consequently,
there are obvious limitations in a system that is exclusively dependent on achieving
ethical performance through self enlightenment.
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The bureaucracy is itself a system of assuring accountability, primarily through
consistency and practice of behaviors. Mulgan (2000b) observes that moral conduct
might be a dimension of the bureaucratic system but only if moral behaviors have
been institutionalized as an organizational norm. Regardless, in the bureaucratic
setting accountable behavior is predictable behavior according to certain adopted
rules. To the degree that behaviors conform to the rules set by the organization, the
behavior cannot be deemed unaccountable.

Behavior which fails to conform is

noted by exception.

Bureaucracy is largely an overhead system of democratic behavior in which the
lines of responsibility and accountability extend up or back to the most senior
elected officer (Downs, 1999).

It is a codified system of rules that is largely

hierarchical and parties in the chain of hierarchy answer to their superiors or peers
with whom they interact (Durant et al, 1995; Moe and Gilmour, 1995).

Bureaucracy is tethered to administrative attributes of individuals and organizations
and probably perceived as the primary source of political accountability by those
most critical of decentralized authority (Furlong, 1998; Moe, 1994, 2001; Moe &
Gilmour, 1995; O'Loughlin, 1990; Warner, 2001).

The bureaucratic structure has

certainly been the center piece of general purpose governments in most western
countries at all levels of government. In the United States, bureaucracy defines
most functions of governance at the local, state and federal levels. It is, according
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to Moe and Gilmour (1995), the single system acceptable under principles of public
law because these ostensibly define the chain of responsibility and accountability.

Koppel (2005) argues that accountability is about transparency but that it is also
involves liability, controllability, responsibility and responsiveness. He posits that
these are measured in terms of performance, possible consequences for malfeasance,
conformance to rules, commitment to duty, and satisfaction of expectations.

Kramer, Pommerenke and Newton (1993) and Mulgan (2000b) draw distinctions
between ethical and professional behavior, in their interpretations of accountability,
suggesting that professional behavior is primarily a technical construction defined
by the metrics of a specific discipline. Because it is a largely technical construction,
the moral aspects influence the nature of a decision or a behavior but not necessarily
the way in which the behavior or decision is made (Miller, 1998).

The party

accountable in this sense is accountable to that metric first and to moral discipline
second.

The literature dealing with accountability has a very definitive historical form that
begins with the Friedrich (1940) – Finer (1941) debates and the role of the
administrative state in its management and policy formulation role. According to
Friedrich, administrative functions are largely technical and are performed free of
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political bias. The more recent literature, though not specifically targeted toward
special purpose governments, seems to affirm the political and technical distinction.

The legal system remains a perceptually potent means of achieving accountability
primarily because it is specific in terms of its behavioral focus and stipulations for
redress (Leazes, 1997; Moe, 1994, 2001; Moe and Gilmour, 1995).

The legal

system may also be the most visible given a growing reliance in the United States to
seek civil remedies for a range of offenses.

The proliferation in legislation

evidences electoral interest and concern in mandated controls. As of August, 2002
there were almost fifty pieces of federal legislation dealing with accountability
introduced to the 107th Congress with about a dozen of these intended to impose
fiscal controls. The text of the 1993 federal Government Performance and Results
Act (H.R. 826) articulates improved public accountability as two of its six
objectives.

The political process is fundamentally a legal construction that empowers many to
exercise control of behaviors.

Although the process is electoral centered, its

mechanics are far more complex, allowing a range of competing interests to interact
with their officials and representatives. It is a process of claims and negotiations
that allows individuals and groups to advance and debate priorities and policies.
Though engagement is clearly an encouraged form of expression that may
accomplish a desired end state, the means of achieving accountability through the
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political process is most often assumed to be electoral control (Kweit & Kweit,
1987). Responsive political agents will be reelected. Non-responsiveness results in
removal from office.

The proponents of NPM see much greater opportunity for organizational centered control
of accountability necessitating, in their scheme, reduced bureaucracy and greater
discretion (Kelly, 1998; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). From this prospective, the desired
outcome, achieved through rigorous technical management of the product or service, is
itself the most telling measure of accountability. Inferentially, if vigorous electoral
controls thwart performance and discretion, special districts have a distinct operating
advantage that will be reflected in their popularity and pricing (Gillette, 1994; March &
Olsen, 1995).

On the other hand, the principles of public law virtually require an

extension of control that leads to the highest elected official, effectively externalizing the
oversight system through the bureaucracy directly or through a deliberative political
process (Moe, 1994, 2001; Moe & Gilmour, 1995).

What these contrasting notions suggest is that a single perspective is not adequate for
understanding how the appropriate mechanisms emerge in varying institutional and
organizational settings (Bonut, 1996; Deleon & Deleon, 2002). Special districts may
occupy their own legal space but the boundaries of that space are in conflict ideologically
(Bottomley, 2000).
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2.2.3 How Accountability Occurs:
The Romzek and Dubnick Model
Among the most widely utilized models describing the dimensions or processes of
accountability as a composite construct is that created by Romzek and Dubnick
(1987) shown in Figure 2.1, on the following page, introduced to explain the
sequence of actions that resulted in the Challenger accident in 1986. Their four part
model, really more of a classification scheme, explains accountability in terms of
the forces that influence it, the methods of implementing it and the systems in place
to assure controls.

The Romzek and Dubnick (1987) model recognizes that the typical organization
faces multiple systems of accountability based on the varying relationships between
primary interests, the issues at hand, and the source of control. As it becomes
apparent that there are flaws in existing systems, new ones are added rather than the
old forms being improved or removed. According to Romzek and Dubnick, the
means of exercising control are sometimes in conflict, sometimes complementary
and an organization must manage these multiple means in accordance with the
expectations that are imposed.

The Romzek and Dubnick (1987) scheme centers on the locus of control,
distinguishing internal and external forces that shape the forces and processes of
accountability. Further, they observe, the means by which accountable behavior is
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achieved can be distinguished by the level of discretionary powers extended to
certain groups and institutions.
`

Figure 2.1: Basic Accountability Framework
Source of Control

Internal

External

Level of
Discretion
Legal

Hierarchal
Low

High

Professional

Political

Romzek and Dubnick (1987) assume that there are four processes or dimensions
associated with accountability. These processes or dimensions are competing and
layered, not necessarily complementary.

They classify these as hierarchical

(internally directed with minimal discretion), professional (internally directed with
greater discretion), legal (externally directed with minimal discretion), political
(externally directed with greater discretion).

Presumably, any or all the above,

approaches yield accountable behaviors although each works in discrete ways.
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The hierarchal system is based on a bureaucratic structure. Accountability
results from a narrowly construed code of administrative behaviors imposed
from the leadership in power or negotiated informally through social
relationships and peers6.



Like the bureaucratic structure within the organization, legal controls are
narrowly construed as strictly coded standards of right and wrong. Behaviors
are both prohibited and/or mandates must be implemented.



Professional forms of accountability take their structure from the technical
codes of their respective disciplines. A large percentage of special purpose
governments, through their emphasis on technical disciplines, are likely to
realize their accountability through professional codes of behavior.



Political forms of accountability, like legal systems, influence and regulate
behaviors externally. The battery of devices that comprise the system of
political accountability is highly varied and discretionary, presumably
controlled only by the legal system and societal norms desired from
conceptualizations of democratic principles. As they have generally applied
it to their previous case studies,
political accountability is broadly
interpreted to represent the complex web that comprises the political process
including interest group mobilization, electoral activity, referenda, individual
lobbying, and citizen dialogues, among others

2.3 Alternative Perspectives on
Accountability: A Revised Foundation
for Examining Accountability in Special Districts
Kearns (1994) and Deleon (1998) have adapted the Romzek and Dubnick (1987)
model to different situations, evidencing its utility for evaluating issues of
accountability in diverse settings. The Kearns adaptation centers on third sector
non-profits and similar organizations engaged to deliver certain government
services as out source providers. In the sense that these similarly independent or
non-aligned entities may be offering or developing programs of the type also
implemented or sponsored by special districts, the Kearns modifications focusing on
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administrative and political controls are instructive.

Deleon acknowledges the

linkages and conflicts among the competing perspectives but observes the scheme
does not adequately address the uncertainties associated with complex decision
making.

Both Deleon (1998) and Kearns (1994) agree that the model's classification
structure is useful but it may not deal sufficiently with relationships among the four
systems themselves. In effect, the Romzek and Dubnick (1987) model does not
adequately address movement across the systems or dimensions of accountability,
suggesting that forces are simply internal or external to the organization which
exercises varying degrees of discretion in its behavior.

Deleon (1998) observes that the political process poses special difficulties when
resources or means to accomplish outcomes are uncertain or untested. In these
situations, control and accountability quickly assume a political character. With
extreme cases, the process can lapse into anarchy where virtually any outcome,
favorable or unfavorable, is possible. The quadrants in the Romzek and Dubnick
(1987) conceptualization imply clear distinctions among variants in accountability
systems that may not exist as power and responsibilities move across a continuum of
competing ideas and interests. More plausibly, any distinctions that might exist are
likely to blur rapidly as the issues grow in difficulty and the expectations for
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managing them begin to drift from clearly agreed upon procedures or previously
negotiated agreements.

The modified model shown in Figure 2.2 offers several recommended changes to the
basic structure of the Romzek and Dubnick (1987) model. The changes create a model
responsive in particular to the features of special districts by recognizing the discrete
market and non-hierarchal structure that often characterize their diverse function(s) and
which are not addressed in the Romzek and Dubnick classification scheme.

Figure 2.2: Form and Content of Accountability in Response to Situation
Complexity
Or Variability
Of Situation
Legal
(Legislation, encompassing other dimensions)

High

Low

Administrative
(Structures)

Professional
(Standards)

Markets
(Preferences)

Political
(Negotiations)

Interactive Participation
Low

High
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While acknowledging the importance of a basic taxonomy for describing accountability
and their respective subsystems, the proposed changes enhance the model’s application to
more diverse forms of governance by elaborating on relationships that exist between and
among the layered or competing forces that Romzek and Dubnick (1987) and others
(Romzek & Ingraham, 1996; Romzek, 2000) have described.. In sum, it is a more
robust description of the many dimensions that interact together in shaping the content of
accountability.

In the Romzek and Dubnick (1987) model, fixed quadrants illustrate a static
relationship among the alternatives that is inconsistent with the cross pressures of
accountability as they describe them.

Instead, the proposed model suggests a

varying range of control exercised by each of the individual systems according to
the nature, (un)certainty and complexity of the circumstances integral to a problem
or its perceived solution, consistent with the Deleon (1998) interpretation.

As the model has been modified, administrative controls occur within a narrowly
constructed space to manage highly routinized acts or procedures,

political

controls, by contrast, extend to a wider range of matters, and may supersede other
dimensions of accountability should circumstances warrant or the public demand.
Professional dimensions of accountability allow more discretionary action than
administrative dimension but much less than political dimensions, even given the
same set of problems or circumstances. Taken together, the revised model posits
that complexity, discretion, and the span of control associated with each dimension
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of accountability are in a continuous state of repositioning to deal with the
circumstances at hand.

Consequently, all actions -- even basic administrative

functions -- require certain discretionary practices and invite some level of external
scrutiny.7

Within the sphere of administrative functions and tight controls, outcomes are likely
to be certain or expectant. As discretion and controls extend, they also introduce
greater uncertainty or variability in outcome simply because of rapidly evolving
circumstances that eclipse normal reporting, standards of practice or functional
channels (O'Loughlin, 1990).

2.3.1 Five Dimensions of Accountability
Table 2.4, beginning on the next page, summarizes the content associated with each
of the four dimensions of accountability described originally by Romzek and
Dubnick (1987) as well as the indicators the literature has associated with each. An
additional column introduces a fifth dimension for market accountability that
addresses the role of the economic system (preferences) as a tool for controlling the
behavior of special district governments in particular. As suggested by Romzek and
Dubnick’s original typology (1987), these dimensions can be thought of as discrete
processes even though practice suggests they overlap and interact.
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Table 2.4: Form and Content of Accountability

Administrative
Accountability

Professional
Accountability

Political
Accountability

Legal
Accountability

Market
Accountability

Description and Content
Emphasis on
vertically integrated
supervisory
relationships…high
degree of
control…very
formalized

Emphasis on
technical conduct
and judgment

Emphasis on
meeting
expectations

Focus largely on
Focus is largely in
demonstrated
engaging
technical expertise participants with
vested interests
Regulated through
Focus is largely
accepted standards Regulated through
internal but can be
normative behavior
considered external of practice
typically expressed
to the degree it
Effectiveness
through the
involves electoral
based political actors measured in terms electorate
of industry norms
Effectiveness
Effectiveness of
measured in terms
management and
of perceived
team outlook reflects
outcomes
style, philosophy, or
political outlook of
senior management
or board Indicators

Emphasis on
specified actions
and procedures
Focus is largely
financial but is tied
to communications

Emphasis on
efficiency
Focus is on public
choice
Regulated through
consumer behavior

Presumed to be free
of outside influences Exit strategy
ultimate strategy
Regulated through
ordinance or statute
Effectiveness
measured in terms
of compliance
reports

Primary Implementation Vehicle
Structured
behaviors

Standards set
behaviors

Negotiated
behaviors

Legislatively
Preferences set
mandated behaviors behaviors

Indicators or Devices Associated with Vehicle
Mission sets policies Education and
certifications
Clear channels for
reporting
Tenure in like
organizations
Single group or
individual
Peer recognition
responsible for
Publications
policy and action

Acknowledgement Audits performed
of ethical behaviors
Certain information
desirable
posted or routinely
Conflict of interest available
reports filed
Certain meetings
Wide voter
regularly scheduled
participation
Activities "noticed"
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Fair pricing
Easy entry to
market
Substitutable
commodities
Not public goods

Administrative
Accountability
Project priorities

Professional
Accountability
Experience of
technical and
Administrative rules leadership staff
are highly codified
Demonstrated
Bureaucratic
experience in like
structure internally circumstances or
venues
Frequency of
evaluations for task Stated
performance
effectiveness
measures
Information on
outputs may be
disseminated in
technical reports

Political
Legal
Accountability
Accountability
Information widely Routine voting
and aggressively
procedures and
disseminated
requirements

Market
Accountability
Conforms to
consumer
requirements

Acknowledged
Comments
importance of
maintained for the
public participation record

Buying or
purchasing of
services is
equivalent to public
participation

Competition for
office

Financial
disclosures and
reporting

Perception, if not
reality, of
Elections regularly
hierarchal structure held and terms of
office stipulated
Sunset provisions

Romzek and Dubnick argue that discretionary actions are embedded in a specific
form of accountability. Although the revised model acknowledges that the form of
accountability influences those occasions in which discretionary action will occur, it
also posits that the level of discretion is a function of both the form and the
difficulty of a particular problem.

At the same time, it also suggests that the

controls generally attached to each form of accountability is fluid, not fixed,
precluding absolute assurance of a particular outcome. While agreeing that the
political dimensions of accountability allow the widest degree of discretionary
behavior, even patently administrative behaviors possess license to act with latitude
within the space of a specifically assigned list of responsibilities or activities.
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The revised model asserts that the dimensions or forms of accountability are ordered
along a continuum.

The essential premise of the model is that the need or

opportunities for participation occur in conjunction with the need for progressively
greater levels of accountability (Thomas, 1990, 1993, 1995). Although the avenues
of participation remain available to interact with any dimension of accountability,
the model suggests that it is invigorated primarily through the political process. In
the proposed model, participation is a constant external force even if it varies across
dimensions.

The current model deletes references to hierarchical controls, substituting
administrative controls in their place. This terminology is a more encompassing
description of organizational centered controls that may or may not be hierarchal or
bureaucratic as Romzek and Dubnick (1987) define these managerial arrangements.
Deleon (1998) suggests a similar change.

The Romzek and Dubnick (1987) model assumes that legal controls originate
exclusively outside of the organization but its role within their model portrays it as
both an equal and a separate dimension at the same time. The current model proffers
that there are legal constraints that exist across all accountability systems, including
even those based upon blatantly political considerations. While the legal system is
intended to set outside boundaries for behaviors, the current model reasons that it is
not the locus of control that is important but rather the means by which legal
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devices interact with all other systems or dimensions of accountability. Laws and
regulations do not comprise an unconnected system of accountability, operating
with complete independence from other systems (Franklin, 2001). Instead, laws and
regulations act in conjunction with all systems, potentially manifested as the norm
of the organization.

The proposed model incorporates a separate dimension recognizing the opportunity
for the market to maintain controls. The addition of market systems is a specific
concession to the organizational character of many special districts that operate in
competitive settings where discipline of the market ostensibly regulates pricing and
distribution (Gillette, 1994; Wettenhall, 1999). Conceivably, the functioning market
is captured in the political dimension of the Romzek and Dubnick (1987)
interpretation through the combined actions of the participating public. This line of
reasoning, however, skirts the controls that the political process can impose on
markets when they fail (Lawrence, 2000; Paul, 1991).

The addition of a market dimension is an important and fundamental modification
that acknowledges the increasing importance of both privatization and market
induced reforms in achieving accountable performance.

The assumption is that

rational economic behavior imposed through market pricing will control, at least
nominally, the content and value of services delivered. Public transit (Boschken,
2000; Mo, 2001) and certain utilities (Hawley, 2000), for example, are conceivably
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ordered according to the market’s ability to function efficiently. The degree to
which this means of enhancing accountable behavior is relevant or useful is highly
dependent on the assumption that market transactions occur without failures. While
special districts may be engaged in market activities, their existence is usually the
result of a market failure, posing some limitation on the efficacy of this approach.

A significant modification to the model is embedded in the dimension associated
with political accountability. As indicated by its position in the model, it is most
responsive to public participation. While consistent with the Romzek and Dubnick
(1987) construct, it is more compatible with Deleon’s adapted model (1998) that
describes the threats to achieving consensus when solutions and/or resources are
vague or unspecified.

Deleon (1998) argues that problems of identifiable content lend themselves more
readily to the means needed to initiate action, needing only the least discretionary
procedures within the confines of administrative structure. Because these problems
are themselves characterized by less uncertainty, the means of achieving
accountability and control are also less speculative. In effect, the need for public
participation is reduced commensurately although channels might exist for civic
forums to become actuated.
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Where neither the solutions nor the resources are clear, political processes will
inevitably emerge to gain control and to assert oversight of accountability,
potentially stimulating highly discretionary or arbitrary responses. At their most
extreme, discretionary actions have the prospect of arbitrariness, consistent with
Deleon's notion of anarchy (1998). Challenging and discomforting as they may be,
the most complex problems are likely to be resolved only through extensive debate
that explores all options and opportunities on the merits of equity and technical
efficacy.

Such debate, however balanced or open, does not lend certainty to

outcomes. Even the legal process, if invoked, does not promise a certain outcome
but rather only the means to air differences.

While certain bureaucratic issues may invite public participation, the model
contemplates that its use will be rare and the dimension itself will control only the
most specific and procedural situations (Thomas, 1990, 1993, 1995). While the
power of political accountability extends over a span of situations wider than that
exerted by competing dimensions of accountability, participation and negotiations
inject variable solutions or actions.

2.3.2 Role of Public Participation in Context of Revised Model
Arnstein (1969), King, Feltey and Susel (1998), Lando (1999), Box (191,1999) and
Thomas (1990,1993,1995), among many others (for other examples, see also
Ashford & Rest, 1999; Bennett, 1997; Berman, 1997; Brennan, 1999; Campbell &
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Marshall, 2000; Cole, 1972,1974, 1975; Ebdon, 2000; Elgin, 1993; Helsley &
Strange, 2000; Lawrence & Deagen, 2001; Lindstrom & Nie, 2000; Tauxe, 1995)
argue the importance of participation as a tool for political accountability. It has
been declared fundamental to political accountability and the most potent device by
which political accountability is achieved.

As the foundation of political

accountability, it is integral to establishing priorities (Lando, 1999), defining the
focus of policy debates (Aydelotte & Miller; Farazmand, 1997; Walters, 2000), and
choosing among options (Kweit & Kweit, 1987).

The importance of civic participation is implied in the Romzek and Dubnick model
(1987) but its function is not elaborated. In the Deleon interpretation of
accountability structures (1998), civic debate would dominate the political process
and would be the primary device used to assert control of situations that are of
uncertain composition.

By extension, the Deleon interpretation offers the

expectation that uncertain circumstances pose the greatest promise for public
participation while it might yield only limited benefit to systems dependent on
administrative devices. That value might not be added should not be construed as
meaning public participation is neither necessary nor warranted (Simon, 1999). It
does mean that demands for citizen participation will and should vary according to
the circumstance (Campbell & Marshall, 2000; Thomas, 1990, 1993).

Simple

administrative decisions do not appear to warrant public participation routinely but
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decisions about where to locate a road may. Other policy matters lying between
these extremes may or may not.

Complexity of Accountability

Effectively, the varying dimensions present in

accountability exist in a dynamic state. Those most directly involved and engaged
are continuously redefining the content of these processes (Radin & Romzek, 1996;
Romzek, 2000; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000). Interaction
between the party or the organization held accountable and those in the oversight
role is the fulcrum on which the concept pivots (March and Olsen, 1995).

If accountability fails to result in a reconciliation of expected or negotiated
behaviors, there necessarily must be a settlement of accounts (McTigue, 2000). As
the discussion intimates, the means of ultimate resolution may take many forms but
it must be appropriate to the degree of circumstance, ill performance or
misbehavior.

Where special districts are concerned, it is apparent that many perform in highly
technical

settings.

Others

operate

almost

exclusively

as

administrative

organizations. Because accountability exists in a dynamic state, any of the devices
to assure that it is achieved or maintained may be appropriate at various points in
time and in different stages of problem discussion or resolution.. According to
Romzek and Dubnick (1987) and many following, (Thomas, 1990, 1993; Radin &
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Romzek, 1996; Romzek & Ingraham, 1996; Deleon, 1998; Weber, 1999a, 1999b;
Romzek, 2000) the structure of accountability is continuously being redefined,
shifting from formal to informal controls and from external to internal forces. In
some situations, the literal interpretation of accountability may be concerned with
transparency while in another the concept might be concerned only with matters of
liability (Koppell, 2005).

While this analysis studies the systems or devices in place in special purpose
governments, its principal objective is to understand how, if at all, special district
executives perceive their systems of accountability, the importance or role they
assign to accountability, and the role of public participation in shaping approaches
to accountability. The intent of the current research is to examine participation
specifically to see if it functions as a viable control mechanism for these forms of
governance.

2.4 Public Participation and
Its Role in Accountability
Debates may have yet to answer whether participatory or representative systems are
more appropriate institutions for governance. Still, it has long been established that
democratically created institutions have a duty to respond to the electorate. In the
proposed model of accountability, public participation looms as an important source
of control. The value of such control as a tool for accountability has been suggested
by Ashford and Rest (1999), Balla (2000), Box (1991, 1999) Lando, and Paul (1991)
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among others (for other examples, see also Bennett, 1997; Berman, 1997; Brennan,
1999; Campbell & Marshall, 2000; Cole, 1972,1974, 1975; Ebdon, 2000; Elgin,
1993; Helsley & Strange, 2000; Lawrence & Deagen, 2001; Lindstrom & Nie, 2000;
Tauxe, 1995), but that value has not been explored with specific reference to special
district governments. Public participation, while recognized as a political device, is
acknowledged primarily in its instrumental role.

As used in this analysis, public participation includes virtually any form of public
involvement through an organized and legitimate political process (Cole, 1974,
1975: Kuhn, 1998; Langton, 1987b; N. Rosenbaum, 1987, W. Rosenbaum 1987;
Rowe and Frewer, 2000; IAPP, nd; Lawrence, & Deagen 2001; Lowndes, Pratchett &
Stoker, 2001; Maloff, Bilan & Thurston, 2001). Instrumentally, involvement of this
kind has come to be identified with public meetings, information exchanges, small
meetings, focus groups, referenda and a wide range of formal devices associated
with citizen interaction whether based on individual or collective group action
(Hampton, IAPP, Kuhn, 1998; Langton, 1987a; Rowe and Frewer, 2000).
Presumably all these devices, in some mix or degree, should be available to citizens
through special districts governments, regardless of their legally independent status.

For accountability to be achieved through public participation, action must result in
some specific outcome (Adsera & Boix, 2001; Ammons, 1997; Ben, 1994; Berman, &
Wang 2000; Bok, 1997; Cole, 1974; CPIT, 1998 ; Epstein, Solomon, & Grifel, (nd);
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Ethridge, 1987; Franklin, 2001; Langbein & Kerwin, 2001; Swindell, & Kell, 2000;
Wang, 2001). This outcome may be experienced in the guise of an electoral action,
but it may also be experienced through a shift in or a confirmation of a policy
direction or program content.

The complexities of a changing social order are bringing calls to engage citizens
more resolutely in policy formulation (Putnam, 1993, 1995). The recent movement
for enhanced public participation revives historic debates about preferred means of
accomplishing governance. Now, the concerns may be less centered on personal
skills or knowledge, given the resources of the information age, but rather on the
nature of an increasingly diverse society where the distractions of popular culture
may be a constraint to citizen involvement at every level of government (Putnam,
1993; Putnam, 1995; Vigoda, 2000). A growing body of literature across disciplines
seems to be in agreement on both the need for enhanced participation and the
difficulty of achieving individually driven action in an era with growing personal
and ideological conflicts.

If accountability is dependent upon participation, reduced participation would
presumably yield less accountable behaviors. Langton (1987a, 1987b) observes that
participation can be interpreted as either an alternative to or a necessary means of
improving democratic governance, implying, at the very least, its symbolic
importance as a device of political accountability. According to some observers of
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political culture, America's social capital will continue to ebb as once familiar
alternatives for community interaction are de-emphasized and public decisions
appear only prescriptive or bereft of citizen input (King and Stivers, 1998; Putnam,
1995). The loss of social capital is a precursor to increased citizen isolation that
leads to growing frustration and distrust in the larger system of governance
(Berman, 1997; Bourne, 1998; Kelly, 1994; Putnam, 1995). One way in which the
public's cynicism with government might be countered, they believe, is to improve
the process in which citizens contribute to public decision making. Active public
participation is touted by Putnam (1995), Berman (1997), and King and Stivers
(1998) as an important means of curbing the erosion of America's social capital, the
conceptual bundle of selfless civic acts that collectively build community networks
and institutions.

What we are experiencing is an apparent advocacy for the participatory model that
seeks to raise the threshold requirements of accountability. Whether democratic or
participatory, the objective is to remove autonomous actions by opening all
activities to public exposure (Ashford & Rest, 1999; Balla, 2000; Gardner, 1998;
Kelly, 1994; Kelly , 1998). Less autonomy reduces the need for rigid accountability
systems because the insulating processes that might otherwise shield behavior stand
transparent to even limited scrutiny. Presumably, a need exists for both increased
participation and enhanced accountability but the arguments advancing these
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concepts make their claims without the benefit of broadly generalizable evidence
that voluntary or prescriptive processes involving interaction enhance outcomes.

2.4.1 Concerns about Public Participation
Various ideas regarding public participation have been explored in the context of
general purpose governments at the local (Boaden, Goldsmith, Hampton, & Stringer,
1982; Bockmeyer, 2000; Carr & Halvorsen, 2001), state (DEP, 1996; Innes, 1992)
and federal (CPIT, 1998; DOE, 1994) levels but special districts -- as these units
have now been defined by Bollens (1961), Foster (1997), Walsh (1978) and others
(Mitchell, 1992, 1999; Leigland, 1992, 1994, 1995) -- are largely neglected.
Federal legislation and, in some situations, state legislation, appears to have
advanced

citizen

participation

in

conventional

government

settings

while

overlooking their special district counterparts (Henriques, 1978; Moe, 2001; Walsh,
1986).

Literature from the urban planning and political science perspectives is well
developed and describes the dynamics attendant to public participation applied to
land use planning (Innes, 1992; O'Doherty, 1996; Simon, 1999), transportation
(CPIT, 1998; Lindstrom and Nie, 2000), and natural resource management
(Cvetkovich & Earle, 1994; Lawrence, & Deagen, 2001) as well as other issues of
societal concern (Ashford & Rest, 1999; Kuhn, 1998; Linder, 2001; Maloff, Bilan,
& Thurston, 2001). As a process, public participation has been cited for its laudable
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contributions in the resolution of environmental centered issues (Koontz, 1999a;
Shepherd and Bowler 1997) and roundly condemned when applied to transportation
related projects (Kirtley, 1999). Both the merits and the criticisms focus on
participation’s value to achieve prescriptive ends but the arguments are constructed
almost exclusively on ethical and democratic grounds (Ashford & Rest, 1999;
Benveniste, 1989; Boaden, Goldsmith, Hampton, & Stringer, 1982; Hobbing & TheissMorse, 2001; Koontz, 1999a, 1999b, Kuhn, 1998; Kweit & Kweit, 1987; Warren,
1996; Webler & Tuler, 2000).

There is at least an impression that public participation is more beneficial when
applied to social welfare functions rather than functions keyed to development or
provision of infrastructure (Ashford & Rest, 1999; Kuhn, 1998; Linder, 2001;
Maloff, Bilan, & Thurston, 2001). Maintenance functions, including fire, police,
and parking for example, do not appear to be addressed. The reasons for the varied
responses have been tied to the highly technical nature of development and
infrastructure based activities and their extraordinary capital costs that can only
increase with unanticipated delays (Foster, 1997). The justification for participation
in these settings is that it may expedite or facilitate an action.

In a situation

involving societal concerns, by contrast, the goals for participation extend from the
perceived importance of individual rights and equity in addressing community
issues.
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Both case studies and commentaries capture the difficulties in engaging public
participation or civic involvement (Buckwalter, Parsons & Wright 1993).

The

literature points specifically to concerns about the populations included in forums
for public participation (Langton, 1987b; Wilson, 1997), its form (Cvetkovich,
1994), its thematic content (Creighton, 1999; King & Stivers, 1998; Verba, 1993),
its procedural implementation (Lindstrom and Nie, 2000; W. Rosenbaum, 1987), its
timing (DOE, Walters, 2000) and accessibility to critical information (Walsh, 1978).
Ultimately, the biggest challenge is evaluating the overall value of public
participation (Wang, 2001; Rowe and Frewer; IAPP, 2001).

The richest form of public participation requires that citizens go beyond the role of
disinterested observers.

Instead, public participation must vigorously involve

citizens in the formulation of issues, the setting of priorities and the development of
strategies or approaches to implementation (King and Stivers, 1998). What Lando
(1999) calls meaningful participation yields measured impact on resulting policy
decisions. King, Feltey and Susel maintain (1998) that the outcomes, while
important, are secondary to that part of the public participation process that yields
an identification of the problems themselves. In their framework, policy emerges as
importance is assigned to competing priorities by those most affected.

Whatever the weaknesses or flaws in the process -- functional, political, cultural or
normative-- there are many observers that conclude public participation yields
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increased satisfaction with outcomes while strengthening perceptions that
administrative and elected leaders are accountable for their decisions (Braithwaite
and Levi, 1998; Cole, 1972, 1974, 1975; King and Stivers, 1998; Lando, 1999).
Decisions made in an active forum resonate more favorably than those that are
simply ratified. Public participation generates personal as well as political equity.
According to Marshall (1990), favorable action is dependent upon bi-directional
participation between the state and the citizen that demands some measure of selfresponsibility and active involvement. The issue for the current generation of the
politically active, claims Bentley (2001), is not policy content but process (Hobbing
et al, 2001 ).

The dominant theme continues to be that citizens have a responsibility to engage in
participation (Bourne, 1998). Only through an enhanced level of interaction can it
be assumed that the desired results will be achieved or that the tools for modifying
behavior will remain available. Control of both results and behavior are the bedrock
on which systems of accountability involving public participation will be
constructed (March & Olsen, 1995).

2.5 Implications of the Framework
for the Proposed Research Hypotheses
Accountability is a complex, multi dimensional concept. Its application is highly
dependent upon its perceived value to achieve certain goals, the form and content of
the issues involved, the parties engaged in oversight and implementation roles, the
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vehicles available to exercise control, and the symbolic value of control or
punishment. Certain dimensions of accountability, as learned in the Challenger and
Columbia investigations, tend to be evoked only in time of crisis. If not proven
effective, another form of control or oversight might be added leading to the
layered, possibly contradictory mechanisms described by Romzek and Dubnick
(1987).

It would seem that the most effective structure or system would be one that
manages expectations and behavior while it simultaneously anticipates possible
failings so these can be avoided.

The literature places emphasis on financial

controls (Wang, 2002), management reports (Dunn & Legge, 2001) and
benchmarking (Berman & Wang, 2000; Kelly, 1998) as various means of managing
behavior.

Using this line of reasoning, codified or institutionalized reporting

systems are themselves adequate tools for achieving accountability. Others persist
that measures and like controls may augur efficiency but alone are not a system of
achieving

accountability

but

rather

a

system for

gauging

individual

or

organizational effectiveness (March and Olsen, 1995; Miller, 1998). Through the
lens of those advocating such codified controls, effectiveness and efficiency,
achieved through administrative (Thomas, 1990, 1993), professional (Dunn and
Legge, 2001) or market based practices (Boschken, 2000; Gillette, 1994; Schachter,
1997) are themselves commensurate with accountable behavior. Alternatively, the
belief in democratic institutions and the availability of enhanced public participation
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offer the promise that engagement in the political process will assure political order
and desirable behavior.

The literature presents these divergent possibilities as

relatively in conflict. The proposed model offers an opportunity to elaborate on
these opposing normative positions by exploring relationships between participation
and various dimensions of accountability.

Romzek and Dubnick (1987) and others (Radin & Cooper, 1989; Romzek &
Ingraham, 2000) have used their recognized scheme as a screen for accountability in
a variety of governmental settings.

Consequently, the apparent conflicts and

inconsistencies present in a situation dependent on structured devices are now better
understood. Nonetheless, it remains difficult to generalize about the case studies
that have raised many insights about organizational and personal responses to
behavior under scrutiny. What appears more certain is that the nature of formalized
systems has not been examined in a way that allows us to understand organizational
perceptions regarding various dimensions of accountability, nor is it really
transparent how public participation might function in that context to achieve
improved accountability.

2.6 Summary
Public participation lies at the bedrock of our democratic institutions and its role in
planning, implementation and policy have been documented in a number of different
settings. Beyond its obvious ethical appeal, it may encumber some deliberations and
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processes. If so, these shortcomings need to be weighed against the perceived
societal values that are realized through an engaged citizenry. It is the possible
absence of an engaged or involved citizenry that raises many questions about the
accountability of special district governments and their suitability to manage the
public’s business affairs.

While the value of accountability has long been accepted conceptually as a
foundation of public administration, its construction and dimensions are less clearly
defined. The literature links public participation and accountability, noting its
particular influence on political accountability. If, however, the effectiveness of
participation is somehow obviated in the special district setting, it stands to reason
that its usefulness as a control or influence on accountability may be compromised
leading to the possible expectation that these forms of government are not fully
accountable or committed to accountable behaviors.

The following chapter outlines a methodological approach to evaluate the causal
relationship(s) between participation and accountability in the special district
setting. This approach includes the construction and distribution of a survey
instrument focused on variables that stem from the literature and interpretation
presented in Chapter 2, operationalization and measurement of these variables, and
a discussion of their relationship to the specific research questions posed at the
organizational level.
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1

Florida provides a test case for these definitions. In this state, independent units file an annual report
that addresses certain required financial information. As a result, the data maintained on Florida's
special district governments is unusually comprehensive compared with that archived in many other
states. Florida's Department of Community Affairs reports about 500 independent districts existed in
this state in 1997. These 500 governments constitute a virtual match with the governments identified in
Florida by the U.S. Census Bureau as special districts in 1997.
2
In Orange County, Florida, for example, the library district, with its own millage for operation, is
deemed a dependent district because its board must submit its agency generated budget to the County
Commission for approval. Once the budget is accepted, the organization operates with relative
autonomy. The Greater Orlando Aviation Authority (GOAA), however, is an independent agency even
though it receives some funds from another level of government. GOAA has no dedicated millage but it
does derive revenue from extensive operations and landing fees.
3

Henriques and Walsh speak of special of districts and authorities as though they are interchangeable units of
government. In reality, some special district governments are identified as authorities. Mitchell speaks primarily
of authorities and estimates there are about 7,000 of these governments defined primarily on the basis of
independence. Foster and Bollens believe the number is much higher, using the count and definitions provided
by the U.S. Census and described in this analysis.
4

Because the voting schemes within many special districts are actually based on proportionate
ownership, the process may be more perverse than Bollens initially recognized. Ballots controlled as a
block, in effect, implement a corporate (private) model of accountability rather than a democratic
(public) one. Proportionate voting is used by the special districts in California and Florida where a
profusion of these governments enable the financing and operation of road, water and sewer facilities
supporting large-scale community development. In the case of Florida, these districts have been
scrutinized for a range of electoral abuses but still they constitute the largest forming segment of
government in this fast growing state.
5

In the United States, the distinctive forms of public participation emerge in the Federalist Papers, the collection
of essays by Hamilton and Madison that presage the American constitution (Kramnick, 1987). In their respective
articles, Hamilton and Madison argue the merits of centralized and decentralized government authority and their
varying forms of public involvement. Madison advocates the most representative principles of democratic
thought while Hamilton remains an advocate of strong centralized governmental controls, largely because of
concerns that the electorate was neither sufficiently informed, educated, or skilled to conduct affairs of state.
While it is Hamilton's views that are more reflective of the existing constitutional order, Madison may yet be
vindicated.

6

The nature of the behaviors and structures varies according to the technical skills employed and status of the
work involved. Organizations with more highly educated work forces will assume a less rigid protocol for
reporting but the organization's structure dictates the broader limits of acceptable behaviors. Acceptable in this
context means the behaviors are largely repetitive and predictable within agreed upon limits. The effectiveness
of management and team outlook reflect the style, philosophy or political sensitivity of senior management.

7
The example of a small electrical utility operating as a special district unit demonstrates the altered
model’s intended function over a range of related activities and strategic decisions.

• Billing and collection procedures follow very specific procedures. Errors, in billing, if any, are
handled systematically according to established practices. The organization is responsive to its
subscribers and responsible for righting mistakes. By making the adjustment, the organization is
deemed to be accountable. Expectations and performance are managed through procedures
implemented in accord with the administrative structure of the organization. There is fixed process
for dealing with the problem, and there is no uncertainty of outcome. The organization or the person
involved have little discretion in dealing with the matter and only narrowly defined billing problems
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can be corrected this way. The necessary corrective actions are internalized through codified
accounting practices. External auditors may have assisted in implementing these practices.
• Technicians determine that service interruptions exceed industry standards and that one of three
means are available to assure continued service. The variation in solutions is the outcome of
professionally implemented planning and analysis. Many alternatives may have been possible but
professional standards of practice largely dictate those most practical or achievable. Given the
relatively clear objective, the means to upgrade or maintain service levels are also clear. The
analysis, possibly completed by staff, is dependent on industry and professional norms and certified
by regulators to meet requirements. The technical staff is responsible for implementing these plans,
and the organization is deemed accountable by meeting these standards or norms. To not do so
would be deemed unaccountable. Unlike administrative controls, technical discretion extends
across a larger continuum of problems. .
• The most costly of the three alternatives would likely assure electrical service even during the worst
storm season. The customer does not care which of the two least expensive options will be
implemented because they vary only by capacity of the line such that the change does not affect
service at a specific address. Because any of the possibilities satisfy a desired level of utility at
approximate an equal cost, the customer operates at a point of indifference regarding this specific
decision and the devices to implement it. As a specific action is addressed, the zone of indifference
diminishes.
• The more expensive alternative, however, will cause power costs to surge so the broader market is
unlikely to support the more costly scheme. Market discipline imposes efficiency on the
organization, encouraging the less expensive service decision. The more expensive strategy,
whether accepted or rejected, is speculative in its potential cost and value but the anticipated results
can be projected within a tolerable range. Ideas and products generated with some discretionary
judgment internally are ultimately controlled by externalized conditions realized in terms of
preferences.
• Should the third alternative be deemed more desirable, the franchise area will have to be expanded
to defray costs. Expanding this area infringes on the franchise of another utility district but that
utility’s license is expiring and may not be renewed. The decision to expand or deny an application
for the expansion is a political issue of regional concern and involves substantial investments to
acquire needed easements. These costs will be passed to subscribers but potentially recovered.
Given the many interests, accountability for decisions is subsumed by a largely political process
where the alternatives and their impacts are debated and weighed. They are the product of
negotiations among affected parties. The outcome of the measure is uncertain, and the arrangements
needed to achieve the alternative are very complex. Deliberations will draw on the internal expertise
of the organization but delegated authority vests in parties or processes external to the organization.
Defining accountability in this context is somewhat more difficult but it is likely to be reflected in
terms of an achieved consensus derived from multiple sources of input.
• All the above must occur within some legally defined boundaries.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

At the center of the proposed research effort are three principal research questions
and a group of related hypotheses that query the importance of accountability and its
relationship or dependence upon pubic participation activities. The analysis explores
the benefits of accountability in terms of its impacts on behavior and performance
within the context of the special district form of government.

Chapter 3 describes the research questions, relates them to the theoretical
framework proposed in Chapter 2, and outlines in detail the methodology that
underlies the analysis. The content of the chapter includes a description of the
survey instrument assembled, the logic and justification for the information solicited
in the context of theory, a description of the variables and their construction as well
as a detailed discussion of the subsystems comprising the dimensions of
participation and the five dimensions of accountability that are the focus of the
current research. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the research questions
in the context of the procedures that are proposed.

3.1 Model Overview and Description
of Key Variable Relationships
The model proposed in Chapter 2, Figure 2.2 illustrates and tests several aspects of
the relationship thought to exist between public participation and accountability.
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These include:


The ordering of each dimension relative to the perceived organizational
commitment to accountability and its relationship with public participation.



The expectation
participation.



The expectation that participation is most influential in its power to shape the
dimensions of political accountability.

that

organizational

accountability

increases

with

In the proposed research, public participation functions as the independent variable. The
analysis tests its impacts and influences on accountability defined here in terms of the
total organizational commitment to specific devices or protocols intended to monitor,
control or redirect behaviors (Auditor General of Canada, 1998).

The relationship

between the independent variable and the dependent variable, along with their description
and suggested measurement scheme are reflected in figure 3.1.

The literature offers the prospect that increased participation will yield increasingly
accountable government by providing opportunities for citizens to guide, persuade, or
dissent (Kramer, 1999; Braithwaite & Levi, 1998;). Such participation occurs through
broadly inclusive activities and unrestricted access to information and staff during all
phases of policy analysis and program implementation beginning with some
identification of the problems and priorities that should be of concern.
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Figure 3.1: Relationship and Interaction Among Key Variables
Variables
Independent

Controls

Dependent

Public
Participation

Contextual
Influences

Accountability

Description or
Definition

The process of
interactive
involvement in the
affairs or actions of
government beyond
that associated with
voting or elections

Organizational
(Internal) and
Environmental
(External) influences
that might otherwise
impact the role of
public participation

The presence of systems
or devices which, through
their structural content,
manage behavior
according to some
standard or expectation of
outcomes

Major
Dimensions
or Themes

Accessibility
Focus: paths to
information and
resources used in
interactions
Permeability
Focus: the level of
engagement and the
means used to distill
interactions
Transparency
Focus: attitudes
toward open
governance

Organizational
Focus: operating
structure and
resources
Environmental
Focus: influences of
setting

Administrative
Focus: routine command
and control
Professional
Focus: standards for
practice
Market directed
Focus: consumer oriented
actions and preferences
Political
Focus: Stewardship and
integrity
Legal
Focus: specified conduct

Organizational
o Attitudes in the
workplace setting
o Staff attitudes about
accountability
o Organization type
o Emphasis on
regulation
o Controls specific to
the organization
involved
o Dependence on tax
collections
Environmental
o Implementation
vehicle
o Service area
o Political volatility
o Special interests
represented on
board
o Political dominance
o Electoral controls
o Other controls

Legal
o Presence of rules and
regulations
Administrative
o Presence of management
controls
Professional
o Industry guidelines and
procedures
Market directed
o Responsiveness and
service
Political
o Behavioral conduct

Measurement Accessibility
Operationalized o Physical access
o Information access
(Examples)
o Venues and locale
o Frequency of
deliberation
Permeability
o Participation at
multiple process
stages
o Information
creation
o Apparent influence
Transparency
o Defined structure
o Representativeness
o Openness
o Consistency
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Proponents of participation argue that continued interaction with affected constituencies
builds democratic consciousness while it also raises the community awareness necessary
to monitor and direct policy makers (Ashford & Rest, 1999; Innes, 1992; Kweit & Kweit
1987; Kramer, 1999; Lando, 1999; Walters, Aydelotte & Miller, 2000; Warren, 1996).
Such sentiments aptly describe interaction with general purpose institutions, but it is not
certain how the citizen's role is best realized in the special district setting.

The

expectation is that levels of participation are likely to vary across organizations,
depending on the specific function, the dimension of accountability that is invoked, and
the balance to be achieved between complexity and uncertainty.

Correspondingly, accountability, as measured by both the willingness to provide key
information and the behavioral emphasis on a battery of administrative, professional,
market, political and legally codified practices is expected to be greater as the influence
or presence of public participation increases. On balance, the analysis anticipates that
public participation will have its strongest influence where dimensions of political
accountability are invoked.

The presumed value in improved accountability, using

participation as a vehicle to develop accepted behaviors, is improved outcomes
(Barberries, 1998; Behn, 2001; Berman & Wang, 2000; Downs, 1999).

The

emphasis on outcomes derives from the strong programmatic focus that is the frequent
justification for the special district form of government.

Given that political

accountability is also associated with increased levels of discretionary behavior,
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participation, while leading to enhanced accountability, may also be associated with less
certain solutions and outcomes (Deleon, 1998).

Controls in this model consider the possible impact or influence of organizational culture
and the environmental context in which decision making occurs because the special
district operating and political structure may themselves be the impetus for accountable
behavior rather than public participation. In effect, the character of the organization and
the setting in which it operates loom as possible alternative explanations for variations in
accountable behavior and must be considered in testing the present model (Ruscio, 1999).

As this model is conceived, organizational variables center on each district's operating
structure, and service orientation. Considine (1975) and Putnam (1995, 2000) hold out
the prospect that informal networks involving highly trusted organizations may, in effect,
negate the need for public participation. Environmental variables center on each district
government's context and setting, specifically the size of its service area, legislative
origin, board construction, and electoral controls over that board.

3.2 Research Strategy
The research uses a survey instrument distributed to a specifically defined population of
about 500 special district governments and their chief operating or executive officers.
The survey incorporates Dillman's (2000) design principles and was implemented
according to his strict methods of monitoring and follow-up.
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These special districts and their addresses were culled from electronic archives provided
by the United States Department of Commerce and represent the districts and their 1997
operating characteristics. The analysis is concerned only with those districts designated as
large districts -- defined and explained below-- in 1997. In these archives, 1382 special
districts are enumerated but the data base provided records for 1370. This group was used
and in many cases contact information was updated.

The survey instrument inquires extensively about public participation and accountability
practices, the principal issues of concern in this dissertation. In terms of accountability,
the survey probes about the professional practices, legal requirements, market context,
and other devices used to control organizational and administrative behaviors. To
evaluate the context in which participation and accountability occur, the survey inquires
about the organization’s mission, political stability, reporting systems, program content,
program objectives, financial performance, legislative environment, electoral practices,
size of service area, and dependence upon taxes among other organizational and
environmental factors.

These attributes together are, in effect, the social and

demographic characteristics of the organization’s being investigated and together
represent the control functions or possible rival influences shaping accountability.
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There were no known questionnaires addressing the substance of the research questions
of interest here. However, the scope of the questionnaire parallels the issues and concepts
discussed at length in the framework developed form the literature and summarized in
Chapter 2. That literature focused on the structural and management issues of special
districts perceived as reducing their accountability, the democratic importance of public
participation and its role in shaping accountability, and finally the ways in which
accountability might be measured or evaluated. Based on this literature, three specific
research questions were posed.

The questionnaire combines a series of statements and questions intended to identify
specific devices or mechanisms extant or planned within these governments and
management's perceptions of their utility or effectiveness in certain kinds of situations.
Where appropriate, various measures that capture the specific dimensions of many related
activities, were summed to create multiple indices. These index variables focus largely
on the multiple dimensions of public participation and the various schemes for
implementing accountable behaviors described in the modification to the Romzek and
Dubnick (1987) model.

The data, once summarized, was exposed to a series of statistical tests, including
univariate, bivariate and multivariate procedures. The process builds to a multivariate
model that tests the variation in an organization’s commitment to accountability
stemming from public participation when controlled for other possible influences. In that
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model, participation emerges as a statistically significant factor in shaping organizational
accountability as that term is defined in this research.

The concepts explored through the questionnaire and then statistically tested were
discussed in series of brief interviews with selected district executives. These interviews
confirmed the reasonableness of the theoretical approach to the research problem and
provided perspective on the application of the research findings.

3.3 Survey Development
As noted above, the concepts and dimensions of the analysis are materially
dependent on the themes and framework described in Chapter 2. While there is a
substantial body of literature on public participation and a growing body of
knowledge on accountability, many of the conceptions applied have to be
considered exploratory.

There are, for example, no known existing scales or

questionnaires that loan themselves to the current research purpose. As the survey
was assembled, it was reviewed by several executives engaged in special district
activities and others who have expressed an interest in discrete elements of the
larger analysis. A group of twenty surveys was mailed to administration
professionals for testing. Several modifications were made following receipt of
comments from the peer reviewers and a return of the pilot survey.
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3.4 Population and Sampling Frame
The sampling frame is drawn from approximately 1,400 special district or special
purpose units in the country identified categorically as large special districts by the
United States Department of Commerce (USDC, 1997). These units represent about
four percent of the total estimated 35,000 special districts and special purpose
governments reported in operation (USDC). As shown in Table 3.1, this group of
special purpose governments is engaged in various transportation, recreational,
resource management, fire control, community development, community health, and
environmental activities that are otherwise performed by departments contained
within general purpose governments.

These larger special district governments are distinguished by the resources and fulltime
or permanent staff available to implement policy internally. The present analysis and
model are concerned only with the discretely drawn lines of authority and institutional
systems that exist in these larger hierarchical organizations, at least in part because
hierarchical leadership rests at the foundation of the Romzek and Dubnick (1987)
typology. The survey was directed toward the senior management of these special
districts because they are the principal coordinators of institutional policy within
each respective organization. Ultimately, 489 units were targeted as the sampling
frame. As shown in Tables 3.2A -3.2C, this group of governments includes all those
units with at least 75 employees other than hospital authorities.
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Table 3.1: Inventory of Large Special Districts, Their
Function(s) and Relationship to Sampling Frame

Function or Activity
Air transportation (airports)
Cemeteries
Drainage
Education
Electric power
Fire protection
Fire protection and water supply
Flood control
Gas supply
Highways
Hospitals
Housing and community development
Industrial development
Irrigation
Libraries
Mortgage credit
Natural resources and water supply
Other and unallocable
Other health
Other multifunction districts
Other natural resources
Parking facilities
Parks and recreation
Public mass transit systems
Public nursing homes
Sea and inland port facilities
Sewerage
Sewerage and water supply
Soil and water conservation
Solid waste management
Water supply
Totals

Total,
All Large
Districts

% of
Large
Districts

26
1
1
30
78
16
1
8
17
8
241
191
27
20
21
8
14
77
46
93
1
5
54
78
3
21
76
70
2
26
110
1370

2%
0%
0%
2%
6%
1%
0%
1%
1%
1%
18%
14%
2%
1%
2%
1%
1%
6%
3%
7%
0%
0%
4%
6%
0%
2%
6%
5%
0%
2%
8%
100%
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Number of
Districts
in Sampling
Frame
18
0
0
0
27
13
0
0
5
5
0
105
0
5
21
0
8
4
38
43
0
1
44
64
0
7
28
24
1
3
29
489

% of
Sampling
Frame
4%
0%
0%
0%
6%
3%
0%
0%
1%
1%
0%
22%
0%
1%
4%
0%
2%
1%
8%
9%
0%
0%
9%
13%
0%
2%
6%
5%
0%
1%
6%
100%

Table 3.2A: Construction of the Sampling Frame
Used in the Analysis
Districts Included/Excluded

Totals

All large special districts
Less:
Hospital districts with 0 employees
Hospital districts with 1-74 employees
Other districts with 0 employees
Other districts with 1-74 employees
Subtotal:

1370
59
3
182
458
702

Large special districts with at least 75 employees
Less:
Hospital districts with at least 75 employees

668
179

Total in sampling frame

489

Table 3.2B: Sampling Frame, By Type of Special District

Type or Function
Air transportation
Electric Power
Fire Protection
Gas Supply
Highways
Housing and Community Development
Irrigation
Libraries
Mass Transit
Natural Resources and Water
Other and unallocable
Other Health
Other Multifunction
Parking
Parks and Recreation
Sea and Inland Ports
Sewerage
Sewerage and Water
Soil and Water Conservation
Solid Waste
Water Supply
No Response
Totals

Number of
Districts in
Sampling
Frame
18
27
13
5
5
105
5
21
64
8
4
38
43
1
40
7
28
24
1
3
29
N/A
489

% of
Sampling
Frame
4%
6%
3%
1%
1%
21%
1%
4%
13%
2%
1%
8%
9%
0%
8%
1%
6%
5%
0%
1%
6%
0%
100%
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Number of
Respondents
12
15
4
0
0
34
2
12
32
7
1
5
12
0
33
4
11
14
1
3
22
2
226

% of
Respondents
5%
7%
2%
0%
0%
15%
1%
5%
14%
3%
0%
2%
5%
0%
15%
2%
5%
6%
0%
1%
10%
1%
100%

Table 3.2C: Sampling Frame, By Total Employment
Number of
Districts in
Sampling
Frame

Number of
Employees
75-100
101-200
201-300
301-400
401-500
501-600
601-700
701-800
801-900
901-1,000
1,001-2,000
2,001-3,000
3,001-4,000
More than 4,000

73
152
68
48
35
25
14
16
3
8
19
15
5
8
Totals

1

489

% of
Sampling
Frame
15%
31%
14%
10%
7%
5%
3%
3%
1%
2%
4%
3%
1%
2%
100%

Number of
Respondents
30
66
33
19
10
15
11
5
4
4
18
5
3
1
1

224

% of
Respondents
13%
29%
15%
8%
4%
7%
5%
2%
2%
2%
8%
2%
1%
1%
100%

Exclsudes No Responses

Although the 489 governments that comprise the sampling frame provide or manage a
variety of services, the specific activity may be less critical than the relationships among
staff, the organization, and the organization’s affected constituency. As noted, each of the
units in the sampling frame employs at least seventy-five persons under the direct
supervision of the chief executive officer. The governments include a variety of local
heath care organizations but not those linked to hospitals. The respective size and budgets
suggest that these 489 governments are themselves the proprietary source of the goods or
service in question. From informal discussions with some of these groups, it appears that
these units do not contract the goods or services they provide nor do they oversee
facilities that are managed or leased on behalf of others for purposes of production or
implementation.
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Overall, the total number of special purpose governments continues to grow, increasing
from about 22,000 governments in 1967. However, many of these governments exist
simply to satisfy the legal requirements of an independent structure while their actual
functions are fulfilled by staff assigned to or operating within another entity. Such
staffing may be administrative or technical. In some cases, there is simply no staff and
reporting is the responsibility of another agency altogether. Because they are often
vehicles for a single initiative, these governments may be relatively inactive, abandoned,
or tabled but not actually dissolved. In effect, they are not really functional units (Nunn
and Schoedel, 1997). Expectedly they would have small operating budgets or limited
debt commensurate with their focus and their authorizing legislation.

In contrast to the very small or relatively inactive bodies, another group of special
purpose governments employs substantial personnel and carries significant indebtedness.
These large special district governments, as they have been defined by the U.S.
Department of Commerce (USDC, 1997), have annual revenues or expenditures of at
least $10,000,000 and/or carry debt greater than $20,000,000. For the most part, they
maintain large bureaucracies and may have multiple facilities or work stations under their
control. The largest of the special districts within this sampling frame employs almost
13,000 people.
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Although the 1370 units constitute only about four percent of the total number of special
districts, they collectively represent almost eighty percent of the operating revenues and
88.2 percent of the outstanding indebtedness incurred by all special purpose governments
(USDC, 1997). Because of their scale and impact, these large special districts are, in
effect, a window into the particular behaviors that nuance this form of government.

Even among these large special purpose governments, however, there are bodies that
have no staffs or very small staffs. As a result, they have significant indebtedness but
limited operating budgets. A reported 702 of these governments have fewer than 75
employees. In 1997, 241 units within this group had no employees whatsoever. With
limited or non-existent manpower, these units may not have the capacity to implement
the full battery of accountability controls suggested by the model nor to sustain the
intensive program of public participation as it is defined here.

Among the 1370 large special district governments, there are 241 hospital authorities or
hospital districts, including fifty-nine with no employees or about twenty-five percent.
These authorities are the biggest group within this strata of special purpose governments.
By virtue of their apparent lines of accountability, they pose a special case that do not
make them well suited for inclusion in this analysis. Given that these hospital districts
represent about eighteen percent of the total number of large special districts, there is
some concern that their presence in the sampling frame might mask outcomes that the
analysis seeks to investigate.
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Hospital districts are a notable departure from the other large special districts, including
even local healthcare groups and counseling agencies. These local healthcare groups and
counseling agencies, unlike hospital districts, have an apparent preference for hierarchical
organizations and dedicated staff that provide services, implement programs, and
cultivate public participation. In contrast, hospital districts typically oversee large
facilities that are dependent on loose contractual arrangements with the physicians that
are not in their employ or under their exclusive control. Viewed in this way, the hospital
is only a conduit for a service delivered by a network of attending physicians and
specialists. In most cases, the attending physicians will have their own practices which
assure financial independence from the hospitals with which they partner. Some
physicians will have an affiliation with multiple hospitals that may have different
standards or systems in place. Further, these physicians are accountable to other agents
outside of the hospital system including the state, their respective accreditation bodies,
peers, insurers, and their patients. These are multiple forms of control that have little in
common with the systems integral to the model being tested.

This group of 489 governments comprising the sampling frame is a substantial part of the
total number of large special districts and, from a functional standpoint, appears to
represent the larger group of governments quite well. An examination of the data and
their distributions shown in Tables 3.2A-3.2C indicates there is no obvious bias within
the example itself stemming from the activity of the special district or from its size
as measured by the total number of persons employed.
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In the aggregate, the sampling frame represents about thirty-six percent of the total 1370
large special districts. It represents about forty-three percent of the 1129 large districts
with fulltime or permanent staff. Net of hospital districts and districts with no employees,
the sampling frame represents about fifty-two percent of the remaining 947 large special
districts.

The literature asserts that highly technical disciplines will be more resistant to
public participation, relying instead on professional standards of practice, markets
and administrative procedures. To address this distinction in program perspectives
and outlook, each organization in the sampling frame is ultimately assigned to a
classification indicative of its relative technical or social orientation.

3.5 Distribution of Survey and Data Collection
Methods for preparing and administering the survey reflect the Dillman (2000)
design and process. Special districts in the sampling frame received and cover letter
The survey instrument itself could be returned either via self addressed, postage
paid envelop or toll free fax.

One week after the initial mailing, each non-respondent received a reminder notice,
followed by a second survey instruments to those still not responding. Finally, after
three weeks, non-respondents were contacted by telephone and encouraged to return
the survey instrument.
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Dillman offers the expectation that approximately forty percent of the targeted
respondents will reply if the methods described are followed. In the present case,
226 potentially usable replies from an identifiable 489 special districts were
received, representing a 46.2 percent response rate.

After reviewing the replies

received, 206 surveys provided sufficient and complete data for developing the
various models described in Chapter 5. The suitable replies represent about a fortytwo percent response rate.

3.6 Instrumentation and Measurement
As the analysis is structured, public participation is the independent variable and
accountability is the dependent variable. Control variables are comprised of factors
that consider other environmental or organizational influences on operating culture
and context and which, individually or collectively, might be construed as potential
rival explanations for variations in organizational accountability.

3.6.1 Public Participation
Public participation is a process of interactive involvement in the affairs or actions of government
beyond that associated with voting or elections. Defined in this way, public participation is
measured in terms of processes associated with three discrete dimensions. These processes
speak to the context or manner in which a specific activity occurs. In the case of
public participation process is related to the way in which interactions are
managed, the vehicles used to facilitate interaction and its frequency.
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The literature is rich with instrumental interpretations of meaningful public
participation described in terms of its process functions (Boaden, Goldsmith,
Hampton, & Stringer, 1982; Bockmeyer, 2000; DOE, 1994; Ebdon, 2000; Rowe and
Frewer, 2000; Warren, 1991). The most participatory forms of involvement require
deep immersion in the broadest possible range of interactions. Questions and/or
responses examined the reported benefit and the relative desirability or benefit of
participation in the context of agenda setting, policy development, resource priority,
budget analysis, budget confirmation, problem identification, program development,
program confirmation, general information exchanges, routine dialogues and other
activities.

As well, the literature identifies many vehicles for the implementation of
participation with the explicit declaration that open houses and informational
meetings rate as the least beneficial forma of community dialogue. Questions in the
survey examined the frequency and relative desirability of information exchanges,
open houses, citizen review or advisory boards, standing committees, ad hoc
committees, individual meetings and other devices.

The research strategy treats public participation as a continuous variable using the
following Likert scale.

Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Disagree
Somewhat
(3)

Don't Know,
Can't Say
(4)
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Agree
Somewhat
(5)

Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree
(7)

Not
Applicable
(8)

Individual scores to thirty questions listed in Tables 3.3A-3.3C were aggregated and
averaged to create a composite measure indicating the apparent weighted
importance or desirability of public participation and its various process functions.

3.6.2 Accountability
Accountability is defined in this analysis as the total organizational commitment to
manage or control expectations or behaviors using the full battery of devices or
protocols available to that organization (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987; Kearns, 1994;
March and Olsen, 1995; Miller, 1998; Mulgan, 2000b). It is characterized by the
presence of highly structured or controlled systems or devices in place to manage
behavior or practices according to some standard or expectations of outcomes.
Table 3.3A: Public Participation, Accessibility,
Paths to Information,
Staff and System Resources
Survey Question
•

Staff typically initiate citizen participation activities.

Q1-59

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Citizen participation activities occur in a variety of venues and settings.
Citizen participation activities occur at widely varying times of day
Citizen participation activities are supported by wide distribution of information.
Informal citizen contact with staff is encouraged.
We maintain a web site that allows direct communication.
Staff from many different levels of the organization have a role in citizen participation activities.
Citizen participation activities involve the use of committees, individual meetings, and advisory
boards.
Our citizen participation activities rarely involve the use of large public meetings.
Citizen participation activities occur regularly and frequently.

Q1-60
Q1-61
Q1-62
Q1-63
Q1-64
Q1-65
Q1-66

•
•
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Q1-67
Q1-68

Table 3.3B: Public Participation, Permeability:
Opportunities to Engage the Organization
At Specific Task Levels
Survey Question
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

We encourage our clients or constituents to suggest new ideas for programs or services.
We ask our constituents to suggest what kind of staffing or skills are needed to implement these
new programs.
We ask our constituents to tell us what the results of our programs should be.
Every proposed, new, or continuing program uses public participation in some way.
As a result of our citizen participation activities, there have been several new programs initiated
in the last two years
As a result of citizen participation activities, there have been changes in the way our organization
budgets, staffs, or manages its programs.
Citizen participation activities are used to evaluate and/or critique our existing programs.
Public participation activities influence our proposed, new, and continuing programs equally.
The organization distributes minutes of its citizen participation proceedings.
The organization’s performance evaluation criteria place an emphasis on citizen participation
activities.
We work hard to assure that citizen input. is reflected in the way our programs are created,
planned and managed.

Q1-48
Q1-49
Q1-50
Q1-51
Q1-52
Q1-53
Q1-54
Q1-55
Q1-56
Q1-57
Q1-58

Table 3.3C: Public Participation, Transparency:
Embedded Attitudes Toward
Open Governance
Survey Question
•

Citizen participation activities are emphasized more today than they were two years ago.

Q1-69

•
•
•

Our citizen participation activities generate public trust.
Our citizen participation activities can be described as a candid exchange of ideas.
The staff people responsible for public participation have been involved in such activities for
many years.
These people are comprised of senior staff or they report directly to senior management.
Our participation activities can be described as polite or civil.
We set clear goals for our participation activities.
Our citizen participation activities are open to all parties.
Even when the results of citizen participation are different than expected, it is our practice to
schedule the remaining events as they were originally planned.
We aggressively seek participants for our citizen input.

Q1-70
Q1-71
Q1-72

•
•
•
•
•
•
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Q1-73
Q1-74
Q1-75
Q1-76
Q1-77
Q1-78

The intention in the present case is to define accountability in terms of the content
shaping the form of expectations or outcomes that will be realized. It is worth
repeating again that, like participation, accountability is also multi-dimensional but
substantially more complex in its composition (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987; March
and Olsen, 1995).

Heretofore, five dimensions have been identified, each with its own process and
content measures as described below. Together, they offer a composite glimpse of
accountability.

Tables 3.4A-3.4E identify the various questions used as summed

scale for organizational accountability.

Table 3.4A: Accountability, the Administrative Dimension:
Presence of Management Controls
Intended to Assure Routine Command and Control
Survey Question
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

This organization has a mission statement.
Staff evaluations occur regularly and frequently.
The organization has an administrative manual that describes procedures for all routine tasks.
The organization uses the most current information technology.
The organization has a clear chain of command.
We complete an independent financial audit annually.
Our mission statement has been revised or modified in the last two years.
The organization maintains a detailed job description for each staff position.
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Q1.1
Q1.2
Q1.3
Q1.4
Q1.6
Q1.7
Q1.8
Q1.9

Table 3.4B: Accountability, the Professional
Dimension: Presence of Industry Guidelines,
and Procedures Intended to Create Standards of Practice
Survey Question
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Most of our professional staff exceed the minimum qualifications stipulated for their jobs.
We use external inspections or peer review processes.
We require staff to participate in continuing educational activities.
Performance measurement is used to direct the professional staff.
Our organization is subject to the rules of a professional association or regulatory body.
We encourage our key staff to contribute to professional publications.
The organization and staff maintain licensures and/or certifications at least comparable to those of
similar organizations.
We have a recognized industry or institutional standard for almost every service we provide.

Q1.27
Q1.28
Q1.29
Q1.30
Q1.31
Q1.32
Q1.33
Q1.34

Table 3.4C: Accountability, the Political Dimension:
Behavioral Conduct That Suggests
Stewardship and Presence of Leadership Integrity
Survey Question
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Complex or controversial policy matters are always discussed during regular board meetings.
It is our practice to seek out the opinions of related or nearby governments to keep them informed
of our plans or activities.
Many people tend to compete for our board seats.
Our board typically supports proposals advanced by staff.
Nearby or related governments have trust in our actions
This organization is more likely to encourage citizen participation than other nearby or local
governments.
Staff are encouraged to express their opinions to board members.
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Q1.11
Q1.14
Q1.16
Q1.17
Q1.18
Q1.20
Q1.45

Table 3.4D: Accountability, the Market Dimension:
Responsive Service Practices Institutionalized
by Consumer Oriented Demands

Survey Question
•
•
•
•

We have been successful in adapting our services and pricing to the demands of our customers.
It is our practice to anticipate the needs of users or constituents in advance of their demands.
Any service problems, deficiencies, or outages are promptly corrected.
We achieve our financial goals while maintaining the quality of our services.

Q1.21
Q1.22
Q1.23
Q1.26

Table 3.4E: Accountability, the Legal Dimension:
The Presence of Rules and Regulations
That Assure a Minimum Standard of Conduct

Survey Question
•

Annual audits are required.

Q1.88

•

Other reports must be completed or filed annually.

Q1.90

Administrative Accountability The importance of administrative accountability is
embedded in management and organizational style and outlook (Hirst, 1995). Its
related measures, described by Romzek and Dubnick (1987), focus primarily on the
organization's structure and its relationship with staff (internal) and other
organizations (external). Questions will consider the availability or presence of
clear mission statements, charters, or by laws, procedure manuals, the nature of the
administrative structure and reporting systems, official acknowledgement of
participatory processes, the frequency of staff or task evaluations, and the role of
benchmarking tools that guide or redirect program activity or staff functions. This
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analysis treats administrative accountability as a continuous variable using the
following Likert scale.

Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Disagree
Somewhat
(3)

Don't Know,
Can't Say
(4)

Agree
Somewhat
(5)

Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree
(7)

Not
Applicable
(8)

Individual scores were summed and averaged by the total number of answered
questions, creating a composite measure indicating the apparent weighted
importance or desirability of each individual tool or device associated with
administrative structure. The highest scoring response will be indicative of those
organizations centered on routine practices or procedures to achieve administrative
accountability.

Professional Accountability Professional accountability reflects an organizational
commitment to a rigorous code of technical effectiveness (Dunn & Legge, 2001;
Durant et al, 1995; Dwivedi and Jabbra, 1989 ; Hirst, 1995; March and Olsen, 1995;
Romzek and Dubnick, 1987).

The principle underlying this dimension of

accountability is the trained specialist's willingness to subvert self or professional
interest to public interest (Bundt, 1992). Its related measures focus on the
organization's use of standards of professional practice and competence. Questions
and responses in the survey consider the availability or presence of educational
standards, staffing relative mission, years of service, peer recognition, licensures,
publications,

application

of

benchmarking
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or

performance

measurement,

availability of technical documentation supporting decisions or actions, and internal
peer reviews.

The research strategy treats professional accountability as a

continuous variable using the following Likert scale.

Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Disagree
Somewhat
(3)

Don't Know,
Can't Say
(4)

Agree
Somewhat
(5)

Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree
(7)

Not
Applicable
(8)

Individual scores were summed and averaged by the total number of answered
questions, creating a composite measure indicating the apparent weighted
importance or desirability of each individual dimension associated with professional
accountability.

The highest scoring responses will be indicative of those

organizations centered on professionally imposed means to achieve accountable
behaviors.

Political Accountability In both the Romzek and Dubnick (1987) and the models
that have borrowed from their typology ( Deleon, 1998; Dicke & Ott, 1999; Kearns,
1994), political accountability involves negotiations between and among the
organization itself and participation among individuals citizens, groups, lobbyists,
elected interests, related political interests, and others needing to create, advance or
respond to an agenda.

Public participation assumes a pivotal role in political

accountability. The primary measures or indicators implicit in the role of political
accountability reflect the circumstances in which it is invoked and its perceived
strength as an influence over organizational effectiveness and mission (Dwivedi &
111

Jabbra, 1989; March and Olsen, 1995; Mulgan, 1997, 2000b, 2002; Payne is
Skelcher, 2001; Sinclair, 1995). The survey instrument explores the nature of the
electoral process, the competition for office, terms, interaction with constituencies,
ethic

standards,

conflict

of

interests

statements,

aggressive

information

dissemination, clear commitments to wide forms of participation, and a symbolic
commitment to other layers or organizations of government. This research treats
political accountability as a continuous variable using the following Likert scale

Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Disagree
Somewhat
(3)

Don't Know,
Can't Say
(4)

Agree
Somewhat
(5)

Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree
(7)

Not
Applicable
(8)

Individual scores were summed and averaged by the number of questions answered,
creating a composite measure indicating the apparent weighted importance or
desirability of each individual dimension associated with political accountability.
The highest scoring responses are indicative of those organizations centered on
participation and other interactions that induce accountable behaviors through
politically negotiated processes.

Legal Accountability

Legal accountability assumes certain minimal reporting

procedures codified or mandated through law with the expectation that
organizations and/or individuals will comply or reply accordingly. Laws, observe
Romzek and Dubnick (1987), are at the foundation of the administratively governed
state.. The literature suggests that legal structures are the most common form of
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control and potentially the most in conflict with other systems or devices to exercise
oversight (Dubnick, 1998; Franklin, 2001; Hirst, 1995; Leazes, 1997; Moe &
Gilmour, 1995). Legal accountability may arise from within the organization but it
is distinguished from internally maintained administrative procedures in that legal
controls may apply across all forms of accountability as an expectation of a
minimum standard of behavior.

As characterized in the modified model, legal

accountability and its battery of controls or rules exist simultaneously within and
outside of the organization. Measures related to legal accountability derive from
legislation and orders. Questions in the survey consider the requirements for audits,
conformance to accounting standards, notices for meetings,

routine voting

procedures, public participation codified in terms of specific notice or vehicles,
record maintenance, financial disclosures, and sunset provisions.

The present

strategy treats legal accountability as a continuous variable using the following
Likert scale.

Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Disagree
Somewhat
(3)

Don't Know,
Can't Say
(4)

Agree
Somewhat
(5)

Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree
(7)

Not
Applicable
(8)

Individual scores were summed and averaged by the number of questions answered.
creating a composite measure indicating the apparent weighted importance or
desirability of each individual dimensions associated with legal accountability. The
highest scoring responses are indicative of those organizations centered on
mandated controls to achieve accountable behaviors.
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Market Accountability

The clearest departure from the Romzek and Dubnick

(1987) model considers the role and importance of market based controls to achieve
accountable behavior. In concept, the market assumes that appropriate behaviors
should be induced thorough efficiency and pricing (Boschken, 2000; Coats, 2002;
Cummins, 2000; Gillette, 1994; Hawley, 2000; Mo, 2001; Robert, 1993; Wilson,
1995). The competitive market model assumes the existence of alternative services
systems but these are not likely to be available within the jurisdiction of most
special districts.

More likely, the market based model for special districts will

reflect issues of reasonable pricing rather than competitive pricing, reported
consumer (dis)satisfaction,

perceptions about alternative service providers or

substitute commodities, vehicles to acknowledge public needs, system upgrades,
systems failures, systems for customer service, financial reports, annual reports, and
aggressive marketing or outreach.

The research strategy treats market

accountability as a continuous variable subject to the following Likert type scaling.

Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Disagree
Somewhat
(3)

Don't Know,
Can't Say
(4)

Agree
Somewhat
(5)

Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree
(7)

Not
Applicable
(8)

Individual scores were summed and averaged by the number of questions answered,
creating, a composite measure indicating the apparent weighted importance or
desirability of each individual dimensions in achieving a market based from of
accountability. The highest scoring response are indicative of those organizations
centered on efficiency imposed through the behavior of markets.
114

3.6.3 Control Variables
Control variables are imputed into the analysis as a means of addressing other
internal or external considerations that might otherwise impact the emphasis and
role of public participation in the model.

The model incorporates a series of

organizational and environmental variables that provide some description of both
the organization's composition and structure as well as the context in which the
organization functions. As shown in tables 3.5A and 3.5B some of these controls
are index or composite measures, and their construction is discussed in the
following chapter. The remaining controls are non-index variables.
Table 3.5A: Internal Controls: Organizational
Attributes That Influence the Manner in Which
Deliberations and Policies Are Shaped
Survey Question
•
•

•
•
•
•

Industry emphasis and program orientation
General attitudes and sensitivity to accountably issues. Index comprised of
the following
à By being accountable, the public takes a more favorable view of
this organization.
à By being accountable, the actual quality of our work is improved.
à By being accountable, our programs are implemented more
efficiently.
à A formal accountability system creates a positive work
environment for the staff.
à Accountability is important to maintaining public trust.
à Our system of accountability is important to maintaining our
financial and political independence.
There are controls that are unique to this organization
This organization views itself primarily as a regulatory body.
Assessments, dedicated millages, or other taxes are this organization’s
primary source of funds.
Perceived quality of the work environment work environment. Index
comprised of the following
à
à
à
à

This organization is effective.
Our constituents or clients appreciate our services and
accomplishments.
Our staff is highly committed to their work.
Overall, this is considered an excellent place to work.
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Q2.4

Q1.79
Q1.80
Q1.81
Q1.82
Q1.83
Q1.84
Q1.95
Q1.97
Q1.100

Q1.39
Q1.43
Q1.46
Q1.47

Table 3.5B: External Controls: Environmental
Attributes That Influence the Manner in Which
Deliberations and Policies Are Shaped

Survey Question
• Organization faces other controls not specified
• The number of board seats representing a specific interest group or
industry.
• The service area extends beyond the boundaries of a single county or
municipality.
• The organization was created by a special act
• It is our belief that we operate in a stable political environment.
• Nearby or related governments see us as powerful or dominant in setting
policy.
• Most board members are elected.

Q1.94
Q2.7
Q1.96
Q1.101
Q1.13
Q1.19
Q1.102

Internal controls These internal controls or organizational attributes include the
quality of the workplace setting, attitudes or perceptions regarding the importance
of accountability, dependence on taxes as a source of revenue, and the form of
product or service. This group of variables is comprised of composite and non
index variables.

The most obviously distinguishing variable stems from the ostensible differences in
the services provided and their industry orientation. These differences, in turn, yield
plausible differences in the way accountability is managed, attitudes and systems in
place for achieving accountable behaviors. For example, the literature cites the
potential impact of formal and informal means of control, emphasis on ethical
behaviors through centralized management practices, and the general workplace
environment as affecting worker morale and productivity, and potentially their
responsiveness to accountability practices.
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Those districts that benefit from dedicated millages or tax levies are reasonably
expected to respond to constituents wanting to control those dollars. If a unit
perceives itself as a regulatory body, more than a service provider, it also seems
reasonable that such a district would approach accountability with greater passivity
than a district with frequent constituent interaction.

External controls

These external or environmental variables consider the legal

form of implementation, the form of its leadership and the size of the service area.
This group of variables is comprised of composite and non index variables. The
composite variables are drawn from various questions that are summed and
averaged by the number of questions.

As the literature indicates, many of these districts are created by special acts of the
legislature as they were in Florida until passage of the Uniform Community
Development Act in 1980. Such legislation articulates procedures for filing and reporting
that constitute rigid, deterministic controls. Board seats may be the product of special
interest groups or industry segments that direct organizational policy in directions that
result in greater or lesser accountability. Frequently, special industry representatives are
required to fill board seats, hardly a means of linking a broad constituency to the actions
of a special district. A basic premise of our democratic structure is that direct electoral
control is an essential form of accountability but many board seats – particularly those
with an industry or special interest focus -- are not elected but appointed. Deleon’s
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(1998) interpretation of complex settings and issues would suggest that politically
dominant organizations or those operating in a stable political environment might
respond differently to perceived requirements for accountability. Those districts that
operate across multiple jurisdictions have many competing layers of political and
appointed leadership through which they must maneuver. The need to curry support
among these jurisdictions can enhance accountability by inserting greater controls or lead
to a reduction in accountability because power or control is bifurcated.

3.7 Construction of Accountability Criteria
While this research is concerned about the role of pubic participation as a tool for
improving the accountability practices of these special district governments, the
useful measurement of accountability is itself an important objective. Using the
variables as they have been described for the administrative, professional, market,
political, and legal dimensions of accountability, a measurement scheme is devised
that weighs overall commitments to accountability. These schemes consider varying
levels of criteria connected to increasing or decreasing average scores derived from
these five dimensions and identify each organization as highly accountable,
generally accountable, moderately accountable, and generally not accountable.
These measurement schemes provide a structured approach, absent in the Romzek
and Dubnick (18987) typology, for assessing at least a relative level of
accountability.
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3.8 Follow Up and Interpretation
The quantitative analysis in this research is complemented by a focused series of
comments, gleaned from open ended questions within the survey and subsequent
discussions with a select number of executives associated with districts of varied
levels or forms of accountability. These comments act to validate the constructs that
are incorporated in the theoretical framework and provide added perspective to the
analysis.

3.9 Anticipated Outcomes Based on Model
The analysis posed three questions associated with the perceived value of
accountability and the role in which public participation can influence the various
dimensions of accountability. Together they bring focus to certain aspects of the
dimensions themselves, their perceived value, ordering, and variation relative to
public participation.

3.9.1 Research Question 1: What Is the Importance
of Accountability in the Administration of Special Districts?
The initial question, reflected in the following hypothesis, probes the level of
commitment special districts evidence toward accountability and specific behaviors that
might deem them accountable.

H1.1:

Perceptions about the awareness or importance of accountability will
substantially effect the overall organizational commitment to
accountably and accountable behaviors.
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Such perceptions as referenced are largely value driven assessments to establish a frame
of reference for the interest and support of various accountability protocols implemented
by special purpose governments.

3.9.2 Research Question 2: In What Ways, if at all, Does
Public Participation Affect Organizational Accountability
And Does Its Influence Vary by Operational or Program Focus?
The second research question, also reflected in one hypothesis, is the pivotal issue on
which the research rests. It examines the specific relationships thought to exist between
public participation and the many dimensions of accountability. The emphasis here is the
variability in an organization’s commitment to accountability, controlled for other forces
that inferentially are rival explanations in explaining the formation of accountability.

H2.1:

Public participation, when controlled for other internal and external
factors, is a material influence in encouraging accountable behaviors and
overall organizational accountability.

H2.2:

The programs and operating focus of special district governments, when
controlled for other internal and external factors, are a material influence
in encouraging accountable behaviors and overall organizational
accountability.

3.9.3 Research Question 3: Are There Observable
Differences in the Way That Public Participation Affects Each
System or Dimension of Accountability?
The third research question, also reflected in one hypothesis, deals with the relative
impact of public participation on each of the various dimensions of accountability. As
shown in the suggested model in Chapter that revises the Romzek and Dubnick typology,

120

participation is likely to have its greatest impacts on the political dimension and
commensurately lower impacts on the legal dimension.

H3.1:

As a means of inducing accountable behaviors, public participation is
strongly associated with the political dimension of accountability.

H3.2:

As a means of inducing accountable behaviors, public participation is
weakly associated with the legal dimension of accountability.

3.10 Summary
This chapter has described the procedures associated with exploring the three research
questions and their related hypotheses. The research strategy included the selection of
key variables appropriate for testing in the context of the problem; the construction,
testing and distribution of a survey questionnaire; grouping and evaluation of variables;
operationalization of concepts; completion of statistical tasks; and confirmation of
concepts through interviews.

The following chapter describes the statistical and analytical procedures applied in the
context of the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2 and the research questions
posed in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 4. DATA AND ANALYSIS
At the center of this analysis is the relationship presumed to exist between public
participation and alternative forms of accountability, focusing on overall organizational
accountability. The premise underlying the research is that enhanced commitments to
public participation yield accountable behaviors and an improved means of exacting
those behaviors. Much more generally, there is the expectation that special district
governments assign an explicit value to accountability even if the currency of that system
is not fully understood.

Building on the value and importance of accountability as a conceptual construct,
Chapter 4 describes the analytical procedures leading to the development of a
multivariate model used to explore the relationship between public participation and
accountability, the statistical significance of varied inputs and assumptions
incorporated in that model, potential rival hypotheses that were necessarily
considered in explaining the relationships involved, and specifications supporting
the preferred model.

4.1 Organizational Profile
of Respondents: Perceptions
and Realities of Accountability
An estimated 489 special district governments, engaged in a variety of technical or
social services at multiple jurisdictional levels, were targeted for this research
effort. These 489 units represent about one-third of the largest special district
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governments operating in the United States as these were identified in 1997
(USDC). After reviewing the replies received form these units, 206 surveys yielded
sufficient data, representing about a forty-two percent response rate.

Those replying to the survey were almost exclusively the highest high level staff.
General managers, presidents, chief executives and those with similar titles
represented about 65.5 percent of the respondents. Deputy directors, chief financial;
officers, and department directors represented an additional 22.3 percent of the
respondents, bringing the total senior staff to about eighty-eight percent of the
respondents.

The special district governments responding to the survey were placed in one of two
groups according to their orientation to health, education and welfare activities or
their orientation to broad community development activities, primarily those related
to the provision or management of infrastructure. Some sixty-three percent of the
226 special districts returning the survey are involved in community development
and technical support functions (air transportation, fire protection, solid waste, mass
transit, power, irrigation and similarly oriented activities) while the balance have a
distinct association with health, education or welfare functions (miscellaneous
healthcare activities, housing, libraries, and recreation or similar functions).
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The smallest governments within this target group have at least seventy-five
employees with the largest reporting approximately 4,400 people. On average, these
organizations employ about 500 people. Annual budgets for these units range from
some $4,000,000 to $808,000,000 with a mean of approximately $69,000,000. Of
those special districts reporting the number of board members representing a
specific industry or group, the range extends from zero to twenty-four with the mean
board comprised of 1.5 officials from within a particular industry or interest group.

4.1.1 Perceptions of Accountability
Table 4.1 summarizes selected descriptive statistics relating to a series of questions
that were posed to these special districts regarding their perceptions about the role
and importance of accountability in the management of their respective organization
and the provision of their programs. The model building procedures, including the
univariate and bivariate analysis that are described, do not depend on the statistical
form of this data but the responses and information reflected in these responses
offer evidence of a value system that might be construed complementary to the
relationship between public participation and accountability.

Among these respondents, without reference to their programmatic orientation, there
is an obvious commitment to the concept of accountability.

Queried about the

importance of accountability -- expressed in terms of the public’s perception of the
organization (Q1.79), its work quality (Q1.80), program efficiency (Q1.81), the
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Table 4.1: Frequencies Associated with Survey Questions
Probing Accountability and its Role in Governance

Survey Question

Not
Strongly
Disagree Don't
Agree
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Somewhat Know, Somewhat Agree Agree Applicable Total

Q1.79

By being accountable, the public takes a
more favorable view of this organization

0.0%

0.9%

2.7%

0.9%

15.6%

42.7%

37.3%

0.0%

100%

Q1.80

By being accountable, the actual quality of
our work is improved.

0.0%

0.4%

1.8%

2.2%

12.9%

46.2%

36.4%

0.0%

100%

Q1.81

By being accountable, our programs are
implemented more efficiently.

0.0%

0.9%

4.0%

3.1%

15.1%

48.0%

28.9%

0.0%

100%

Q1.82

A formal accountability system creates a
positive work environment for the staff.

0.0%

1.3%

4.9%

5.4%

25.0%

39.7%

23.7%

0.0%

100%

Q1.83

Accountability is important to maintaining
public trust.

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

8.4%

36.0%

55.6%

0.0%

100%

Q1.84

Our system of accountability is important to
maintaining our financial and political
independence.

3.2%

0.5%

3.2%

3.2%

15.3%

36.9%

37.8%

0.0%

100%

Q1.85

All the various rules and regulations that
govern our organization’s accountability or
conduct are easy to follow.

4.0%

7.2%

16.1%

3.1%

30.5%

24.2%

14.8%

0.0%

100%

work environment (Q1.82), trust generation (Q1.83), and political independence
(Q1.85) -- at least 63.4 percent agree or strongly agree that accountability is
essential to achieving each of these functional or practical objectives. Almost
ninety-two percent of the respondents see accountability as important to maintaining
public trust (Q1.83).

4.1.2 Realities of Accountability
Inevitably the analysis rightfully focuses on the degree to which these various
districts might be deemed accountable according to some scale or metric. The
perceptions of special district personnel, discussed just above, provide a benchmark
by which the actual accountability practices of these governmental units can be
judged.

Three alternative levels of scoring were tested and compared for reasonableness -- a
rigorous, medium or low standard -- each involving an increasingly higher mean
value imputed for the dimensions of accountability described in Chapters 2 and 3.
Criteria establish the basis for four discrete categories that comprise the rigorous,
medium or low standard and exhibit increasing commitments to organizational
accountability as it has been defined in the current research. The alternative scoring
schemes elaborated in Tables 4.2 A- 4.2C act as a sensitivity analysis which, when
viewed together, are suggestive of the most appropriate and rational to use.
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In effect, four categorical variables common to the rigorous, medium and low
standards invite an assessment of the numeric differences in response for each
variable across the three schemes. For purposes of comparison, each organization is
identified as highly accountable, generally accountable, moderately accountable, or
generally not accountable depending upon the average score achieved in each of the
dimensions that operationalize organizational accountability.
The scoring for each standard is described in terms of the original Likert scale
applied to each question administered in the survey.
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Disagree
Somewhat
(3)

Don't Know,
Can't Say
(4)

Agree
Somewhat
(5)

Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree
(7)

Not
Applicable
(8)

That is, a higher score suggests a broader commitment to the many subsystems and
devices that comprise the full battery of controls fundamental to the highest level of
accountability and the highest standard of discriminating behaviors. The average
scores are drawn from the variables ADMACT (administrate accountability),
POLACT (political accountability), MKTACT (market accountability), PROFACT
(professional accountability), and LEGACT (legal accountability) as these are
further defined and explained in Tables 4.4 A and 4.5.
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Table 4.2A: Criteria for Assessing a RIGOROUS Standard of Accountability
Level of
Accountability

Numerical Cutoffs

Operationalization

Highly
Accountable
Generally
Accountable

6.80 or higher average score for
each of the five dimensions
From 6.40 to 6.79 average score for
each of the five dimensions

A minimum response from a point closer to strongly
agree than to agree
A minimum response beyond agree to a point just
below strongly agree

Moderately
Accountable

From 5.50 to 6.39 average score for A response that is not quite strongly agree but at
each of the five dimensions
least better than somewhat agree

Generally not
Accountable

5.0 or less average score for each
of the five dimensions

A response is at least somewhat agree

Table 4.2B: Criteria for Assessing a MEDIUM Standard of Accountability
Level of
Accountability

Numerical Cutoffs

Operationalization

Highly
Accountable

6.50 or higher average score for
each of the five dimensions

A minimum response from less than a midpoint
between strongly agree and agree in all
dimensions
A minimum response of agree to just below the
midpoint of somewhat agree and agree
A response that is not quite agree but at least
somewhat agree

Generally
Accountable
Moderately
Accountable

From 6.00 to 6.49 average score
for each of the five dimensions
From 5.00 to 5.99 average score
for each of the five dimensions

Generally not
Accountable

4.99 average score for each of the A response is not even somewhat agree
five dimensions

Table 4.2C: Criteria for Assessing a LOW Standard of Accountability
Level of
Accountability

Numerical Cutoffs

Operationalization

Highly
Accountable
Generally
Accountable

6.0 or higher average score for
each of the five dimensions
From 5.50 to 5.99 average score
for each of the five dimensions

A minimum response that is agree or better in
all dimensions
A minimum response between somewhat agree
and agree but not quite agree

Moderately
Accountable

From 4.50 to 5.49 average score
for each of the five dimensions

Generally not
Accountable

A response that is from a midpoint between
agree and somewhat agree to a midpoint
between somewhat agree and don’t know
4.49 average score for each of the A response is just less than a midpoint between
five dimensions
don’t know and somewhat agree
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Table 4.3 summarizes descriptive statistics from the application of these criteria to
the special districts responding to the survey. Expectedly, as the standards by which
a district is judged are lowered, the number of districts that ostensibly function at
the highest levels of accountability grow commensurately.

Table 4.3: Comparisons in Standards of Accountability
Rigorous Standard

Highly
Accountable
Generally
Accountable
Moderately
Accountable
Generally Not
accountable
Totals

Medium Standard

Low Standard

Number of
Districts
Achieving

Number of
Percentage Districts
Achieving

Number of
Percentage Districts
Percentage
Achieving

4

1.8%

27

12.4%

93

41.9%

35

15.8%

66

29.7%

80

36.0%
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60.4%

115

51.8%

44

19.8%

49

22.1%

14

6.3%

5

2.3%

222

100%

222

100%

222

100%

The rigorous, or most stringent of the three measurement schemes, indicates that
only 1.8 percent of the districts would be highly accountable, compared with a
medium measure of 12.4 percent and a low measure of 41.9 percent. In effect, the
number of special districts that are either highly or generally accountable under the
most stringent of the three measurement schemes doubles, then doubles again, as the
thresholds by which accountability is deemed appropriate begin to decrease. The
rigorous standard indicates that almost a quarter of the special districts would be
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considered as generally not accountable while a reduced or low standard indicates
that the only 2.3 percent would generally not be accountable.

Appling the medium standard, of the twenty-seven units identified as being highly
accountable, nineteen show an orientation to multiple dimensions of accountability.
Only one of the fourteen districts identified as generally not accountable has
multiple systems of accountability.

Each of these standards yields a Chi Square value of p<.01, indicating the results are
not likely the product of a chance distribution. Having made this statistical
observation, however, the low standard offers the prospect that an unreasonably
large number of special districts embrace the full battery of practices necessary to
achieve full organizational accountability while the rigorous standard seems to
indict all their practices. The middle standard indicates the most balanced results
with 51.8 percent of the special districts embracing practices that would be deemed
at least moderately accountable. On face value alone, the medium standard seems
the most valid.

Reflecting on the questions raised about the perceptions of accountability,
approximately about forty percent of the respondents, on average, indicated they
agreed or strongly agreed on the importance of accountability and its function in
supporting organizational objectives. This figure compares well to the 42.7 percent
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of the districts identified as generally or highly accountable in the medium standard
of measurement.

The rigorous standard yields only 17.6 percent and the low

scheme yields an implausible 77.9 percent.

4.2 The Initial Stages of Model
Building: Description
of Key Variables Considered
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical justification and linkages for the variables
incorporated into the preliminary and final multivariate models developed in the
current research.

Within that framework, several internal and external

environmental factors, operating in conjunction with public participation, were
deemed as potential rival influences for their effects on accountability.

The dependent variable accountability and the key independent variable public
participation are each comprised of attributes or responses that capture their
multiple dimensions as these have been described in this paper.

These are the

study’s most complex variables, comprised of five and three dimensions
respectively.

Administrative accountability, professional accountability, political

accountability, market accountability, and legal accountability are individual
concepts that collectively represent or characterize the broader idea of
accountability as it is interpreted in this research. Accessibility, transparency, and
permeability together evidence public participation as the term is defined in the
present context.
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The survey yielded a total of twenty variables for analysis and specification in three
different multivariate models, including the multi-dimensional measures for pubic
participation and accountability. These several variables were based on both individual
and multiple responses to the questions posed in the survey. Tables 4.4A through 4.4B
on the following page summarize the descriptive statistics associated for each variable
analyzed or subsequently included in the various models that were tested.

These

variables are grouped according to the general role(s) they satisfy in the analysis.

As detailed in Chapter 3, the study relies largely on the use of a Likert scale that assigns a
value to each question that ranges from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). A
score of 8 indicates a respondent considered a question Not Applicable to the
respondent’s organization or set of circumstances. The Likert scale is the basis for a
series of subsequent analyses that generally treat each variable as a continuous form of
measure.

Table 4.4A: Descriptive Statistics, Variables
Associated With Dimensions of Accountability
Variable

Description

N

Orientation to administrative or management
forms of behavioral control.
POLACT Orientation to openness and engagement as a
form of behavioral control.
MKTACT Orientation to efficiency as a form of behavioral
control..
PROFACT Orientation to excellence in technical proficiency
as a form of behavioral control.
LEGACT Emphasis on specified actions and procedures as a
form of behavioral control.
ADMACT

MIN MAX

Mean

SD

Skew

Kur

223

3.00

7.00

6.19

.65

-1.18

2.22

224

2.75

6.88

5.25

.74

-.65

.59

223

1.25

7.00

5.70

.95

-1.44

3.24

223

2.50

7.00

5.52

.86

-.59

.25

226

1.00

7.00

6.61

.76

-3.96

21.86
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Table 4.4B: Descriptive Statistics, Variables Associated with
Public Participation and its Role in Accountability
Variable

Description

N

MIN MAX Mean

SD

Skew

Kur

Accountability (Dependent)
ORGACT

Overall or institutional commitment 226
to sustain a system of controls that
maintains organizational behaviors.

2.70

6.70

5.60

.53

-.861

3.03

1.19

6.81

5.00

.99

-.89

1.13

225

2.00

7.00

6.11

.71

-1.70

5.44

225

3.67

7.00

6.02

.77

-.71

.19

223

1.00

7.00

5.09

1.59

-.99

.09

222

1.00

7.00

4.97

1.45

-.70

.10

224

1.00

7.00

5.82

.16

2.21

.32

224

1.00

7.00

4.97

2.10

-.78

-.81

222

1.00

7.00

5.56

2.17

-1.27

-.08

223

1.00

7.00

1.95

1.19

1.92

4.33

224
224

1.00
1.00

7.00
7.00

3.18
6.04

2.39
1.83

.63
-1.93

-1.31
2.24

223

1.00

7.00

3.78

2.76

.188

-1.88

224

0.00

1.00

214

0.00

24.00

1.49

3.65

3.22

11.8

Public participation (Independent)
PUBPART Use of and dependence upon certain 226
content and processes associated
with public participation.
Other variables (Control)
WRKENV

ACTPRCPT

STABILITY
REGDOM
OTHCON
LEGUNIQ
SERVAREA
REGBOD
REVTAX
SPECLEG
ELECBOD

ORGTYPE

SPECINT

A measure of the quality and
satisfaction of the organizational
workplace.
Perceived importance about
accountability and its role in
organizational wellbeing.
Relative political volatility in which
the organization functions
Political context in which the
organization functions
Other controls or devices not
specified
Uniquely targeted legislative
devices or controls
Organization’s perceived role as a
multi-jurisdictional body.
Organization’s perceived role as a
regulatory body.
Dependence upon taxes
The legislative vehicle that created
the organization.
Perceived role of elected board
members perceived role of elected
board members
Organization’s orientation to
technical or social forms of
programming (Dummy).
The number of board seats assigned
to special interest groups or industry
segments

Given the study’s use of the seven point scale for all but two questions from the survey
instrument, the minimum and maximum range of most responses is narrow. This limited
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range results in a correspondingly narrow minimum and maximum range in the key
variables subsequently analyzed and/or transformed into index values. Both the skewness
and kurtosis statistics are broadly indicative of poorly distributed data. These poor
distributions are confirmed graphically.

4.2.1 Reliability Analysis: Construction of
Index Variables Used in Multivariate Models
Of the potential twenty variables considered in this analysis, nine are composite or
index measures while the remainder are drawn from individual questions in the
survey.

The nine index variables are used to test certain assumptions, or they are

incorporated as controls in the final multivariate model. Table 4.5 identifies those
that are index values, references the question(s) within the survey associated with
each variable, and briefly describes its operationalization.

All of the composite measures are a product of multiple questions explicitly
described or implied by the literature.

As a group, these multiple questions or

responses were subjected to a form of reliability analysis. Cronbach Alpha can be
used to estimate a proportion of variance consistent in a set of scores, providing a
tool that enables the construction and systematic evaluation of individual measures
treated collectively as a sum scale.

Expectedly, some items in the anticipated scale were eliminated from further
consideration since these did not enhance the Cronbach Alpha statistic. Those
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questions or measures that remained after completion of the scaling procedures were
then summed and averaged by the number of responses. Each index variable used in
the subsequent analysis represents an average response value calculated for the
particular group of questions or responses listed and described in the table.

Table 4.5: Attributes and Questions Associated
with Key Index Variables, Models 1,2, and 3
Variable

Operationalized
Definition

Survey
Questions

Cronbach
Alpha

ADMACT

An index calculated from the response value of Q1.1; Q1.2; Q1.3; Q1.4; Q1.6;
eight items, summed and averaged. The
Q1.7; Q1.8; Q1.9
variable measures the organization’s orientation
or commitment to administrative or management
forms of behavioral control.

0.703

POLACT

An index calculated from the response value of
eight items, summed and averaged. The
variable measures the organization’s orientation
or commitment to openness and engagement as
a form of behavioral control.

Q1.11 Q1.14; Q1.15; Q1.16;
Q1.17; Q1.18; Q1.20; Q1.45

0.649

MKTACT

An index calculated from the response value of
four items, summed and averaged. The variable
measures the organization’s operational
efficiency as a form of behavioral control.

Q1.21; Q1.22; Q123; Q1.26

0.733

PROFACT

An index calculated from the response value of
eight items, summed and averaged. The
variable measures the organization’s orientation
or commitment to excellence in technical
proficiency as a form of behavioral control.

Q1.27; Q1.28; Q1.29; Q1.30;
Q1.31; Q1.32; Q1.33; Q1.34

0.723

LEGACT

An index calculated from the response value of
two items, summed and averaged. The variable
measures the organization’s emphasis on
specified actions and procedures as a form of
behavioral control.

Q1.88; Q1.90

0.687
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ORGACT

An index calculated from the response value of
thirty-five items distributed among five
dimensions, summed and averaged. The
variable measures the overall or institutional
commitment to sustain a system of controls that
maintains organizational behaviors.

Q1.1; Q1.2; Q1.3; Q1.4;
Q1.5; Q1.6; Q1.7; Q1.8;
Q1.9; Q1.14; Q1.15; Q1.16;
Q1.17; Q1.18; Q1.20; Q1.21;
Q1.22; Q1.23; Q1.24; Q1.25;
Q1.26; Q1.27; Q1.28; Q1.29;
Q1.30; Q1.31; Q1.32; Q1.33;
Q1.34; Q1.86; Q1.87; Q1.88;
Q1.90; Q1.91; Q1.93

0.836

PUBPART

An index calculated from the response value of
thirty-one items distributed among three
dimensions, summed and averaged. The
variable measures the organization’s use of and
dependence upon certain content and processes
associated with public participation.

Q1.48; Q1.49; Q1.50; Q1.51
Q1.52; Q1.53; Q1.54; Q1.55
Q1.56; Q1.57; Q1.58; Q1.59
Q1.60; Q1.61; Q1.62; Q1.63
Q1.64; Q1.65; Q1.66; Q1.67
Q1.68; Q1.69; Q1.70; Q1.71;
Q1.72; Q1.73; Q1.74; Q1.75;
Q1.76; Q1.77; Q1.78;

0.949

WRKENV

An index calculated from the response value of
four items, summed and averaged. The variable
measures the quality and satisfaction of the
organizational workplace.

Q1.39; Q1.43; Q1.46; Q1.47

0.793

ACTPRCPT

An index calculated from the response value of
six items, summed and averaged. The variable
measures the organization’s perceived
importance about accountability and its role in
organizational wellbeing.

Q1.79; Q1.80; Q1.81; Q1.82
Q1.83; Q1.84

0.848

Accountability (ORGACT) and public participation (PUBPART), as the key
variables of concern in the model(s) tested, are the most complex of the many
measures evaluated. PUBPART is comprised of thirty-seven questions distributed
among its three dimensions. Accountability (ORGACT) is comprised of thirty-one
questions distributed among its five dimensions. The remaining index variables are
based on two to seven questions each taken from the potential 226 cases or
observations in the dataset.
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The variables ADMACT, POLACT, MKTACT, PROFACT, and LEGACT represent
each of the five dimensions of accountability as it is operationalized and defined in
this analysis. These dimensions reflect the Romzek and Dubnick typology, modified
to embrace the free market behaviors that may also characterize certain special
districts.

These individual variables, based on a total of thirty questions, were created to
explore their suitability as indicators of the attributes assumed to be associated with
the respective dimensions and subsequently with the more broadly inclusive concept
of organizational accountability. As well, these variables are also tested for their
discrete association with public participation. In the final model(s), the five
individual variables are combined to create the single, multi-dimensional variable
ORGACT, regressed against PUBPART and other control variables.

WRKENV is a composite or index variable that captures that organization’s
relative desirability as a workplace, considering its attitudes toward the content of
the work itself, pay scales, general effectiveness and organizational outlook.
ACTPRCPT is an index variable that measures overall attitudes toward and
awareness of accountability and its importance at a conceptual level. It is comprised
of six individual questions that solicit responses about specific aspects of
accountability and its perceived importance on the organization’s well being.
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A target Cronbach Alpha statistic is 0.700.

All of the index variables meet or

exceed the target rate with the exception of POLACT (0.649) and LEGACT (0.689)
two of the five dimensions of accountability. Because the discrete measures
comprising these variables are merged with those of the other dimensions to create
the more comprehensive and complete index variable ORGACT, their role in the
analysis is not material to the model outcome.

4.2.2 Non Index Measures or Variables
The eleven variables listed in Table 4.6 are non-index variables used to test certain
assumptions or incorporated as controls in the final multivariate model. With the
exception of ORGTYPE and SPECINT, all the variables above are keyed directly to
a Likert scale -- already described -- that assigns a value to each question that
ranges from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 7 (Strongly Disagree).

A score of 8 would

indicate a respondent considered a question Not Applicable to the respondent’s
organization or set of circumstances. However, none of the respondents indicated
this option to these particular questions.

ORGTYPE is a dummy variable that characterizes the nature of the special district
governments being analyzed.

As indicated, approximately sixty-three percent are

engaged in the provision of infrastructure and community development services. Such
groups are coded with a 1. The remaining thirty-seven percent are engaged in the
provision of various social and health care activities and are coded with a 0. SPECINT
is the only measure that is a true interval variable. SPECINT corresponds to the
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number of board seats assigned to special interest groups or specific industries that
are associated with the activity of the responding governmental unit.

Table 4.6: Attributes and Questions Associated
with Key non-Index Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3
Variable
STABILITY
REGDOM
OTHCON

LEGUNIQ

SERVAREA
REGBOD
REVTAX
SPECLEG
ELECBOD
ORGTYPE
SPECINT

Operationalized
Definition

Survey
Questions

Single item variable describing the relative political volatility in which
Q1.13
the organization functions.
Single item variable describing the relative political context in which
Q1.19
the organization functions.
Single item variable suggesting controls or devices beyond conventional Q1.94
financial controls or legal mechanisms otherwise mentioned or specified
in the survey
Single item variable suggesting that the controls associated with the
organization’s behavioral systems are specific only to the organization
or its particular activities.
Single item variable measuring perceived role as a multi-jurisdictional
body.
Single item variable measuring perceived role as a regulatory body.

Q1.95

Single item variable measuring the organization’s dependence upon
taxes as the main source of revenue.
Single item variable describing the legislative vehicle that created the
organization.

Q1.100

Single item variable measuring perceived role of elected board
members.
Dummy variable that classifies the organization by its orientation to
technical or social forms of programming.
Single item interval variable representing the number of board seats
assigned to special interest groups

Q1.102

Q1.96
Q1.97

Q1.101

Q2.4
Q2.7

Table 4.7 provides a frequency distribution for each non-index variable that is a
product of the Likert scale employed in this analysis.
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Table 4.7: Frequencies for Likert Scale,
non-Index Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Disagree Somewhat

Don't
Know,

Agree
Somewhat

Agree

Strongly
Not
Agree Applicable Total

STABILITY

(1)
3.1%

(2)
7.2%

(3)
10.8%

(4)
0.9%

(5)
26.9%

(6)
(7)
36.3% 14.8%

(8)
0.0%

100%

REGDOM

2.7%

3.6%

9.5%

16.7%

26.1%

28.4% 13.1%

0.0%

100%

OTHCON

4.9%

3.1%

2.2%

5.8%

7.2%

32.3% 44.4%

0.0%

100%

LEGUNIQ

11.6%

9.4%

4.0%

5.8%

15.6%

21.4% 32.1%

0.0%

100%

SERVAREA

10.8%

9.0%

1.8%

4.5%

17.6%

56.3%

0.0%

0.0%

100%

REGBOD

41.7%

39.9%

9.0%

3.6%

4.0%

0.4%

1.3%

0.0%

100%

REVTAX

37.9%

20.1%

8.0%

7.1%

7.6%

19.2%

0.0%

0.0%

100%

SPECLEG

6.3%

5.8%

0.9%

1.8%

2.2%

16.1% 67.0%

0.0%

100%

ELECBOD

38.1%

14.8%

2.7%

0.4%

7.2%

36.8%

0.0%

100%

0.0%

4.3 Model Building: Univariate
and Bivariate Procedures
Several variables of potential interest in the current modeling effort were examined
initially at the univariate level for their potential statistical distribution then and at
the bivariate level to identify significant relationships between the several
independent variables and the dependent as well as relationships among the
independent variables suggestive of potential collinearity, heteroscedasticity, or
other flaws in the final model(s).
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4.3.1 Univariate Analysis
The efforts to evaluate both the perceptions and realties of accountability and its
importance in the role of special district administration have been described. Those
procedures yield frequencies and distributions of value in exploring relationships
among the other variables, in constructing three models to be described, and
ultimately in testing the various hypotheses posited for this research.

The variables relevant to the modeling effort were graphed and tested for normal
distribution, Appendix B. With the exception of ORGACT, the composite measure
for organizational accountability, none of these variables were visually or
statistically normally distributed.

The remainder were considered in need of a

transformation. The change was completed using a natural logarithm scale but the
distributions remained poor.

The variable transformations ultimately proved

unnecessary because the multivariate model(s) do not violate assumptions of
normality and heteroscedasticity, problems that can stem from poor distribution of
data. The procedures involved with the transformation procedures are not discussed
further.

Table 4.8 provides statistical confirmation of their apparent poor

distribution.

141

Table 4.8: Tests of Normality, Kolmogorov-Smirnov
STATISTIC

DF

SIG.

.049

206

.200(*)

PUBPART

.085

206

.001

Other variables (Control)
OTHCON
STABILITY
REGDOM
LEGUNIQ
SERVAREA
REGBOD
REVTAX
SPECLEG
ELECBOD
ORGTYPE
WRKENV
ACTPRCPT
SPECINT

.323
.258
.187
.226
.314
.303
.273
.373
.269
.411
.160
.115
.399

206
206
206
206
206
206
206
206
206
206
206
206
206

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

Accountability (Dependent)
ORGACT
Public participation (Independent)

4.3.2 Univariate Findings
Findings are discussed in terms of their implications for accountability as a
construct and for their potential implications in subsequent stages of model
building.

Implications for Accountability As indicated in Table 4.1, the special districts
queried for this research report very favorable attitudes toward the value and
importance of accountability both as a concept and as a tool for achieving various
organizational objectives. Much more than half of the respondents strongly agree
142

that accountability is importance to building public trust (Q1.83). More than thirtyeight percent agree or strongly agree that the organization’s rules for instilling
accountability are easy to follow (Q1.85). This question did generate some
disagreement, however. A combined total of 27.4 percent disagreed at least
somewhat that the rules were manageable. The respondents showed strong
disagreement with only one other question, Q1.84 relating to structural freedom
(Q1.84). Less than four percent strongly disagreed that the organization’s system of
accountability furthered their respective organization’s political or financial
independence, suggesting that accountability may have other intrinsic values.

Recalling that a minimum of four and possibly as many as ninety-three special
districts achieve high levels of accountability based on an assessment of their
various behaviors within each of the five dimensions, this group of independent
governments evidences practices reasonably consistent with perceptions about their
relative importance. In conjunction with the replies to specific questions about the
importance of accountability to operations, it appears that the medium standard of
measurement is the most defensible. The medium standard offers the prospect that at
least half the special districts have systems in place that would assure at least
moderate accountability.

Less than seven percent would be considered

unaccountable by the medium standard if applied.
.
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Implications for Model Building Upon initial inspection, the key variables of
interest to the models appear to violate distributional assumptions that may signal
later problems. Again, such issues are not evident in tests of the final model,
however.

Momentarily setting aside possible issues of normal distribution, the most material
findings in the data stem from perceptions about the roles these governments play in
their local and regional settings.



Because it is a dummy variable, ORGTYPE displays a bimodal distribution.
Of the 226 groups returning the survey, 142 are engaged in community
development and technical support functions while the balance have a
distinct orientation to health, education or welfare functions. Groups in the
former category are coded 0. Groups in the former category are coded as a 1.



Among these respondents, without reference to their programmatic
orientation, 83.2 percent agree or strongly agree that their organizations have
unusual powers because they were created through special legislation
(SPECLEG).



Almost seventy-seven percent of the respondents agree or strongly agree that
their organizations may be subject to certain controls that may not have been
identified or queried specifically within the survey that they received
(OTHCON).



About forty-one percent of the respondents agree or strongly agree that their
organizations occupy some dominant place in the local or regional political
environment (REGDOM).



About fifty-one percent of the respondents agree or strongly agree that their
organizations operate in a stable political environment (STABILITY).



Some fifty-three percent of the respondents agree or strongly agree that their
organizations are subject to a battery of controls that are unique to their
organization or its structure (LEGUNIQ).
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Very few of the organizations consider themselves as primarily a regulatory
body. Only 1.7 percent agree or strongly agree that their organizations fulfill
a regulatory role (REGBOD).



Taxes do not appear to be a important in the operation of these organizations.
Less than twenty percent agree or strongly agree that taxes are the primary
source of revenue (REVTAX).

Interpretations Answers and frequencies, such as summarized above, appear
consistent with the strength of the bivariate relations among key variables and the
weights that each of these variables assume in the final model(s). For example,
REGDOM, OTHCON and STABILITY are all statistically significant, at least at the
0.05 level, within Model 1 described in Section 4.4.2. By contrast REVTAX,
identified as relatively unimportant, has no statistical significance in this model.

These impressions were largely confirmed in interviews with district executives
who explained that the services or activities provided through their organizations
are something of an exclusive enterprise in their respective settings. Consequently,
they wield enormous political influence.

Operating in the context of an

environment, at least partially stabilized by their own presence, these powerful
organizations are also able to avoid the trials and conflicts that might otherwise
emerge as competing interests vie to solicit support for their own agendas. Such
support, or possibly the absence of opposition, can change in the course of an
election occurring in a nearby general purpose government that suddenly raises the
visibility of a district. Whatever the apparent power of these special purpose
entities, political stability, or the lack, may be only a single vote away.
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Overall, the responses suggest a group of administrators in touch with the political
conditions in which they function and the powers their districts exercise. While
conceding to the possible magnitude of their powers, they also reason that the
powers themselves carry a heightened responsibility or burden to maintain a higher
standard of accountability. “Setting aside the regulations, we have a responsibility
as stewards for the services and programs we provide. At an individual level, we
are all responsible and accountable for our organization’s actions”

While the districts seem to be similar in their management structure, there appear to
be subtle differences in controls that no survey can capture. Citing the example of
an ombudsman, district personnel indicate that rules and regulators vary by
organization and state making it difficult, if not impossible, to inventory every
control that might be applicable. Such comments are then consistent with the idea
that so many respondents would identify the controls regulating their organizations
as unique to their set of circumstances or programs.

4.3.3 Bivariate Analysis
Bivariate analysis provides some perspective on the role of accountability as a
conceptual form of regulation and control among the survey respondents,
establishing a foundation for the basic framework and construction of the
multivariate model(s). At least on a preliminary basis, bivariate analysis yields an
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initial indication of the relationships among ORGACT, PUBPART and each of the
other principal variables that are the central focus of this research.

The measures and tests described provide perspective on the strength of the specific
relationship between the key dependent and independent variables while also
offering insight into other relationships between selected variables that may support
the validity of the final multivariate model(s). Again, on a preliminary basis, the
bivariate analysis may also point to possible multiple correlations among the several
independents anticipated as control influences in the final model(s). While offering
some guidance about potential collinear effects, bivariate techniques yield no
insight into the causality of any relationships that might exist.

Spearman’s Rho: Results The non-normality of the data suggests some limitations
in the reliability of using a symmetrical test to examine relationships between and
among variables. Spearman’s, and like nonparametric tests, offer a less restrictive
tool, assuming that the variables involved are treated as nominal and ordered data.

The outcome of the Spearman’s analysis is shown on Tables 4.9A, 4.9B and 4.9C,
beginning on the following page.
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Table 4.9A: Spearman Bivariate Correlation Matrix
Key Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3
Variable

STABILITY REGDOM

OTHCON LEGUNIQ SERVAREA REGBOD

REVTAX

STABILITY

1.000

REGDOM

.171(*)

1.000

OTHCON

-.027

.103

1.000

LEGUNIQ

.060

.244(**)

.301(**)

1.000

SERVAREA

.019

.110

.009

.043

1.000

REGBOD

-.011

-.110

-.099

-.019

.009

1.000

REVTAX

.019

-.096

-.185(**)

-.122

.047

.208(**)

1.000

SPECLEG

.007

.242(**)

.075

.120

.258(**)

.115

-.003

ELECBOD

.115

.028

.016

-.050

.074

-.016

.144(*)

SPECINT

.017

.120

.152(*)

.040

-.076

.006

-.201(**)

ORGTYPE

.026

-.063

.095

.093

-.364(**)

-.186(**)

.054

WRKENV

.299(**)

.341(**)

.099

.179(**)

.157(*)

-.226(**)

-.091

PUBPART

.066

.270(**)

.196(**)

.218(**)

-.004

-.079

.123

ADMACT

.199(**)

.309(**)

.197(**)

.248(**)

.134(*)

-.293(**)

-.032

POLACT

.351(**)

.402(**)

.018

.085

.105

.064

-.040

MKTACT

.327(**)

.309(**)

.151(*)

.164(*)

.131

-.128

-.073

PROFACT

.098

.313(**)

.208(**)

.200(**)

.152(*)

-.054

-.177(**)

LEGACT

.105

.230(**)

.356(**)

.241(**)

.121

-.102

-.220(**)

ORGACT

.304(**)

.513(**)

.207(**)

.254(**)

.166(*)

-.162(*)

-.120

.090

.271(**)

.189(**)

.275(**)

.160(*)

-.040

-.023

ACTPRCPT
* p< .05, ** p< .01
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Table 4.9B: Spearman Bivariate Correlation Matrix
Key Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3
Variable

SPECLEG ELECBOD SPECINT ORGTYPE WRKENV PUBPART ADMACT

SPECLEG

1.000

ELECBOD

-.129

1.000

SPECINT

.101

-.106

1.000

ORGTYPE

-.017

-.069

.121

1.000

WRKENV

.093

.170(*)

-.019

.025

1.000

PUBPART

.039

.039

.186(**)

.134(*)

.303(**)

1.000

ADMACT

.045

.223(**)

.029

.173(**)

.484(**)

.360(**)

1.000

POLACT

.101

.124

.122

-.137(*)

.387(**)

.498(**)

.368(**)

MKTACT

.023

.172(*)

-.044

-.050

.664(**)

.231(**)

.473(**)

PROFACT

.205(**)

.009

.134

-.035

.475(**)

.432(**)

.420(**)

LEGACT

.206(**)

.055

.228(**)

.093

.280(**)

.174(**)

.313(**)

ORGACT

.191(**)

.150(*)

.104

-.006

.632(**)

.509(**)

.705(**)

.144(*)

.072

.033

.071

.448(**)

.432(**)

.383(**)

ACTPRCPT
* p< .05, ** p< .01

Table 4.9C: Spearman Bivariate Correlation Matrix
Key Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3
Variable
POLACT

POLACT

MKTACT

PROFACT

LEGACT

ORGACT

ACTPRCPT

1.000

MKTACT

.311(**)

1.000

PROFACT

.467(**)

.461(**)

1.000

LEGACT

.165(*)

.252(**)

.341(**)

1.000

ORGACT

.652(**)

.669(**)

.782(**)

.426(**)

1.000

ACTPRCPT

.275(**)

.468(**)

.409(**)

.250(**)

.470(**)

* p< .05, ** p< .01
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1.000

Of the twenty variables subjected to this bivariate analysis, eight show a positive
and statistically significant relationship with the proposed dependent variable
ORGACT at the 0.01 level, including STABILITY, REGDOM, OTHCON,
LEGUNIQ, SPECLEG, ACTPRCPT, WRKENV and PUBPART. WRKENV (.632),
REGDOM (.513), PUBPART (.509) and ACTPRCPT (.470) show the strongest
relationships

with

ORGACT.

SERVAREA,

REGBOD,

AND

ELECBOD

demonstrate significance at the 0.05 level but the relationship between REGBOD
and ORGACT is a modestly negative one. REVTAX, ORGTYPE, AND SPECINT,
as potentially other controls or explanatory variables used in the subsequent
multivariate model(s), indicate no obvious relationship with ORGACT.

Statistically significant correlations among and between some of the intended
independent variables, however, hint at possible multi-collinearity. For example,
REGDOM evidences positive and statistically significant values at the 0.01 level
with LEGUNIQ (.244), SPECLEG (.242), and WRKENV (.341). STABILITY
shows significance at the 0.01 level with WRKENV (.299).
relationships between REVTAX and SPECINT and between

Similarly, the
SERVAREA and

ORGTYPE are also statistically significant at the 0.01 level but negative. Though
statistically significant, all of these results appear to be only weak to moderately
strong. Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black (1998) advise that troublesome
correlations of less than .900 are unlikely to be observed without studying their
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respective Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). Subsequent VIF analysis confirms that
there is virtually no collinearity among the independent variables.

Expectedly, PUBPART evidences statistically significant relationships at the 0.01
level with POLACT (.498), PROFACT (.432), ADMACT (.360), MKTACT (.231)
and LEGACT (.174), the variables representing each of the five specific dimensions
of accountability. The statistical significance, relative strength, and ordering
between PUBPART and the five dimensions of accountability imply that the
strongest relationship is between PUBPART AND POLACT, the weakest between
PUBPART and LEGACT.

WRKENV, REGDOM, and ACTPRCPT are also strongly related to each of these
five variables at the 0.01 level. Several of the remaining independents are also
correlated with POLACT, PROFACT, ADMACT, MKTACT, and LEGACT as the
five dimensions of accountability. These relationships, however are generally
weaker and of a lower statistical significance

Pearson Correlation: Results Although of somewhat lesser reliability because of
the data’s possible non-normal distribution, Pearson provides another bivariate tool
for screening the data initially.

While possibly providing evidence of other

variables that might be considered in the final multivariate model(s), its principal
value in this case is that the output offers a basis for comparisons with the results
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achieved using Spearman’s rho. The outcome of the Pearson correlation analysis is
shown in Tables 4.10A, 4.10B, and 4.10C.

Table 4.10A: Pearson’s Bivariate Correlation Matrix
Key Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3
Variable

STABILITY REGDOM

OTHCON LEGUNIQ SERVAREA REGBOD REVTAX

STABILITY

1.000

REGDOM

.135(*)

1.000

OTHCON

-.068

.020

1.000

LEGUNIQ

.048

.232(**)

.177(**)

1.000

-.045

.060

.003

.074

1.000

REGBOD

.092

-.071

.000

.049

.095

1.000

REVTAX

.035

-.088

-.174(**)

-.061

.057

.135(*)

1.000

SPECLEG

-.027

.185(**)

-.007

.102

.175(**)

.149(*)

-.026

ELECBOD

.109

.018

.084

-.070

.119

-.065

.054

SPECINT

-.091

.051

.065

-.027

-.006

-.041

-.148(*)

ORGTYPE

.022

-.065

-.024

.087

-.387(**)

-.201(**)

.011

WRKENV
PUBPART

.344(**)
.031

.357(**)
.238(**)

.058
.182(**)

.121
.172(*)

.105
-.044

-.123
-.111

-.049
.083

ADMACT

.204(**)

.305(**)

.134(*)

.182(**)

.088

-.255(**)

-.037

POLACT

.356(**)

.412(**)

.117

.099

.083

.103

-.065

MKTACT

.280(**)

.319(**)

.077

.079

.072

-.123

-.075

PROFACT

.043

.304(**)

.178(**)

.144(*)

.087

-.009

-.144(*)

LEGACT

.038

.206(**)

.116

.116

.081

-.131

-.116

ORGACT

.311(**)

.497(**)

.183(**)

.185(**)

.111

-.086

-.115

.055

.227(**)

.128

.178(**)

.120

-.024

.009

SERVAREA

ACTPRCPT
* p< .05, ** p< .01
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Table 4.10B: Pearson’s Bivariate Correlation Matrix
Key Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3
Variable

SPECLEG ELECBOD SPECINT ORGTYPE WRKENV PUBPART ADMACT

SPECLEG

1.000

ELECBOD

-.129

1.000

SPECINT

.118

-.076

1.000

ORGTYPE

-.023

-.068

-.037

1.000

WRKENV
PUBPART

.069
.008

.195(**)
.018

.027
.074

.044
.147(*)

1.000
.249(**)

1.000

.

ADMACT

-.058

.248(**)

.005

.190(**)

.539(**)

.317(**)

1.000

POLACT

.077

.135(*)

.092

-.157(*)

.458(**)

.436(**)

.367(**)

MKTACT

-.026

.182(**)

-.018

-.053

.696(**)

.182(**)

.510(**)

PROFACT

.167(*)

.041

.124

-.048

.471(**)

.381(**)

.423(**)

LEGACT

.136(*)

.124

.118

.101

.199(**)

.146(*)

.315(**)

ORGACT

.117

.178(**)

.093

.008

.674(**)

.439(**)

.728(**)

.176(**)

.115

-.055

.078

.482(**)

.368(**)

.374(**)

ACTPRCPT

* p< .05, ** p< .01

Table 4.10C: Pearson’s Bivariate Correlation Matrix
Key Variables, Models 1, 2, and 3
Variable
POLACT

POLACT

MKTACT

PROFACT

LEGACT

ORGACT

ACTPRCPT

1.000

MKTACT

.329(**)

1.000

PROFACT

.476(**)

.485(**)

1.000

LEGACT

.145(*)

.197(**)

.230(**)

1.000

ORGACT

.652(**)

.725(**)

.797(**)

.385(**)

1.000

ACTPRCPT

.281(**)

.423(**)

.378(**)

.227(**)

.469(**)

* p< .05, ** p< .01
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1.000

Of the twenty independent and dependent variables considered, the same eight
independent variables show a statistically significant relationship with ORGACT at
the 0.01 level.

WRKENV (.674), REGDOM

(.497), PUBPART (.439) and

ACTPRCPT (.469) show substantially stronger relationships than the other four,
STABILITY (.311), OTHCON (.183), LEGUNIQ (.185), and ELECBOD (.178).
The ordering of the three strongest correlations mirrors exactly that found using
Spearman’s rho.

One departure from Spearman’s worth noting is the relationship between ORGACT
and the proposed independents SERVAREA and REGBOD. Although only weakly
correlated with a statistical significance at the 0.05 level, they lose all significance
in the Pearson correlation.

REGDOM is statistically significant at the 0.01 level with WRKENV (.357) and
PUBPART (.238). STABILITY is also statistically significant at the 0.01 level with
WRKENV (.344), and OTHCON is statistically significant at the 0.01 level with
LEGUNIQ (.182). The correlations are similar to those attributed Spearman’s rho
and are only vaguely suggestive of possible collinearity. VIF analysis evidences no
multiple correlations in the final multivariate model(s) using these variables.
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PUBPART continues to evidence statistically significant relationships at the 0.01
level with POLACT (.436), PROFACT (.381), ADMACT (.317), and MKTACT
(.182), the same ordering found using Spearman’s. As well, the Pearson correlation
also indicates that the relationship between PUBPART and LEGACT is significant
at the 0.05 level.

Using the Pearson correlations, WRKENV, REGDOM, and ACTPRCPT remain
strongly related to each of these five variables at the 0.01 level as well. Generally
these independents display somewhat stronger relationships than PUBPART and are
uniformly related at the 0.01 level to each of the variables standing for the five
dimensions. Other independents are also correlated with POLACT, PROFACT,
ADMACT, MKTACT and LEGACT as the five dimensions of accountability.
These relationships, however, are generally weaker and of lower significance.

4.3.4 Bivariate Findings
Respondent attitudes regarding the importance of accountability and its various
subtexts point to the concept as an instrumental force shaping organizational
outlook toward programs, their implementation, certain behaviors, and broader
policy matters. Such importance, arguably, is the foundation for the bivariate
relationships that seem to be present in the data.
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While the strength of the relationships are only implied by the correlations between
PUBPART and ORGACT and between other variables and ORGACT, they are
significant statistically. The output generated by Spearman’s rho is corroborated by
the Pearson correlations which also evidence strongly significant relationships. The
non-normal distribution of the data notwithstanding, there is at least the implication
of a confirmatory result using the alternative means of analysis.

The statistical interpretations of the data are harmonious with theoretical concepts
linking public participation and accountability. The results also show the anticipated
ordering between pubic participation and ADMACT, POLACT, MKTACT,
PROFACT, and LEGACT, the five discrete dimensions comprising accountability.
That is, PUBPART is more substantively connected to POLACT, the political
dimension, than LEGACT or ADMACT, the legal and administrative dimensions of
accountability.

The strength of these relationships is consistent with certain frequencies identified
in the univariate analysis. Conceptually, STABILITY, REGDOM, and OTHCON
show strong statistical significance with ORGACT, hinting that they are potential
rival explanations for variability in ORGACT.
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Interpretations The bivariate relationships are consistent with the basic framework
advanced for the current research and consistent with the themes implied by the
univariate analysis. The importance of a stable political environment (STABILITY),
the organization’s political dominance (REGDOM), and the power or responsibility
conferred through special legislation (SPECLEG) or miscellaneous controls
(OTHCON) seems confirmed.

Again, conversations with organization executives intimate the importance of an
apparent sensitivity to the role and function of accountability (ACTPRCPT), the
culture of the workplace (WRKENV), and public participation (PUBPART).
Paraphrasing one respondent, “Service and constituent satisfaction are products of
worker satisfaction”. Another senior executive adds, “It is essential that we raise
expectations among our employees about a higher purpose.”

These remarks speak

to the role of organizational culture and mission in shaping accountability as it is
defined here.

Of the several variables showing a statistically significant bivariate relationship
with ORGACT, REGBOD indicates a negative correlation. If, in fact, an
organization’s activities are regulatory rather than service oriented, the inverse
relationship may stem from a belief that it is the organization’s function to assure
the accountability of others, possibly those providers that interact with users or
constituents on a more direct basis. For example, one special district suggested that
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its control of privately implemented water conservation practices rarely generated
scrutiny.

At this point, it remains less clear how these and other intervening influences
working together may impact or shape accountability.

Subsequent analysis,

however, demonstrates that pubic participation remains a potent force in affecting
organizational accountability even when other internal or external factors are
considered.

4.4 Model Building:
Multivariate Procedures
The univariate and bivariate analyses offer a glimpse into the basic framework driving
the primary research, the degree to which public participation is capable of enhancing
organizational accountability. Together, the univariate and bivariate analyses identify
certain concepts of substantive value in exploring this relationship. Over the next several
pages, a multivariate model is specified that describes this relationship and the relative
influence of other variables that are reasonably perceived as also shaping accountable
behaviors.

In terms of sequence, a model incorporating untransformed variables was specified,
initiated, tested and rerun after eliminating possible outliers, yielding statistically
significant and apparently valid predicted values as described over the next several pages.
The potential issues stemming from non-normal distributions at the univariate level
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suggested a confirmatory iteration of the model employing natural logarithm
transformation of all variables. In the case of the latter, the residuals appear less
satisfactorily distributed, key independents fall in significance, and the overall fit of the
model degrades. The transformed model is not reported or described in this paper.

4.4.1 Overview of the Preferred Multivariate Model (Model 1)
Although public participation is repeatedly cited for its instrumental role in decision
making, it assumes something of a rhetorical quality when invoked in the context of
accountability. Our democratic institutions fervently embrace public participation and its
variants as essential to orderly, responsive and accountable government. While the
relationship between participation and accountability may be intuitively compelling, its
value for achieving accountable behaviors remains untested in a setting that controls for
other possible influences and their impacts. Given the ostensibly public responsibilities
assumed by special district governments, it becomes imperative that their processes for
achieving accountability be both evaluated and encouraged.

The literature, derived primarily from Romzek and Dubnick and others that have
borrowed from their typology, suggest that many devices are evidence of accountable
behaviors, and collectively they are representative of organizational accountability.
Deleon (1998), Kramer (1999), King (1998) and others speak persuasively for the role
that public participation plays in advancing these behaviors. Other possibilities must
necessarily be considered, including the nature and type of the organization, its cultural
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milieu, the moderating structure of any oversight or regulatory board, legislatively
inserted controls, and political dominance, among others.

Bivariate analysis suggests that various combinations of variables, in conjunction with
public participation, merit further consideration as explanations for the relationship in
question. Some variables emerge as potentially less material.

Program content, for

example, as reflected in the orientation of the special district itself appears to be largely
an unimportant variable in assessing the commitment to organizational accountability.
Ultimately, the preferred model is comprised of fourteen variables, including thirteen that
provide statistical controls intended to isolate the role of public participation as a
principal agent in enhancing accountability in these government units.

ORGACT

=

ƒ

(STABILITY,

REGDOM,

OTHCON,

LEGUNIQ,

ACTPRCPT, SERVAREA, REGBOD, REVTAX, SPECLEG, ELECBOD,
ORGTYPE, WRKENV, PUBPART, and SPECINT)+ e

4.4.2 Multivariate Analysis, Preferred Model (Model 1), All Cases Retained
Table 4.11 shows the coefficients from the initial model. As indicated above, the
model significantly predicts the variability in an organization’s commitment to
accountability

and

related

accountable

behaviors

stemming

from

public

participation and participation activities. The global F statistic (25.679) indicates at
least one independent variable in the model is statistically related to ORGACT at
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the 0.001 level. The multivariate model yields an adjusted R2 of .628, evidencing
that the variables within the model explain approximately 62.8 percent of variation
in an organization’s commitment to a scheme of accountable behavior.

Of the fourteen total independent variables in the model, PUBPART, WRKENV,
and REGDOM are statistically significant, all at the 0.001 level. Of the thirteen
variables functioning within the model as controls, STABILITY and OTHCON
show significance at the 0.05 level. The remaining control variables evidence no
significance at any level.

Most materially, from the standpoint of the primary research question, public
participation (PUBPART), while of significance within the model, is of less
influence than the favorable setting created by the workplace environment
(WRKENV) and comparable in impact with REGDOM.

In terms of the

standardized (Beta) coefficients, WRKENV (.437) evidences almost twice the
explanatory power of PUBPART (.242) and twice the power of REGDOM (.226).
The ordered relationships and relative explanatory power of each of these
independent variables are generally maintained in subsequent iterations of the
model. All variables with the exception of REVTAX and ORGTYPE positively
influence ORGACT. These control variables, however, evidence no statistical
significance and offer only limited explanatory power in the overall model.
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Although it is difficult to think in terms of organizational accountability measured
in terms of a specific unit, the unstandardized (B) coefficients offer something of a
metric. In the initial model, for example, a unit increase in PUBPART increases the
organizational commitment to accountability (ORGACT) by .131 units. Similarly, a
unit increase in WRKENV increases the value of ORGACT by .334 units.

Table 4.11: Coefficients, Model 1, ORGACT Dependent
Variable
(CONSTANT)

B

Std. Error

1.587

Beta

.251

t

Sig.

6.313

.000

Public participation (Independent)
PUBPART

.131

.026

.242

4.993

.000

Other independent variables (Controls)
STABILITY

.041

.017

.113

2.342

.020

REGDOM

.085

.018

.226

4.581

.000

OTHCON

.032

.015

.096

2.122

.035

LEGUNIQ

.006

.012

.024

.521

.603

SERVAREA

.009

.012

.036

.739

.461

REGBOD

.004

.021

.008

.178

.859

REVTAX

-.016

.010

-.069

-1.520

.130

SPECLEG

.010

.014

.034

.723

.471

ELECBOD

.014

.009

.070

1.548

.123

ORGTYPE

-.010

.055

-.009

-.189

.850

WRKENV

.334

.043

.437

7.677

.000

ACTPRCPT

.058

.037

.084

1.594

.113

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig.

.007

.053

1.187

.237

Variable
SPECINT

B
.008

R2=.653, Adjusted R2=.628, F=25.679, N=205
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4.4.3 Multivariate Assumptions, Preferred Model (Model 1), All Cases Retained
Multiple regression requires that certain data assumptions not be violated if the
model is to be validated. Specifically,



Normality. The error terms must be normally distributed.



Collinearity. There should be no linear relationships between or among the
independent variables in the regression.



Linearity. The data must be linear in the parameters of the regression.



Independence. The error terms must be independent. Current values should
not be associated with preceding values in a series.



Homoscedasticity. The variance must be constant across the error term. That
is, the data should not be heteroscedastic.

The analysis relies on histograms, plots, and statistical measures to explore possible
deviations from these assumptions.

Normality To satisfy the requirements of this assumption, the error terms must be
normally distributed with a mean equal to zero. The absence of normality warns that
the properties inherent to the normal curve cannot be inferred from the data, limiting
generalization. Problems stemming from non-normal distributions are more
troubling with small samples.

It is not necessary that the variables themselves be normally distributed (Gujarati,
1988) and, in fact, they are not. As already described, transformation of these
variables failed to improve the apparent poor distribution that characterizes the data.
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Figure 4.1 on the following page offers a visual indication that the error terms are
normally distributed with only modest deviations from the actual normal curve. This
distribution is confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that is extremely
sensitive to deviations from normal distribution.

Multicollinearity This assumption requires that there be minimum correlation
among the key independent variables in the regression variate. While some
multicollinearity might be inevitable in the course of testing, its presence masks the
true effects of key independent variables and their relationship(s) with the
dependent variable.

Figure 4.1: Histograms Associated with Key Variables Analyzed
Dependent Variable: ORGACT

25

Frequency

20

15

10

5
Mean = 6.28E-15
Std. Dev. = 0.965
N = 206

0
-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

Regression Standardized Residual

164

3

Table 4.12 reports the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) associated with each of the
independent variables incorporated in the preferred model. A VIF score greater than
5.0 suggests threshold concerns about multicollinearity. All independents have
values well below the hurdle rate. Although not shown, an assessment of the
eigenvalues offers additional evidence that conditions of multicollinearity are not
violated.

Table 4.12: Variance Inflation Factors, Model 1, ORGACT Dependent

CORRELATIONS
Zero-order
Partial

COLLINEARITY STATISTICS
Part
Tolerance
VIF

Public participation (Independent)
PUBPART

.443

.340

.213

.771

1.297

Other independent variables (Controls)
STABILITY

.351

.167

.100

.776

1.288

REGDOM

.505

.315

.195

.748

1.336

OTHCON

.176

.152

.090

.887

1.127

LEGUNIQ

.199

.038

.022

.875

1.143

SERVAREA

.104

.053

.031

.753

1.329

REGBOD

-.079

.013

.008

.858

1.166

REVTAX

-.102

-.109

-.065

.879

1.137

SPECLEG

.116

.052

.031

.827

1.209

ELECBOD

.163

.111

.066

.880

1.137

ORGTYPE

.016

-.014

-.008

.756

1.323

WRKENV

.689

.486

.327

.561

1.781

ACTPRCPT

.469

.115

.068

.652

1.533

SPECINT

.087

.086

.051

.923

1.083
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Linearity Relationships between the independents and the dependent must
necessarily be linear within the parameters of the regression itself. To the degree,
relationships between the independents and the dependent vary from linearity,
conventional regression will understate the overall substance of the relationship.
When several independent variables are involved in the analysis, partial regression
plots identify those which may need to be reconsidered for their influence in the
variate.

In the present case, the partial regression plots shown in Figures 4.2A through 4.2N
of the independent variables against the dependent variable indicate no obvious
departures from linearity. The plots evidence no curvature in the distribution of
points of intersection.

Figure 4.2: Partial Regression Plots Associated with Key Variables, Model 1

Figure 4.2A: STABILITY

Figure 4.2B: REGDOM
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Figure 4.2C: LEGUNIQ

Figure 4.2D: SERVAREA
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Figure 4.2E: REGBOD
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Figure 4.2F: SPECINT

Partial Regression Plot

0.0

-0.5

0.0

-0.5

R Sq Linear = 1.667E-4

-1.0

R Sq Linear = 0.007

-1.0
-4

-2

0

2

4

6

-5

0

5

REGBOD

10

15

20

25

SPECINT

Figure 4.2G: SPECLEG

Figure 4.2H: ELECBOD
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Figure 4.2I: OTHCON

Figure 4.2J: PUBPART
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Figure 4.2M: ACTPRCPT

Figure 4.2N: WRKENV
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Independence This assumption requires that the error terms not be serially
correlated with past error terms.

A failure to avoid autocorrelation causes

subsequent or dependent values to be misstated. This problem is frequently
associated with time series data rather than cross sectional data such as that which
underlies the present analysis.

First order autocorrelations can be detected using the Durbin Watson test which
compares a benchmark statistic against a general value. A value of 1.5 to 2.5
suggests that observations underlying the model are independent. In the initial
model with all observations retained, the Durbin Watson value is 2.100 indicating
that autocorrelation is not likely to be present in the preferred model.

Homoscedasticity If data is not homoscedastic -- that is, heteroscedastic -- there will
be unequal variance of the error term across the different values of the independent
variables. The presence of heteroscedastic data casts doubt on the validity of the F
test and the general form of the overall model. The presence of heteroscedastic data
can be gleaned from a simple residual plot comparing the standardized residuals
(ZRESID) against the standardized predicted value (ZPRED).

Common patterns associated with heteroscedastic data indicate a grossly flaring or
trumpet shape distribution of points that evidence increasing dispersion from zero.
Hair (1998) describes these as either triangle shaped or diamond shaped patterns.
Although very modest departures might be inferred from the residual plot on the
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following page, it indicates none of the disturbing patterns that would compromise
the analysis.

Figure 4.3: Scatterplot, ZRESID/ZPRED, Model 1
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4.4.4 Outlier Analysis, Initial Model (Model 1), All Cases Retained
Outliers are data points that may fall outside the explanatory power of the model.
Influentials include any observations that could have a disproportionate impact on
the estimated regression output.

Certain outliers or leverage points might be

considered influentials.

The present analysis uses standardized, studentized and studentized deleted
residuals, Cook’s Distance (D) and Leverage or hat values to identify observations
ostensibly inconsistent with the balance of the dataset. Cases meeting or exceeding

170

one or more of the following thresholds were identified and considered for possible
removal from the dataset subject to another iteration of the model.



Standardized residuals (ZRESID), 2.0 standard deviations, nine cases



Studentized residuals (SRESID), 2.0 standard deviations, eleven cases



Studentized deleted residuals (SDRESID), 2.0 standard deviations, eleven
cases



Cook’s Distance (D), .0207, two cases



Leverage or hat values, 0.5, two cases

Figures 4.4A and 4.4B visually confirm that a total of thirteen cases violating one or
more above the benchmarks might justify elimination from the dataset as part of the
model evaluation process.

Figure 4.4: Outliers and Influentials, Model 1
Figure 4.4A: Outliers

Figure 4.4B: Cook’s/Leverage Points
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4.4.5 Multivariate Analysis, Revised Model (Model 2), Thirteen Cases Removed
Table 4.13 summarizes the coefficients from the revised model, removing the
potentially offending cases from the analysis.

On balance, the model remains

relatively unchanged in terms of the relative weights and ordering of the
standardized coefficients or their significance. The adjusted R2 shows some
improvement, increasing from 0.628 in the initial model to 0.687. The global F
statistic (31.121) indicates significance at the 0.001 level.

Table 4.13: Coefficients, Model 2, ORGACT Dependent

B
(CONSTANT)

Standard
Error

1.871

Beta

.228

t

Sig.

8.195

.000

Public participation (Independent)
PUBPART

.172
Other independent variables (Controls)

.023

.354

7.604

.000

STABILITY
REGDOM
OTHCON
LEGUNIQ
SERVAREA
REGBOD
REVTAX
SPECLEG
ELECBOD
ORGTYPE
WRKENV
ACTPRCPT
SPECINT

.014
.016
.013
.010
.010
.019
.009
.012
.007
.046
.039
.031
.005

.130
.242
.167
.029
.095
.015
-.134
.017
.069
.029
.391
.020
.043

2.824
5.084
3.929
.675
2.024
.342
-3.142
.371
1.622
.619
7.311
.392
1.030

.005
.000
.000
.501
.044
.733
.002
.711
.107
.536
.000
.696
.304

.041
.080
.050
.007
.020
.006
-.027
.004
.012
.029
.286
.012
.005

R2=.710, Adjusted R2=.687, F=31.121, N=192
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WRKENV, PUBPART, and REGDOM remain the three variables offering
the greatest explanatory power of the model, still ranking 1, 2, and 3 in terms
of their contributions to the model.



WRKENV, PUBPART, and REGDOM remain significant at the 0.001 level
even after the cases have been deleted.



The relative weighted differences among the three have decreased somewhat
based on the value of the beta coefficients. In the initial model, WRKENV
assumed 1.8 times the value of PUBPART and 1.93 times the value of
REGDOM. These values have decreased to 1.1 and 1.6 respectively.



Seven variables continue to show no statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
LEGUNIQ, SERVAREA, REGBOD, SPECLEG, ELECBOD, ACTPRCPT,
SPECINT, and ORGTYPE again evidence little explanatory power of the
model.



REVTAX, of no significance in the initial model, is now significant at the
0.01 level but among the key variables is of only moderate weight in
explanatory power.



The power of STABILITY has lost some of its explanatory power, falling in
its importance from 4th to 6th while improving its statistical significance from
0.05 to 0.01.



In the revised model, OTHCON, increases in importance, moving from 5th to
4th among the key variables, simultaneously improving in statistical
significance. In the initial model OTHCON was significant at 0.05. Here, it
becomes significant at the 0.001 level.

Visual inspections of histograms and scatterplots evidence no basis for
reinterpreting the underlying assumptions essential to multivariate analysis. A
scatterplot of the model’s standardized residuals and its standardized predicted
values provides a reference.
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Figure 4.5: Scatterplot, ZRESID/ZPRED, Model 2
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4.4.6 Multivariate Analysis, Revised Model (Model 3), Four Cases Removed
Table 4.14 summarizes the coefficients from a further revised model. In this
iteration, only the cases with extreme leveraging or distance effects are removed
from the dataset. The remainder are retained even as possible outliers so that the
discrete effect of the specific extreme cases can be evaluated on overall model fit.

In this iteration of the model, removal of the four extreme cases modestly degrades
the model’s adjusted R2 from 0.628 to 0.620 although the model itself remains
statistically significant at the 0.001 level with overall F statistic of 24.456. The
standardized coefficients show little change from Model 1 or Model 2. As before,
WRKENV, PUBPART, and REGDOM evidence the greatest explanatory power of
the model with all three remaining significant at the 0.001 level. While WRKENV
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sustains a higher standardized coefficient, its importance in Model 3 is 1.2 times
that of PUBPART compared with 1.8 times in Model 1 and 1.1 times in Model 2.

Table 4.14: Coefficients, Model 3, ORGACT Dependent
Variable
(CONSTANT)

B

Standard
Error

1.920

Beta

.258

t

Sig.

7.445

.000

Public participation (Independent)
PUBPART

.170

.026

.328

6.551

.000

Other independent variables (Controls)
STABILITY

.037

.016

.111

2.288

.023

REGDOM

.093

.017

.271

5.393

.000

OTHCON

.033

.014

.107

2.325

.021

LEGUNIQ

.001

.011

.003

.054

.957

SERVAREA

.006

.011

.027

.545

.586

REGBOD

-.002

.021

-.005

-.097

.923

REVTAX

-.023

.010

-.110

-2.362

.019

SPECLEG

.004

.014

.016

.325

.745

ELECBOD

.011

.008

.059

1.275

.204

ORGTYPE

-.016

.052

-.015

-.302

.763

WRKENV
ACTPRCPT
SPECINT

.299
.021
.006

.043
.035
.006

.391
.032
.044

6.916
.605
.970

.000
.546
.333

R2=.647, Adjusted R2=.620, F=24.456, N=201

Visual inspections of histograms and scatterplots evidence no basis for reinterpreting the
essential underlying assumptions essential to multivariate analysis. A scatterplot on the
following page of the model’s standardized residuals and its standardized predicted
values provides a reference.
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Figure 4.6: Scatterplot, ZRESID/ZPRED, Model 3

Dependent Variable: ORGACT

Regression Standardized Residual

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3
-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

Regression Standardized Predicted Value

4.5 Model Building: Confirmation
and Reconciliation of Three Models
The three models, taken together, show only modest variation in terms of their
overall explanatory power, statistical significance and the relative order of
importance assumed by the three key independent variables. While the absolute
weighted differences among the beta coefficients of these three variables changes by
some small measure across the alternative models, WRKENV remains as the most
substantive explanation for variation in ORGACT, the dependent variable. Although
clearly important in explanatory power in each model, PUBPART does not achieve
the dominance of WRKENV.

Even with outliers removed on the basis of discrete measures, the overall fit and
integrity suggested by the initial model is unchanged. Under these circumstances,
there are no ostensible reasons for deleting any of the observations comprising the
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dataset or altering inferences based on a comparison of the roles assumed by each of
the key variables within the original regression model. With all cases retained, the
initial model has enhanced generalizability. In effect, Models 2 and 3 are
confirmations of the content and assumptions that underlie Model 1.

4.5.1 Interpretations an d Comparisons with Bivariate Analysis and Findings
The preferred model is consistent with the strongest bivariate relationships that have been
described.

For example, STABILITY, REGDOM, OTHCON, WRKENV, and

PUBPART evidence statistical significance at least at the .05 level in the preferred
model. No additional variables emerge in the in the preferred model with potential
explanatory power.

SPECLEG and LEGUNIQ -- identified in the bivariate analysis as having a statistically
significant but weak correlation to ORGACT -- decline in their importance when
incorporated in the preferred model. Neither is significant at the .10 level in the preferred
model.

These variables, however, exhibit greater importance than REVTAX and

SPECINT which display no bivariate correlation with ORGACT and virtually no
significance or explanatory power in the preferred model. SERVAREA and REGBOD
which had weak correlations with ORGACT -- but significance at the .05 level -- also
show virtually no explanatory power in the preferred model. In effect, the poorest or
weakest of the bivariate relationships with ORGACT assume similarly low explanatory
power in the preferred model.
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On balance, the character of the preferred model adopts the attributes of the bivariate
analysis. To the degree, there are differences, they appear to be immaterial to a general
interpretation of the preferred model and the role of the independent variables
contributing the greatest explanatory power.

The preferred model, viewed in the aggregate, points to the obvious importance of
political context, civic interaction and workplace setting in achieving desirable
accountable behaviors. The comments of special district executives reaffirm the
importance of transparency and communication with constituents (attributes of public
participation); communication with other governments, stewardship, consistency in
action and apolitical behaviors (attributes of stability and political dominance); along
with ethical standards, controlled expectations, reinforced behaviors, higher purpose and
favorable employment conditions (attributes of the workplace environment) in achieving
overall organizational accountability.

These attributes, though the mix is varied by

organization, represent recurring themes in shaping commitments to accountability.

The conversations with organizations evidencing high accountability indicate a greater
awareness not only about the perceptual importance of accountability but the ethical
conduct that must accompany preferred behavioral practices. Public participation is
recognized as sometimes burdensome and costly but essential to assure community
integration and organizational responsiveness. The views are balanced but lean toward a
preference for more – more involvement, more communication, more training, more
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leadership. The highly evolved organizations see accountability as requiring complex
systems in the ways envisioned by Romzek and Dubnick (1987), Behn (2001) and
Koppell (2005). The leadership in these organizations, while agreeing there may be some
confusion about which system takes precedent, however, may not necessarily agree that
the goals are always in conflict.

Organizations with lower or less accountability seem more concerned with appearances
rather than substantive measures or behaviors. Participation, for example, is practiced
because it is expected or legislated, not because of its potential for contributions. Legal
prescriptions provide cover but are not a vehicle for accomplishing organizational goals.
.
4.6 Application of Data and Analysis to
Research Questions and Hypotheses
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the importance of accountability in the
administration of special districts?
H1.1:

Perceptions about the awareness or importance of accountability will
substantially effect the overall organizational commitment to
accountably and accountable behaviors.

Although intuitively attractive as an institutional force, accountability remains
something of an abstraction. While many special district governments appear in
broad agreement that the concept is an influence in defining the ways in which
accountability shapes its organization’s programs and defines the standards by
which it is judged and interacts with its constituents, it is less clear that sensitivity
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to its importance is anything more than rhetorical, hence the minimal explanatory
power of ACTPRCPT in Model 1 and its variations. The low explanatory power of
ACTPRCPT and its failure to achieve statistical significance in any of the models
indicate that this hypothesis is properly rejected.

Ultimately, of course, this observation begs the question of whether these special
districts are or are not accountable. While perceptions of accountability may not in
themselves be a force to generate accountable behaviors, given the statistical
significance of public participation and other variables, a systematic evaluation of
accountability according to a defined standard indicates that at least sixty percent of
special districts, applying the most stringent standard of measurement, would be at
least moderately accountable. The medium standard indicates that at least forty-one
percent are generally or highly accountable by the criteria invoked here. This
standard parallels the perceptions that executive personnel have expressed about the
importance of accountability even if those perceptions do not figure strongly into its
production. “Accountability is a fundamental concept but the laws alone do not
invoke accountable behavior.”

RESEARCH QUESTION 2: In what ways, if at all, does public participation affect
organizational accountability and does its influence vary by operational or program
focus?

H2.1:

Public participation, when controlled for other internal and external
factors, is a material influence in encouraging accountable behaviors and
overall organizational accountability.
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Public participation emerges in all three of the models developed for this analysis as an
important predictor of the variability in an organization’s commitment to accountability.
In Model 1, PUBPART has a standardized coefficient of .242, and it is statistically
significant at the 0.001 level. While it shares explanatory power with other key variables
in the regression, it is among only three predictors that are instrumental in influencing
variability in ORGACT. While the weight of PUBPART’s standardized coefficient ebbs
moderately in relation to these other variables in subsequent iterations of the model, it
still retains strong explanatory power and has statistical significance at the 0.001 level.
This hypothesis is sustained.

H2.2:

The programs and operating focus of special district governments, when
controlled for other internal and external factors, are a material influence
in encouraging accountable behaviors and overall organizational
accountability.

Implicitly, there are material differences in providing, managing or creating programs
oriented to the social and physical environments.

The regression model, however,

controls for these differences in its use of the variable ORGTYPE, intended to distinguish
the emphasis of program content and orientation between districts. ORGTYPE, however,
offers little explanatory value in Model 1 or its variants and achieves no statistical
significance in any of the models. This hypothesis is rejected.
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Apparently, program focus and direction make little, if any, difference in the ways an
organization demonstrates its commitments to accountability or accountable behaviors.
The possible explanation may be as simple as understanding that it is the totality of the
workplace and the environment it creates. Based on that premise, it is compelling to think
that even diverse organizational cultures, regardless of programs and potentially the
technical skills involved, can nurture accountable behaviors if they adopt a core set of
values and practices. How accountability practices are implemented then becomes as
important as what the concept itself represents. Notes one executive, “It really doesn’t
matter what the organization does but how it does it.”
RESEARCH QUESTION 3: Are there observable differences in the way that public
participation affects each system or dimension of accountability?

H3.1:

As a means of inducing accountable behaviors, public participation is
strongly associated with the political dimension of accountability.

The bivariate analysis -- stemming from both Spearman and Pearson -- identifies
correlations between PUBPART and each of the five variables standing for the multiple
dimensions of accountability, including ADMACT, PROFACT, POLACT, MKTACT,
POLACT, and LEGACT. While the strength of these correlations varies, PUBPART
achieves a moderately strong correlation with POLACT, statistically significant at the
0.01 level. This relationship, based on the indicated value of the correlation, is of greater
strength than that achieved between PUBPART and the remaining four variables. This
hypothesis is sustained.
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H3.2:

As a means of inducing accountable behaviors, public participation is
weakly associated with the legal dimension of accountability.

As described above, the bivariate analysis identifies correlations between PUBPART and
each of the five variables standing for the multiple dimensions of accountability,
including ADMACT, PROFACT, POLACT, MKTACT, POLACT, and LEGACT. In
this instance, the correlation between PUBPART and LEGACT appears very weak
although it is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This relationship, based on the
indicated value of the correlation, is of much less strength than that achieved between
PUBPART and the remaining four variables.

Regarding the relationship between PUBPART and POLACT, one executive
observes that his district has substantial participation and the board listens. “They
are active board members so that makes them politically animated. I see no
connection between participation and legal accountability. The organization either
follows the laws set in code or it does not.” This hypothesis is sustained.

4.7 Summary
The univariate, bivariate, and multivariate procedures work together to demonstrate both
the seeming accountability of most special district governments and the value or strength
of public participation in exacting organizational accountability. There is also validity to
the claim that the influence of public participation is likely to vary across dimensions.
As the research indicates, the influence of public participation will be most evident in a
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highly politicized setting or situation, as Deleon (1998) posits, where citizen involvement
has the power to redirect resources, to create or change policy, and to bring immediate
redress or accountability.

At the same time, the analysis also indicates that other forces are at work to assure
accountability and they may not be as evident or posses the rhetorical quality implicit in a
call for enhanced citizen involvement. The work environment, in particular, emerges, as a
possible source of accountability empowerment that can respond to fundamental
principles of leadership, communication and task stimulation.

Apparently, even though a structured and systematic evaluation of their accountability
practices evidences that a material number of special districts are accountable, is not clear
that perceptions about the importance of accountability are themselves a singular factor in
the generation of accountable behaviors. If there is a conflict, it may only be the
questions posed in the analysis provoke socially desirable responses while failing to
address the materiality of the complex forces that are the real controls to accountable
behavior.

In the next chapter, the current research is discussed in terms of its contributions to the
existing literature, public administration principles, and professional practice.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Given their proliferation, independence and concentration of financial resources, special
district governments remain a relatively unexplored form of government. Even though
special districts now outnumber general purpose governments, little is known about their
behavior, administration, and responsiveness to the democratic ethos that presumably
characterizes the typical political unit.

Romzek and Dubnick’s 1987 typology has proven useful for classifying various means
and methods of seeking or assuring accountable behavior. With some modifications, their
model provides the foundations for a more robust framework used to examine the
practices that constitute various approaches to accountability in these special districts. Of
particular interest in the current research is the way in which public participation might
strengthen an organizational commitment to accountability.

The focus on public involvement as a means of assuring accountability arises from its
pivotal role in the participatory model of governance. Indeed, active participation is seen
as essential to assuring public accountability (Ashford & Rest, 1999; Balls, 2000;
Gardner, 1998), and advocates of the process such as Arnstein (1969) suggest that
governments purposely distancing themselves from engagement are inherently flawed.
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The normative values associated with an engaged citizenry as the fulcrum on which
accountable behaviors balance comprise the bedrock on which most of our democratic
institutions are constructed. Nonetheless, the relationship between accountable behaviors
and the force of citizen action is understood almost exclusively at a procedural level. The
current study provides an opportunity to explore the relationship between citizens and the
institutions perceived to be controlled through participatory processes and to analyze the
specific behavioral systems in place in America’s devolved system of special purpose
governments.

In this chapter, the current research is summarized and the findings are discussed in the
context of their implications for special districts, the role of public participation as a
democratic tool, and the ways in which special district governments respond to the
pressures of participation and calls for accountable behaviors. The findings documented
in this dissertation are important ones, and they are described in terms of their
contributions to the literature and to the practice of public administration.

5.1 Summary of Findings
This dissertation poses three research questions related to special districts, their attitudes
about accountability generally, and the procedural form of accountability as it might
be influenced by public participation and practiced by special purpose governments.

186



RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the importance of accountability in the
administration of special districts?



RESEARCH QUESTION 2: In what ways, if at all, does public participation
affect organizational accountability and does its influence vary by
operational or program focus?



RESEARCH QUESTION 3: Are there observable differences in the way that
public participation affects each system or dimension of accountability?

The first question is investigated in this research through a series of inquiries that probe
organizational attitudes regarding the importance of accountability to public perception,
the quality of work, program efficiency, general work ethos, and public trust. Viewing
this series of inquiries as a group, at least 63.4 percent of the respondents indicated that
accountability was a material factor in achieving these various functional or practical
objectives. Further, only 4.3 percent of the respondents indicated that the rules in place to
assure accountable behavior are difficult or cumbersome to follow. In effect, we see an
organizational culture attuned to the value of accountable behavior to advancing
organizational goals and priorities, both internally and externally. Possibly as important,
these special district governments are not dissuaded from their attitudes by a bureaucratic
structure that might frustrate desirable behaviors or practices.

These perceptions apparently parallel the reality of accountability even if it is unclear that
perceptions themselves are instrumental in the production of accountability. Despite the
harsh criticisms levied against special districts and encompassing a broad range of
undesirable practices, the current research offers the prospect that these governments are,
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in fact, accountable. Applying the medium classification scheme described in Chapter 4,
at least 12.4 percent of the sample group would be considered highly accountable and
more than forty-one percent would be considered generally or highly accountable. The
higher percentage tracks responses from district personnel about various symbolic and
functional aspects of accountability. Using the medium standard no more than 6.3 percent
would be considered unaccountable. Under the most stringent standards of measurement
no more than 22.1 percent would be deemed unaccountable. The criticisms of special
districts seem largely unfounded, and the analysis may offer some evidence that
privatization initiatives by themselves do not erode democratization.

The second research question is the foundation on which this analysis rests. In three
variations of the model, public participation (PUBPART) is statistically significant at the
0.001 level as a predictor of an organization’s commitment to accountable behavior. In
conjunction with the nature of the workplace environment (WRKENV) and the political
context in which the organization exists (REGDOM), public participation emerges as one
of the three key variables in the model that explain the variability in organizational
accountability (ORGACT). While there may be perceptions that groups with a social or
humanist centered mission will more naturally respond to demands of accountability by
vigorously incorporating public participation in their program activities, the analysis
evidences virtually no statistical indication that accountability is a function of program
focus. Again, in three iterations of the model, ORGTYPE shows neither explanatory
power or statistical significance.
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Finally, the third research question probes the way in which participation influences
specific dimensions of accountability.

The bivariate relationships indicate that the

strongest relationships exist between PUBPART and PROFACT, PUBPART and
POLACT.

The weakest relationships exist between PUBPART and LEGACT,

PUBPART and ADMACT, generally as posited in the model. There is at least the
inference that an organization’s politically propagated behavioral controls intended to
instill accountable behavior respond to public participation.

5.2 Voices and Participation
The models developed for this analysis indicate the relationship between public
participation and organizational accountability, both at the latter’s broadest level and at
its more discrete levels represented by the multiple forms of behavior originally described
by Romzek and Dubnick (1987).

These are important findings that underpin the

rhetorical value of participation in the American system of governance. Because the
analysis considers public participation in terms of many dimensions -- in the current
research these dimensions include participation’s accessibility, permeability and
transparency -- the process has a rich conceptualization that goes beyond intuitive and
emotional claims. Across a broad spectrum of special district governments, roundly
criticized for their apparently poor accountability practices, it has been determined that
public participation heightens an organization’s commitment to accountability. This
conclusion has tremendous implications for the management of these and other units that
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must balance the demands imposed by participation and the calls to be programmatically
and financially efficient. Studying these potentially competing demands in the special
district setting automatically centers attention on program efficiency because these
organizations are fundamentally defined by their program content.

What also emerges from this research is that public participation by itself may not be
adequate to assure the full range of accountable behaviors even if process is fully
developed and administered. Something more may be needed, especially if the trade-offs
between efficiency and cost, for example, are to be adequately managed.

Given the specific meaning of participation as used here, the analysis also offers some
evidence that an enriched and well-organized work environment -- one in which
employees and managers see each other as team members devoted to a common series of
objectives -- can be a potent indicator of an organization’s predilection to pursue
accountable behaviors as well. There is at least the inference that highly motivated,
properly paid, and intellectually challenged employees will collectively work for the
constituencies represented by their respective organizations, even absent the well crafted
public participation sequence. In this rubric, the emphasis is centered on the value of the
organization’s personnel and expectations that they set for themselves.

In a fertile

environment, the proper behavioral forms are nurtured and grow without rigidly
structured form. Though participation sustains the voice of its democratically centered
claimants, other vehicles may exist for accomplishing similar objectives.
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Ideologically, the merits of participation as a precursor to transparency are difficult to
refute given a substantial body of literature citing its value in trust building, information
exchange, and satisfaction.

The literature is rich with the importance of broadly

inclusionary participation invigorated through unlimited access to pertinent information
(Bockmeyer, 2000; O’Donovan, 2002; Ryan, 2002; Tauxe, 1995). Given the promises of
favorable results from both an ideological and a practical standpoint, the image of an
engaged public is intuitively compelling.

Unfortunately, it is not proven, other than through incidental observation, that public
participation necessarily yields better outcomes (Linder, 2001) or more accountability in
special purpose or general purpose governments. The assumed rationale for citizen
participation may be based on both unfounded and idealized expectations about the
citizen’s role in the functioning of the state (Kettl, 1996; King and Stivers, 1998) that tax
the very limits of the participatory and representative models.

Boundaries for participation exist even if they have yet to be recognized fully by those
evoking the concept exclusively on normative grounds (Benveniste, 1989). It seems
reasonable to assume that any mechanism that implements public participation
necessarily must compromise what might otherwise be the best means to assure adequate
time, attention, and resources to the widest range of issues. Inevitably, a balance must be
achieved between rational decision making where costs are always a consideration and
democratic decision making where societal values are the hard currency.
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While it may not be a popular idea to confront a fundamental belief in democratization,
participation’s real utility -- beyond visceral enhancement -- may be limited in large part
by the notions described originally in The Federalist Papers (Kramnick, 1987). That is, a
fundamental lack of time, commitment, and expertise to address the issues at hand cloud
its value except in isolated situations. Such situations, according to Deleon (1998), are
those that lack obvious resources or means of resolution. Those situations respond to a
collective voice by airing new ideas, establishing new priorities and redirecting resources.
In the case of special districts, their routinized situations would mitigate the need for
participation, just as the professional skills of special district staff engaged in a technical
specialty presumably obviates the need for engagement in the course of normal service
provision. Employees well trained, directed and aware of their missions may be capable
of achieving the desired results without outside intervention, at least in the short term.

Public participation may invigorate democratization, but the present research suggests it
is not an absolute prerequisite to accountability unless involvement is defined in the
broadest possible terms to include virtually any form of interaction.

This line of

reasoning leads to the conclusion that the narrowly ordered purpose of certain bodies may
reduce the need for public participation if there is a particular emphasis on administrative
means of control which, as indicated by the model, are the least responsive to public
participation. Thomas (1990, 1993), in his protocol for policy deliberation, makes this
distinction for general purpose governments and it would seem to have application here.
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The limited literature specific to special districts (Bollens, 1961; Burns, 1994; Foster,
1997; Mitchell, 1992,1999; Walsh, 1978) maintains that these governments are less likely
than their general government counterparts to engage citizens in active dialogues
regarding agenda setting and policy making, actions associated with public participation
that could be the foundation for a system of accountable behavior. The activities of
special districts, certainly in many cases, are of such a narrow technical nature that they
may not warrant or attract public input in the ways that their critics insist are necessary.
Foster (1997), for example, observes that the course and direction of special district
programs is set within their legislative framework (Foster, 1997) implying that their
mission, while potentially altered by participation may in certain cases be independent of
such processes.

Though desirable in western civic culture, openness and accessibility should not be
confused with public involvement that has forced interaction as its primary objective. To
achieve the desired accountability that is the focus of the current research, public
participation must be rich and multi-dimensional as the process is conceived here. At the
very least, the current analysis seems to imply that institutional commitments toward
accountability need not depend exclusively on public participation to assure that there are
no commensurate reductions in transparency, legitimacy, or program outcomes.
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5.3 Accountability of Special Districts
Bollens (1961), Henriques (1986), and Walsh (1978) among others contend that special
districts are not accountable, reasoning in large part that their independent form and nonpublic style of administration together preclude accountable behaviors while encouraging
corrupt or delinquent behaviors. Their perspectives express the sentiment that general
purpose governments adhere to a more rigid standard of behavioral compliance because
of their broad constituencies and opportunities for citizen input through multiple points of
access. In effect, their claims are an indictment of non-electoral schemes of governance.

Their disapproval of this form of government may be unjustifiably harsh and imbalanced
based on the evidence that is assembled. The charges against special districts have
something of an ideological foundation that pits the participatory and representative
forms of democratization against one another, claiming the inherent dysfunction of the
latter. Excepting Foster’s (1997) detailed work, the literature is primarily anecdotal or
illustrative and appears at odds with the wide body of evidence collected in the current
research.

Just as there are examples of poorly managed business affairs, there are

examples of productive and well implemented programs provided by special district
governments.

The charges against special purpose implicitly promote the general

purpose government as the superior form of government. The academic and popular
literature report glaring flaws, corruption or declining trust in these units that cast some
doubt on their abilities in a contemporary setting stressed by time, competing constructs
and profusion of information and ideas.
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If anything the data favorably suggest that these governments may satisfy their functions
within accepted democratic principles. Their independent structure is a visible target for
attack but the evidence indicates that the totality of accountability and the way in which it
is implemented are properly the focus of scrutiny, not the structural integrity of the legal
arrangement that breathes life into these governments.

Accountability is essential to legitimate governance regardless of its form but a broadly
conceived normative scale may be inadequate for dealing with ideas beyond those that
constitute a core value system. At the very least, the independent structure and
application of the special district suggest that the complexities of accountability described
by Romzek and Dubnick (1987) may have attributes different from those of the general
purpose government. Legislation creating the special district intentionally diverts the
structure away from the conventions of the traditional general purpose government to
accomplish an intended mission or scope of activities.

The criticism of special districts appears focused on the wrong set of issues. It is not
diversion that is problematic but the abdication of responsibility to an affected
constituency (Adams, 1998). Research completed by Sinclair (1995) concludes that
public officials acknowledge the importance of accountability, sometimes shaping its
requirements to suit a value system that comports to their own personal and professional
value systems. In the current analysis, the leadership of the responding special districts
have uniformly identified accountability as an important management objective. Because
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their independent form insulates these organizations from political control, the
conceptualization of accountability may be more important to a special district
government than it is to a general purpose government with an established history of
direct electoral participation.

5.4 Implications for Public Administrators
Berman and Wang (2000), together and individually, (Berman, 1997; Wang, 2002b) have
written extensively about the need for performance measurement systems to guide,
assuage and reinforce specific behaviors that advance organizational objectives. Berman
(1997), in particular, notes that performance measures are a way of avoiding the
mediocrity and cynicism that distract so many government units from their principal
missions. The current analysis seems to reinforce and to broaden those findings by
reasserting the primacy of communication tools and workplace controls as the
institutional variables most influential in shaping the conduct of employees.

This interpretation of prior work should come as no surprise but the concept of behavioral
encouragement or reinforcement has not been thought of in terms specific to cultivating
participation skills or developing mechanisms for accountability. To the degree that
techniques of performance measurement are incorporated into organizational
management, it may be appropriate to integrate measures that consider various indicators
of accountable behaviors. For executive staff, those indicators may relate to the attitudes
they display openly and consistently, expecting staff to emulate. A priority would include
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positive attitudes toward open governance and participation, an authentic rather than a
contrived or token form, that recognizes its intended purpose is to provoke, distill and
advise not just confirm. For staff, indicators may simply relate to the way in which
routine activities or functions are executed on behalf of affected constituencies.

Whatever the importance of performance measurement as a means of monitoring
employee behaviors, the analysis offers evidence that it is not the process of measurement
that is itself the means of encouraging the proper behaviors. To be clear, performance
measurement is only the vehicle used to gauge the organizational practices that are the
most critical to performance and accountability. The process of establishing those
standards is much more cumbersome. To assure that the workplace environment is
maintained in a form conducive to both accountable behavior and performance,
leadership must be sensitive to general physical conditions, workplace ethics, payroll,
advancement opportunity, general fairness, deportment, and other work centered
concerns which together comprise the favorable work setting.

While participation and workplace conditions prove themselves valuable in creating
accountable employees, simple legal measures prove less dependable (Cooper, 1998).
Mandates may establish minimal thresholds for practice and reporting, but today’s
leadership cannot protect their organizations behind a battery of legal controls that may
only ensnare the culpable by accident rather than by design. Legal devices confer
legitimacy but they do not assure it even if the controls are easily abided. All too often, as
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Romzek and Dubnick describe, legal controls are layered atop of other controls when
outcomes are different than anticipated.

Specific to special districts, it might be worthwhile to emphasize accountability and
transparency in public communications with affected constituencies. While the analysis
suggests engagement is one among a battery of influences, participation remains among
the key variables in the model in advancing organizational commitments to
accountability. Further, the literature offers evidence that participation does promote
satisfaction in decision making which is itself a beneficial goal of the process. The point
to be made here, however, is that the fullness and richness of the public participation
process as recited in the literature may not always be necessary, hence the purpose of
market, administrative and professional controls. Open and continued communication, on
the other hand, is probably a minimal requirement of transparency. Absent regular,
balanced communication every special district may be exposed to claims that the
information it distributes is either selective, self-serving or both. These charges, even
when baseless, inevitably generate defensiveness, potentially causing the special district
to withdraw even further from minimal engagement. If accountability is about the
management of expectations, then any failure to act affirmatively always invites scrutiny
premised on information ostensibly withheld because it was unfavorable or damaging.
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Linking management practices to public participation, it then seems prudent to reward
staff and leaders that are open about the organization’s activities. A setting in which
information is available and freely flowing may do much to create the favorable
workplace environment in which accountability, as well as employee performance, are
enhanced.

5.5 Suggestions for Future Research
Any of the key variables in the model offer the prospect for richer research and
perspective. If the workplace environment is so important in establishing a context for
accountable behaviors, then it makes sense to delve in greater detail into those elements
of the environment that can be isolated, controlled or redirected. As described, existing
research touches various aspects about the workplace environment but not in a way that
illuminates the connection to accountability. Similarly, the current model offers the
prospect that special district governments, politically dominant in their respective
settings, will demonstrate a greater organizational commitment to accountability. Again,
it is worth understanding how this political positioning has occurred, if it occurs in
conjunction with some extraordinary oversight or regulatory role, or if is dependent upon
some special technical expertise peculiar to a franchise, resource or provisioning process.
We still know very little about which types of government units are the most accountable.
While there are indications that special districts may not confirm to normative concepts
of accountability, it is not clear that general purpose governments, when pressed on some
broad level, will yield behaviors that are more supportive of our democratic ethos. A
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research effort targeted to chief executive officers in both special purpose and general
purpose governments that inquiries about comparable practices would offer insight into
electoral and non-electoral schemes that would validate apparent claims about their
respective commitments to the litany of behaviors associated with accountability.

Program outcomes are among the principal reasons cited for increased public
participation but they are also a justification for establishing an accountability regime.
Although not a concern of this analysis, an examination that probes the satisfaction of
program outcomes in terms of their dependence or linkage to accountability systems
would offer valuable insight into the ways organizations manage their activities when
facing different accountability devices. At this point, we simply do not whether program
performance is affected or not by the presence of accountable behaviors.

Conversations with representatives from a few of the governments responding to the
survey instrument indicate a crisis in leadership or programs may be an instrumental
control variable that is worth exploring. Although some aspects of institutional memory
would seem to be implied by the age of the organization -- which most people reported -a more focused effort exploring potential events that redirected or reshaped perceptions
about the need for accountability could prove valuable to administrators.
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5.6 Limitations of the Current Study
In this analysis public participation is conceived in the broadest procedural or terms
possible. The emphasis is on the frequency and intensity of interaction. Given many
widely dissimilar efforts to measure the effectiveness of various participation
processes in previous case studies, there may simply be other aspects of
participation required to capture its full process value. Because participation has yet
to be explored in special districts, the more pertinent issue at this level is whether
these governments provide an environment in which participation, however it is
defined, can be realized.

In this study, the unit of analysis is the organization itself. The research effort is
dependent upon the responses of chief administrative officers at the identified
special district governments as representatives of those bodies. Controls have been
imposed to assure that it is this administrative officer who speaks for the special
district government in question and almost eighty-eight percent of the respondents
identified themselves as chief executives or the most senior staff. Still, it can never
be confirmed that the views reported are those of that officer rather than a
designated staff person.

The bigger challenge, at the organizational level, is

confirming that the reported perceptions accurately gauge the sentiments among all
key staff. Because the analysis is an exploration of administrative viewpoints, the
replies would seem to reflect the apparent environment in which the opinions are
offered.
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It may have been appropriate to solicit more detailed demographic data about the
specific respondents even though the organization was the subject of analysis. Staff
with a longer period of employment history may have answered certain questions
differently, assuming varied institutional knowledge. Although the paper does not
discuss operating history, for example, the survey instrument did query about the
age of each organization which would stand for its maturity and its evolved
institutional memory. In a brief exploratory analysis, preparatory to the models
documented, age indicated no association with any other variables.

The literature suggests definitional issues in the population of special districts that
may result in a sampling error. Among the group of 35,000 governments, those
without staff or financial resources seem unlikely to contribute to an understanding
of these governments as vehicles for governance.

The purposeful focus of this

research on those districts that comprise about ninety per cent of special district
finances would seem to address that limitation. Further, among those remaining
there is representation from a wide variety of industries and specializations that
might mitigate sampling error. As shown in a discussion of the sampling frame,
there was no obvious bias based on function or size even though the analysis
focuses on this seemingly small group of special district governments.
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The conceptualizations involving accountability and its subsystems may be another
limitation.

The analysis treats the many subsystems as the equivalent of

dimensions, and the research is entirely dependent upon the work of Romzek and
Dubnick (1987) to give these dimensions form. Together, these dimensions imply
that greater or lesser accountability is defined by these varied aspects in their
totality. In the most democratic schemes of accountability where all dimensions of
accountability integrate with public participation, this is a defensible position that
extends the reasoning already posited in the literature.

Still, the intended

measurement of accountability may be an invalid construction.

Finally, of course, it is virtually impossible to identify the full range of
organizational and environmental influences that impact accountability. In an
attempt to generalize to this type of government, it seems inevitable that there are
material differences deeply embedded in the state and local legislation that have
created these bodies. While it is likely that these differences were not fully
addressed in the survey instrument, the effort attempts to capture the nuances of
varied operating history, legislative form, and legal constraints that vary from state
to state. As noted in Chapter 2, there are marked differences in the numbers of
these governments across states that hint at the distinctions in needs, policies and
structure that will influence their response to accountability and certain required
controls.
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APPENDIX A: COMPARISONS BETWEEN SPECIAL PURPOSE AND
GENERAL PURPOSE GOVERNMENTS
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Table A.1: Features Distinguishing Special Districts from General
Purpose Governments, Focusing on Their General Powers

General Powers
General Purpose Governments

Special Purpose Governments

Relatively broad and fluid
Geographically specific

May be geographically specific but more
likely to be service specific

Powers most likely to originate with State

Powers defined by enabling legislation but
may not be discrete
Customer centered
Board involvement (legislative) but
management vested in administrative authority
(executive)
Activities highly techno centered with board
providing guidance primarily on policy

Citizen centered
Obvious separation of powers between
executive and legislative functions
Visible dynamic between legislative and
administrative functions on range of issues
Broad taxing powers
Broad revenue generating capabilities
Substantial capacity to act as a principal in a
broad range of legal matters

Specific taxing and revenue powers

Unspecified life
Broad objectives but no specific mission

Statutory life may be of limited duration
Stipulated objectives and presumably specified
mission

Legal capacity to act likely to be specific
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Table A.2: Features Distinguishing Special Districts from General
Purpose Governments, Focusing on Their Decision Making Processes
Decision Making
General Purpose Governments

Special Purpose Governments

Electoral centered

Technology centered

May employ referenda
Directly responsive to political actors broadly
elected

Membership to board often based on staggered
terms to avoid political influences. Board
members are usually appointed, rather than
elected

Representative based on broad constituency
demands

Board members may come from specified
inertest groups or specified constituencies

Referenda may be initiated by citizen actions
Purposefully inclusive
All citizens able to participate
Characterized by one man/one vote

Likely to be exclusionary
Balloting on issues may be based on
proportionate to ownership of property

Wide range of issues debated in public forums
A specific type of public participation not
typically mandated
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Agenda tends to be narrowly construed
In some cases, public participation of a certain
type is legislated

Table A.3: Features Distinguishing Special Districts from General Purpose
Governments, Focusing on the Nature of Their Public Services
Public Services
General Purpose Governments

Special Purpose Governments

Broadly distributed

Distributed or provided to a specific
constituency

All citizens have entitlements or experience
distributional effects
Based on widest possible concept of public
interest
Extensive involvement in activities concerned
with general health safety and welfare
Keyed to vague quality of life considerations

Keyed to specific considerations about
efficiency and effectiveness

Table A.4: Features Distinguishing Special Districts from General Purpose
Governments, Focusing on Their Orientation toward the Public Interest
Public Interest
General Purpose Governments

Special Purpose Governments

May vary depending upon issues

Relatively narrow based upon mission

Multi-dimensional constituencies but
geographically defined
Governmental responsibilities extend to all
citizens
Citizen one with the jurisdiction

Issues may be multi dimensional but
constituencies are small and the mission is
defined
Responsibilities focus on a specific
constituency
Metaphorically, citizens are customers

Legal standing is broad

Legal standing is based on "private acts"
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Table A.5: Features Distinguishing Special Districts from General
Purpose Governments, Focusing on Their Range of Fiscal Powers

Fiscal Powers
General Purpose Governments

Special Purpose Governments

Relatively broad financial power and spending
authority
Varied financial resources available

Focus primarily on enterprise activities
Broad financial tools available but resources
are relatively limited

Not restricted to enterprise or similarly oriented
activities
GO debt may require referenda
Subject to legislative and executive discussions
and debate
Accounting principles have only recently
introduced concept of "useful life" for major
assets
Subject to extensive public disclosure

No GO debt
Insular budgetary authority
Accounting practices similar to private industry

Public disclosure not systematically employed
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APPENDIX B: HISTOGRAMS ASSOCIATED WITH KEY VARIABLES
ANALYZED
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Figure 4.1: Histograms Associated with Key Variables Analyzed
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Figure 4.1H: ELECBOD
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